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Design Defects
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*

I. INTRODUCTION
The concept of design defectiveness lies at the heart of products liability
law. A product’s design concept predetermines the extent to which use of the
product will result in human injury, and modern products liability law rests
fundamentally on the premise that manufacturers are fairly held to answer in
the courts for the basic safety of their products’ designs. Yet judicial oversight of a manufacturer’s design choices is a relatively new phenomenon.
Design defect claims under any theory of liability were infrequently entertained by courts early in the twentieth century,1 and only in recent decades
have courts begun to adjudicate with any frequency the reasonableness of
product designs in accident litigation.
Finding an acceptable definition for what constitutes a “defective” design is a difficult task. Elusive as an elf, the true meaning of “design defect”
has largely escaped capture by court or commentator, and the search therefor
leads inexorably to consternation and confusion. The quest for understanding
design defectiveness perennially vexes courts2 and accomplished products
* Carolina Distinguished Professor of Law, University of South Carolina.
Another version of this article appears in DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW
ch. 8 (2d ed. 2008), © Thomson/West 2008. Research and editorial help was provided by Karen Miller. The article is dedicated to Professor David Fischer whose
scholarship on tort law generally, and products liability law in particular, has advanced these fields immeasurably.
1. For a small handful of early examples, see Fleming James, Jr., Products
Liability (pt. 1), 34 TEX. L. REV. 44, 50 (1955).
2. For the views of Chief Justice Roger Traynor, who argued for, adopted, and
explained strict products liability in tort, see Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150
P.2d 436, 461-68 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring), Greenman v. Yuba Power
Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963), and Roger J. Traynor, The Ways and Meanings
of Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32 TENN. L. REV. 363 (1965). Judicial
confusion over design defectiveness was not just a phenomenon of early products
liability law. From the 1970s, see, for example, Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 525
P.2d 1033, 1035 (Or. 1974) (“courts continue to flounder while attempting to determine how one decides whether a product is ‘in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user’”). From the 1980s, see, for example, Prentis v. Yale Mfg. Co.,
365 N.W.2d 176, 182 (Mich. 1984) (“questions related to ‘design defects’ and the
determination of when a product is defective, because of the nature of its design,
appear to be the most agitated and controversial issues before the courts in the field of
products liability”). From the 1990s, see, for example, Denny v. Ford Motor Co., 662
N.E.2d 730, 739, 740 (N.Y. 1995) (Simons, J., dissenting) (“the word ‘defect’ has no
clear legal meaning”). From the 2000s, see, for example, Jarvis v. Ford Motor Co.
283 F.3d 33, 63 (2d Cir. 2002) (N.Y. law) (noting “the unsettled nature of the law in
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liability lawyers3 attempting to unravel design defect problems; delights law
clerks,4 young associates,5 and law students6 furnishing them with an occasion to display their erudition; and provides fertile grist for law professors7
this area”); Pritchett v. Cottrell, Inc., 512 F.3d 1057, 1063 (8th Cir. 2008) (Kan. and
Mo. law) (“‘the determination of when a product is actionable because of the nature
of its design’” is one of “‘the most agitated controversial question[s]’ that courts face
in the field of products liability law”); Blue v. Env’t Eng’g, Inc., 828 N.E.2d 1128,
1153 (Ill. 2005) (three judges specially concurring, one judge concurring in part and
dissenting in part). See also Robert P. Murrian, Products Liability – Tennessee’s
Prudent Manufacturer Test, 67 TENN. L. REV. 307 (2000) (article written by a magistrate judge).
3. For a small sampling of the large literature on design defectiveness written
by the practicing bar, see, for example, Philip H. Corboy, The Not-So-Quiet Revolution: Rebuilding Barriers to Jury Trial in the Proposed Restatement (Third) of Torts:
Products Liability, 61 TENN. L. REV. 1043, 1087-99 (1994); Warren Freedman, “Defect” in the Product: The Necessary Basis for Products Liability, 33 TENN. L. REV.
323 (1966); Paul Rheingold, The Risk/Utility Test in Product Cases, 18 TRIAL L.Q. 49
(Summer/Fall 1987) [hereinafter Rheingold, Risk/Utility Test]; Paul Rheingold, What
are the Consumer’s “Reasonable Expectations”?, 22 BUS. LAW. 589 (1967); Victor
E. Schwartz & Rochelle M. Tedesco, The Re-Emergence of “Super Strict” Liability:
Slaying the Dragon Again, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 917 (2003); John F. Vargo, The Emperor’s New Clothes: The American Law Institute Adorns a “New Cloth” for Section
402A Products Liability Design Defects – A Survey of the States Reveals a Different
Weave, 26 U. MEM. L. REV. 493 (1996).
4. See, e.g., Peter J. Ausili, Ramifications of Denny v. Ford Motor Co., 15
TOURO L. REV. 735 (1999) (law clerk to Eastern District of New York Judge Wexler);
Elizabeth C. Price, Toward a Unified Theory of Products Liability: Reviving the
Causative Concept of Legal Fault, 61 TENN. L. REV. 1277, 1319-25 (1994) (law clerk
to Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Judge King); Robert F. Thompson, The Arkansas
Products Liability Statute: What Does “Unreasonably Dangerous” Mean in Arkansas?, 50 ARK. L. REV. 663 (1998) (law clerk to Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals Chief
Judge Arnold); Frank J. Vandall & Joshua F. Vandall, A Call for An Accurate Restatement (Third) of Torts: Design Defect, 33 U. MEM. L. REV. 909 (2003) (Joshua
Vandall law clerk to Chatham County Judge Ginsberg).
5. See, e.g., Schwartz & Tedesco, supra note 3 (Tedesco); Matthew R. Wilmot,
Baseball Bats in the High Tech Era: A Products Liability Look at New Technology,
Aluminum Bats, and Manufacturer Liability, 16 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 353 (2006).
6. The law reviews are filled with hundreds of student commentaries on the
meaning of defectiveness in products liability law. Perhaps the most valuable student
work was a two-part article, prepared by Richard Wilson for his LL.M. thesis under
the supervision of Dean William Prosser and Professor Albert Ehrenzweig at the
University of California, Berkeley. See Richard G. Wilson, Products Liability (pts. 1
& 2), 43 CAL. L. REV. 614, 809, 810-35 (1955) (exploring the meaning of product
defectiveness).
7. For early excursions by the law professors into the quagmire of design defectiveness, see, for example, Reed Dickerson, Products Liability: How Good Does a
Product Have to Be?, 42 IND. L.J. 301 (1967); James A. Henderson, Jr., Judicial
Review of Manufacturers’ Conscious Design Choices: The Limits of Adjudication, 73
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aspiring for the renown that accompanies discovery of the key to any riddle
wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma.8
Just as strict liability in tort is the dominant liability theory in major
products liability litigation, design defectiveness is the dominant claim in

COLUM. L. REV. 1531, 1534, 1538 (1973); Page Keeton, Products Liability – Current
Developments, 40 TEX. L. REV. 193, 210 (1961) [hereinafter Keeton, Current Developments]; Page Keeton, Products Liability: Liability Without Fault and the Requirement of a Defect, 41 TEX. L. REV. 855 (1963) [hereinafter Keeton, Liability Without
Fault]; John W. Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 SW. L.J. 5 (1965)
[hereinafter Wade, Strict Tort Liability]; John W. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort
Liability for Products, 44 MISS. L.J. 825, 837-38 (1973) [hereinafter Wade, On the
Nature] (setting forth his famous seven factors). At a very early date, Professor Karl
Llewellyn referred to design defects in defining “defect” in Revised Uniform Sales
Act § 1(b) cmt. b (2d draft 1941), cited in Richard G. Wilson, Products Liability (pt.
2), 43 CAL. L. REV. 809, 810 n.7 (1955).
For a sampling of recent additions to the ever-burgeoning literature on design
defects from legal academics, see, for example, C. JOHN MILLER & RICHARD S.
GOLDBERG, PRODUCT LIABILITY ch. 11 (2d ed. 2004) (British law); Mary J. Davis,
Design Defect Liability: In Search of a Standard of Responsibility, 39 WAYNE L. REV.
1217 (1993); Michael D. Green, The Schizophrenia of Risk-Benefit Analysis in Design
Defect Litigation, 48 VAND. L. REV. 609 (1995); James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D.
Twerski, Closing the American Products Liability Frontier: The Rejection of Liability
Without Defect, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1263 (1991); Douglas A. Kysar, The Expectations
of Consumers, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1700 (2003); Keith C. Miller, Myth Surrenders to
Reality: Design Defect Litigation in Iowa, 51 DRAKE L. REV. 549 (2003); David G.
Owen, Toward a Proper Test for Design Defectiveness: “Micro-Balancing” Costs
and Benefits, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1661 (1997) [hereinafter Owen, Toward a Proper Test];
David G. Owen, Defectiveness Restated: Exploding the “Strict” Products Liability
Myth, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 743 [hereinafter Owen, Defectiveness Restated]; Jerry J.
Phillips, The Unreasonably Unsafe Product and Strict Liability, 72 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 129 (1996), reprinted in 72 TENN. L. REV. 833 (2005); Gerald F. Tietz, Strict
Products Liability, Design Defects and Corporate Decision-Making: Greater Deterrence Through Stricter Process, 38 VILL. L. REV. 1361 (1993); Aaron D. Twerski,
Chasing the Illusory Pot of Gold at the End of the Rainbow: Negligence and Strict
Liability in Design Defect Litigation, 90 MARQ. L. REV. 7 (2006); Frank J. Vandall,
The Restatement (Third) of Torts, Products Liability, Section 2(b): Design Defect, 68
TEMP. L. REV. 167 (1995); Vandall & Vandall, supra note 4; Richard W. Wright, The
Principles of Product Liability, 26 REV. LITIG. 1067 (2007).
Professor David Fischer propitiously began his long career of distinguished
legal scholarship with an insightful article on design defectiveness, published in this
journal, David A. Fischer, Products Liability – The Meaning of Defect, 39 MO. L.
REV. 339 (1974), followed five years later with another important design defect article, David A. Fischer, Products Liability – Functionally Imposed Strict Liability, 32
OKLA. L. REV. 93 (1979).
8. Design defectiveness in the 2000s may be somewhat less inscrutable than
was Russia in the late 1930s, but Winston Churchill’s inimitable characterization
nevertheless seems apt.
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most major products liability cases.9 Manufacturer design determinations
involve a multitude of safety-related choices, including decisions on the types
and strengths of raw materials and component parts, the manner in which
such materials and parts are combined, whether safety devices will be included, and the overall product concept. A frequent claim of design defectiveness is the absence of some type of adequate safety device, such as a sufficient housing surrounding a power lawnmower,10 a mechanical guard or
electrical interlock cut-off device on a dangerous machine,11 or a “safety” on
a gun.12 Much automotive products liability litigation challenges the design
of motor vehicles, including the extent to which their designs are sufficiently
“crashworthy” to provide their occupants adequate protection in the event of
a crash.13 In addition to such typical design danger claims, numerous other
forms of design hazards may give rise to claims of defectiveness – such as
allergenic latex gloves, fabrics not treated with flame-retardant chemicals,
drain cleaners comprised of unnecessarily caustic chemicals, products whose
moving parts are made of metal too soft to last throughout the product’s useful life, tampons that are too absorbent, coffee that is too hot, raw asbestos

9. An insurance industry study of large claims (in excess of $100,000) some
time ago revealed that strict liability design defects was the principal claim in 75% of
such cases. See LAWRENCE W. SOULAR, A STUDY OF LARGE PRODUCT LIABILITY
CLAIMS CLOSED IN 1985 (1986) (a joint study of the Alliance of American Insurers
and the American Insurance Association).
10. See, e.g., Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 395 A.2d 843 (N.H. 1978) (strict
tort action against manufacturer of rotary lawn mower for injuries from slipping under
mower that rear trailing guard could have prevented).
11. See, e.g., Burke v. Spartanics, Ltd., 252 F.3d 131 (2d Cir. 2001) (N.Y. law)
(no rear guard on metal shearing machine); Gould v. Rexon Indus. Corp., No. 3:05CV-374, 2006 WL 2301852, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 8, 2006) (table saw designed with
removable blade guard); Daley v. Gemini Bakery Equip. Co., 643 N.Y.S.2d 106
(App. Div. 1996) (safety interlock on dough dividing machine would have turned
machine off when door was opened); Knitz v. Minster Mach. Co., No. L-84-125,
1987 WL 6486 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 09, 1987) (interlock gate guard on press would
have prevented ram from descending on operator’s hand).
12. See, e.g., Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. Day, 594 P.2d 38 (Alaska 1979), modified
on other grounds, 615 P.2d 621 (Alaska 1980); Halliday v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 792
A.2d 1145 (Md. 2002).
13. See, e.g., Connelly v. Hyundai Motor Co., 351 F.3d 535 (1st Cir. 2003) (N.H.
law) (child killed by deployment of front-seat airbag); Gen. Motors Corp. v. McGee,
837 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (fuel tank vulnerable to impact, fuel leakage, and fire); Shipler v. Gen. Motors Corp., 710 N.W.2d 807 (Neb. 2006) (passenger rendered quadriplegic when vehicle’s roof crushed inward in rollover accident). Automotive products liability litigation is treated in DAVID G. OWEN,
PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW ch. 17 (2d ed. 2008).
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comprised of toxic fibers, and tell-tale mechanical heart valves that emit excessive noise.14
In the early stages of modern products liability law, courts commonly
viewed the notion of product “defectiveness” as embracing a single principle
applicable to any type of case.15 As products liability law has matured,16
however, most courts17 and commentators18 have come to understand that
14. See, e.g., Bravman v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 984 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1993)
(N.Y. law) (noisy mechanical heart valve); Toner v. Lederle Labs., 828 F.2d 510 (9th
Cir. 1987) (Idaho law) (DPT vaccine should have been formulated in safer manner);
Apels v. Murjani Int’l Ltd., No. 83-1546, 1986 WL 122176 (D. Kan. Aug. 27, 1986)
(composition of blouse fabric, 80% cotton and 20% polyester, excessively flammable); Drayton v. Jiffee Chem. Corp., 395 F. Supp. 1081 (N.D. Ohio 1975) (formulation of drain cleaner as 26% lye unnecessarily caustic), modified, 591 F.2d 352 (6th
Cir. 1978); Morson v. Superior Court, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d 343 (Ct. App. 2001) (same);
Arena v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 580 (Ct. App. 1998) (toxic
raw asbestos dust inhaled by naval shipyard worker); West v. Johnson & Johnson
Prods., Inc., 220 Cal. Rptr. 437 (Ct. App. 1985) (extra-high absorbency tampons
caused toxic shock syndrome); Hilliard v. A.H. Robins Co., 196 Cal. Rptr. 117 (Ct.
App. 1983) (Dalkon Shield IUD, with multifilament tail string, facilitated migration
of bacteria into uterus); Strothkamp v. Chesebrough-Pond’s, Inc., No. 60645, 1993
WL 79239 (Mo. Ct. App. Mar. 23, 1993) (failure to childproof box of cotton swabs);
Boyer v. Empiregas, Inc. of Chillicothe, 734 S.W.2d 828 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (inadequately odorized propane gas exploded); Nadel v. Burger King Corp., 695 N.E.2d
1185 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997) (175˚ coffee caused second degree burns); Green v. Smith
& Nephew AHP, Inc., 629 N.W.2d 727 (Wis. 2001) (allergic reactions to latex gloves
possessing excessive levels of proteins and other toxic chemical substances).
15. See OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW, supra note 13, ch. 5. Some early
commentators recognized that design and manufacturing defects were conceptually
distinct (and warning defects to a lesser extent, because such defects were sometimes
viewed as a subset of design defectiveness), but such commentators generally viewed
the classification as having little or no doctrinal significance. See, e.g., James, supra
note 1, at 49 (“It is not suggested that this dichotomy [between design and manufacturing defects] has any automatic or uniform legal significance.”). See generally
OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW, supra note 13, § 6.2.
16. Although the distinctive nature of design, manufacturing, and warning defects was overlooked by many courts and commentators during the burst of excitement surrounding the adoption of strict products liability in tort, both the First and
Second Restatements of Torts so divided the cases in the law of negligence. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388 (1965) (duty to warn); id. § 395 (manufacturing flaws); id. § 398 (dangerous design).
17. Some courts still appear to miss this point. See, e.g., Urena v. Biro Mfg. Co.,
114 F.3d 359, 365 (2d Cir. 1997) (N.Y. law) (Plaintiff’s evidence that “design was
unreasonably dangerous because it lacks adequate warnings and instructions was
unrebutted. He therefore survives summary judgment on his design defect claim.”);
Sperry-New Holland v. Prestage, 617 So. 2d 248 (Miss. 1993).
18. Some commentators also appear to miss this point. See, e.g., Corboy, supra
note 3, at 1089-92; Jerry J. Phillips, Achilles’ Heel, 61 TENN. L. REV. 1265, 1267-70
(1994); Price, supra note 4, at 1319-25; Marshall S. Shapo, In Search of the Law of
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meaningful evaluation of the acceptability of a product’s dangers logically
turns on considerations that vary contextually depending upon whether the
problem was one of manufacture, design, or the absence of sufficient warning.19 Early in the evolution of products liability law, observers recognized
that determining how and why a design danger should or should not be characterized as “defective” was at once the most important and baffling problem
in this entire field of law.20 For this reason, much of the search for a general
definition of “product defect” was in fact a search for the meaning of defectiveness in design,21 as explored below.
Determining how to evaluate the acceptability or defectiveness of a
product’s design is difficult in part because a product’s design is the essence
of what the manufacturer decides to make and sell. A manufacturing defect is
truly a mistake, one that results from some fault in the production process
whereby a particular product deviates from the manufacturer’s own “blueprint” specifications of the intended and correct design. Quite to the contrary,
a charge that a product is defective in design challenges those very specifications on the ground that the design engineers, in their conceptual rendition of
the product, failed to take safety into adequate account. Consequently, challenging a product’s design challenges the decision of the manufacturer’s engineers and managers to develop and sell a product containing a particular
type and level of danger. Thus, unlike a manufacturing defect claim, which
implicates merely a single product unit, a design defect claim challenges the
integrity of the entire product line and so pierces to the very core of the manufacturer’s enterprise. For this reason, design defect claims are of greatest
concern to manufacturers, since a judicial declaration that the design of a
particular product is “defective” condemns the entire product line.
Judicial evaluations of manufacturer design decisions encounter other
difficulties, too. Far more than in manufacturing and warning defect cases,
design cases require courts to second-guess a manufacturer’s analyses of
consumer market preferences. Some commentators have challenged the propriety of courts displacing multi-faceted engineering and managerial determinations of this type with judicial fiats rendered in the litigation arena.22 Be
that as it may, courts around the nation have come to adjudicate the sufficiency of product designs on a regular basis.
Products Liability: The ALI Restatement Project, 48 VAND. L. REV. 631, 659-60
(1995).
19. See OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW, supra note 13, § 6.2.
20. For early law journal discussions of this point, see supra note 7.
21. See David G. Owen, The Evolution of Products Liability Law, 26 REV. LITIG.
955 (2007) [hereinafter Owen, Evolution].
22. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, The Risks of Risk/Utility, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 469
(1987); Henderson, supra note 7, at 1534, 1538 (characterizing such decisions by
manufacturers as “polycentric” and “managerial”); Peter Huber, Safety and the
Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk Management in the Courts, 85 COLUM. L.
REV. 277 (1985).
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This Article examines the tests of design defectiveness developed by the
courts, particularly in applying the doctrine of Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 402A. The Third Restatement’s definition of design defectiveness is examined in Part VIII.23

II. THEORIES AND TESTS OF LIABILITY
Manufacturers and other sellers24 are subject to liability for defective design under each of the major theories of liability. Thus, as is true with respect
to other types of defects, product suppliers are subject to liability in negligence, for negligently making and selling products that are defectively designed;25 in implied warranty, for selling products that are not fit for their
ordinary purposes, and hence “unmerchantable,” because they are defectively
designed;26 and in strict liability in tort for simply selling products that are
defective in design.27
Regardless of the theory of liability, whether a design is “defective” is
typically the central issue in litigation associated with a product’s design.
Indeed, the Products Liability Restatement proposes that liability in such
cases be grounded solely on the notion of product defect rather than on tradi-

23. Other topics of particular interest in design defect litigation include: special
considerations in design defect litigation concerning optional safety devices; drugs
and medical devices; automotive crashworthiness; how a warning may affect a manufacturer’s duty of safe design; expert testimony and other considerations involved in
proof of defect; product misuse; and certain limitations on design defect liability, such
as obvious dangers, generic risks, state of the art, and product deterioration. These
topics are examined in OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW, supra note 13, §§ 8.9, 8.10,
17.3, 6.2, 6.3, 6.4, 13.5, and ch. 10.
24. Some jurisdictions partially immunize retailers and other non-manufacturers
from liability for design defectiveness and other forms of strict liability. See OWEN,
PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW, supra note 13, § 15.2.
25. See, e.g., Calles v. Scripto-Tokai Corp., 864 N.E.2d 249, 263-64 (Ill. 2007)
(utility lighter not child-resistant); Shipler v. Gen. Motors Corp., 710 N.W.2d 807
(Neb. 2006) (negligent design of roof structure that collapsed in rollover accident);
Phillips v. Cricket Lighters, 841 A.2d 1000 (Pa. 2003) (butane lighter not child-resistant).
26. See, e.g., Smith v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., No. Civ. A. 94C-12-002JEB,
2002 WL 31814534 (Del. Super. Ct. Nov. 20, 2002) (automobile); Haglund v. Philip
Morris Inc., 847 N.E.2d 315, 322-23 (Mass. 2006) (cigarettes); Denny v. Ford Motor
Co., 662 N.E.2d 730 (N.Y. 1995) (Bronco II).
27. See, e.g., Flock v. Scripto-Tokai Corp., 319 F.3d 231 (5th Cir. 2003) (Tex.
law) (same); Calles, v. Scripto-Tokai Corp., 864 N.E.2d 249, 263-64 (Ill. 2007) (utility lighter not child-resistant); Vautour v. Body Masters Sports Indus., 784 A.2d 1178
(N.H. 2001) (leg press machine with fixed stops); McCathern v. Toyota Motor Corp.,
23 P.3d 320 (Or. 2001) (SUV rollover).
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tional theories of liability such as negligence and strict liability in tort.28
Strict liability in tort, of course, is defined principally in terms of a product’s
“defectiveness.”29 Yet proof of a defect in a product’s design is just as important in cases brought in negligence inasmuch as a manufacturer hardly can
be at fault for selling a product with a safe design, a design that is not defective.30 Moreover, in the great majority of states, and even in most cases
brought in the Empire State,31 proving that a product design is dangerously
unmerchantable under UCC § 2-314 amounts to precisely the same thing as
proving that the product is “defective” (or “unreasonably dangerous”) under
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A.32

28. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. n (1998) (recommending that, because design claims rest on a risk-utility assessment regardless of
doctrinal label, courts should not risk inconsistent verdicts by submitting such claims
to juries on different causes of action, whether negligence, implied warranty, or strict
liability in tort). At least one state supreme court agrees. See Wright v. Brooke
Group Ltd., 652 N.W.2d 159, 169 (Iowa 2002) (“We question the need for or usefulness of any traditional doctrinal label in design defect cases because, as comment n
points out, a court should not submit both a negligence claim and a strict liability
claim based on the same design defect since both claims rest on an identical riskutility evaluation. Moreover, to persist in using two names for the same claim only
continues the dysfunction engendered by section 402A. Therefore, we prefer to label
a claim based on a defective product design as a design defect claim without reference
to strict liability or negligence.”).
29. See OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW, supra note 13, § 5.3.
30. See id. §§ 2.1, 5.9.
31. Denny v. Ford Motor Co., 662 N.E.2d 730 (N.Y. 1995), held that a product
not defectively designed for purposes of strict products liability in tort could nevertheless be unmerchantable for purposes of UCC § 2-314(2). Yet even Denny recognized that in most cases the two standards will produce precisely the same result: “As
a practical matter, the distinction between the defect concepts in tort law and in implied warranty theory may have little or no effect in most cases.” Id. at 738. On
Denny, see OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW, supra note 13, § 5.9.
32. Or under RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2(b) (1998). See
infra Part VIII. Courts often recite the virtual or complete equivalence of the warranty and tort law standards of liability: “[T]o bring an action in implied warranty for
personal injury a plaintiff is required to show product unmerchantability sufficient to
avoid summary judgment on the issue of defectiveness in a tort strict products liability
suit.” Larsen v. Pacesetter Sys., Inc., 837 P.2d 1273, 1284-85 (Haw. 1992), amended
by, 843 P.2d 144 (Haw. 1992); see also State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Miller Elec.
Co., 562 N.E.2d 589 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990); Virgil v. Kash N’ Karry Serv. Corp., 484
A.2d 652, 656 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1984):
To recover on either theory – implied warranty or strict liability – the
plaintiff in a products liability case must satisfy three basics from an evidentiary standpoint: (1) the existence of a defect, (2) the attribution of the
defect to the seller, and (3) a causal relation between the defect and the injury.
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In considering the concept of design defectiveness, it is crucial to remember that a manufacturer’s liability for harm from a product’s design characteristics, even if labeled “strict,” is not absolute. As the strict manufacturer liability principles of Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.33 and
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A spread across the nation in the 1960s
and 1970s,34 courts and commentators searched mightily for standards or
“tests” of liability that would stop liability well short of absolute.35 Although
early test formulations generally failed to distinguish between the various
forms of defect, most of the early cases struggling with the meaning of defectiveness involved dangers in design.36 Consequently, the evolution of early
strict liability tests generally involved a search for appropriate methods for
separating product designs that were adequately safe from those that were
not.
All courts judge the adequacy of a product’s design upon one of two basic standards, or some combination thereof: (1) the “consumer expectations”
test – whether the design meets the safety expectations of users and consumers, and/or (2) the “risk-utility” test – whether the safety benefits of designing
away a foreseeable danger exceed the resulting costs. The following section
examines § 402A’s original test, the consumer expectations test. The fundamentals of the risk-utility test are then considered in Part IV, which explores
the appropriate factors weighed in a risk-utility balance. Part V next inquires
into the critical role of feasible design alternatives in risk-utility decisionmaking. The blending by some courts of the consumer expectations and riskutility tests is investigated in Part VI; the Wade–Keeton prudent-seller hindSee also Gumbs v. Int’l Harvester, Inc., 718 F.2d 88 (3d Cir. 1983) (V.I. law); accord
Voelkel v. Gen. Motors Corp., 846 F. Supp. 1468, 1475-76 (D. Kan. 1994) (for implied warranty, strict products liability, and negligence). Their equivalence is stated
by U.C.C. § 2-314, cmt. 7 (2003) (“When recovery is sought for injury to person or
property, whether goods are merchantable is to be determined by applicable state
products liability [tort] law.”). See OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW, supra note 13,
§§ 4.3, 5.9.
33. 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963).
34. See OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW, supra note 13, § 5.2.
35. See OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW, supra note 13, § 5.3. Phillips v. Kimwood Machine Co., 525 P.2d 1033 (Or. 1974), may have said it best. Noting that the
“courts continue to flounder while attempting to determine how one decides whether
a product is ‘in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user,’” the court
observed:
The problem with strict liability of products has been one of limitation.
No one wants absolute liability where all the article has to do is to cause
injury. To impose liability there has to be something about the article
which makes it dangerously defective without regard to whether the manufacturer was or was not at fault for such condition. A test for unreasonable danger is therefore vital.
Id. at 1035-36.
36. See OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW, supra note 13, § 5.3.

13

300

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73

sight test, based on constructive knowledge of a product’s design dangers, is
explored in Part VII; and the Products Liability Restatement’s treatment of
the design defect concept is examined in Part VIII.

III. THE CONSUMER EXPECTATIONS TEST
The consumer expectations test was the first standard for evaluating design defectiveness, and it remains a persistent, if embattled, liability test in at
least certain types of design defect cases in many states.37 In searching for a
test for design defectiveness, courts first turned to the definitions of the liability standard, “defective condition unreasonably dangerous,” provided in
the Restatement itself. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A comment g
defines the first half of the liability standard, “defective condition,” as follows:
The rule stated in this Section applies only where the product is, at
the time it leaves the seller’s hands, in a condition not contemplated by the ultimate consumer, which will be unreasonably dangerous to him.
Comment i defines the other half of the liability standard, “unreasonably dangerous”:
The article sold must be dangerous to an extent beyond that which
would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases
it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its
characteristics.
Because “defective condition” and “unreasonably dangerous” are both defined as dangerous beyond a consumer’s contemplations, most courts apply37. “The consumer expectations test for design defectiveness has become products liability’s version of the rule against perpetuities: a doctrine nearly universally
reviled but stubbornly and inexplicably persistent.” Kysar, supra note 7, at 1701; see
also John Neely Kennedy, The Role of the Consumer Expectations Test Under Louisiana’s Products Liability Tort Doctrine, 69 TUL. L. REV. 117, 162 (1994); Rebecca
Korzec, Dashing Consumer Hopes: Strict Products Liability and the Demise of the
Consumer Expectations Test, 20 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 227 (1997); Joseph W.
Little, The Place of Consumer Expectations in Product Strict Liability Actions for
Defectively Designed Products, 61 TENN. L. REV. 1189 (1994); William A. Masters,
The Consumer Expectation Test: A Concept in Search of Meaning, 73 DEF. COUNS. J.
22 (2006); Jerry J. Phillips, Consumer Expectations, 53 S.C. L. REV. 1047 (2002);
Schwartz & Tedesco, supra note 3; Ellen Wertheimer, The Biter Bit Unknowable
Dangers, the Third Restatement, and the Reinstatement of Liability Without Fault, 70
BROOK. L. REV. 889 (2005). For citations to additional commentary, see OWEN,
PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW, supra note 13, § 5.6 n.1.
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ing § 402A in the 1960s and 1970s concluded that design defectiveness under
§ 402A should be tested according to a standard of product safety gauged by
“consumer expectations.”38
Roughly two centuries in the past, warranty law broke away from the
tort law action of deceit and migrated to the law of contracts, a field of law
that seeks at bottom to protect the reasonable expectations of the contracting
parties.39 Warranty law sensibly protects consumer expectations predictably
generated by a manufacturer’s representations about its products, both express and implied.40 When the Reporter for the Restatement (Second) of
Torts, Dean William Prosser, was drafting § 402A in the late 1950s and early
1960s, virtually all of the scant case authority for strict manufacturer liability
for injuries to remote consumers from the sale of defective products had been
decided under the law of warranty. The strongest authority for the new tort
doctrine was a long line of cases involving defective food products, a context
in which the law has long protected consumer expectations with special vigilance. So it was only natural that Dean Prosser would define strict products
liability in the same consumer expectations terms that supported the warranty
law cases that served as his authority for the new tort doctrine. And it was
also only natural for the courts, in beginning to apply the new doctrine to
design defect cases in the early days of strict products liability in tort, to
adopt the warranty-based definition of liability provided in the comments to §
402A.41
Although most modern courts have abandoned consumer expectations as
the predominant test for design defectiveness,42 some courts still use this test
38. See supra note 37. For examples of early decisions defining § 402A’s “defective condition unreasonably dangerous” in the consumer expectations terms of
comments g and i, see, for example, Lunt v. Brady Mfg. Corp., 475 P.2d 964 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1970); Rossignol v. Danbury Sch. of Aeronautics, Inc., 227 A.2d 418 (Conn.
1967); Dunham v. Vaughan & Bushnell Mfg. Co., 247 N.E.2d 401 (Ill. 1969); Vincer
v. Esther Williams All-Aluminum Swimming Pool Co., 230 N.W.2d 794 (Wis. 1975).
39. See 1 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS 2 (1993 rev. ed.) (“the law of
contracts attempts the realization of reasonable expectations”). On the warranty law
background of strict products liability in tort, see OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW,
supra note 13, § 5.2.
40. See, e.g., Denny v. Ford Motor Co., 662 N.E.2d 730, 736 (N.Y. 1995) (warranty law, originating in the law of contracts, “directs its attention to the purchaser’s
disappointed expectations”); Markle v. Mulholland’s Inc., 509 P.2d 529, 532, 534
(Or. 1973). See generally David G. Owen, The Moral Foundations of Products Liability Law, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 427, 462-65 (1993) [hereinafter Owen, Moral
Foundations]; Marshall S. Shapo, A Representational Theory of Consumer Protection: Doctrine, Function and Legal Liability for Product Disappointment, 60 VA. L.
REV. 1109, 1370 (1974). On warranty law under the Uniform Commercial Code, see
OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW, supra note 13, ch. 4.
41. For an examination of this history, see OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW,
supra note 13, ch. 5.
42. See id.
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in design defect cases43 and some version of the test is statutory in a small
number of states.44 Although the consumer expectations standard was conventionally viewed as more protective to plaintiffs than the risk-utility standard,45 courts have used the consumer expectations test most frequently to
deny recovery to plaintiffs in cases involving obvious design hazards.46
43. See, e.g., Crump v. Versa Prods., Inc., 400 F.3d 1104, 1108 (8th Cir. 2005)
(Mo. law) (“A product is ‘actionable if dangerous to an extent beyond that which
would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer, who either purchases it or uses it,
with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics.’”);
Liggett Group, Inc. v. Davis, No. 4D04-3811, 2007 WL 2935236 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
Oct. 10, 2007); Calles v. Scripto-Tokai Corp., 864 N.E.2d 249, 256 (Ill. 2007) (explaining the consumer expectations prong of the Illinois two-pronged standard: “a
plaintiff may prevail if he or she demonstrates that the product failed to perform as
any ordinary consumer would expect”); Griffin v. Suzuki Motor Corp., 124 P.3d 57,
63 (Kan. 2005) (while evidence on the feasibility of an alternative design may be
considered, “the final test is one of consumer expectations”); Donegal Mut. Ins. v.
White Consol. Indus., Inc., 852 N.E.2d 215, 221 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006) (for consumer
expectations standard of former statute, consumer does not expect setting an electric
stove to self-clean mode will cause a fire); Green v. Smith & Nephew AHP, Inc., 629
N.W.2d 727, 755 (Wis. 2001) (consumer expectations test appropriate for proof of
latex glove’s defectiveness based on ordinary consumer’s ignorance that gloves could
cause allergic reaction). See also Wheeler v. John Deere Co., 935 F.2d 1090 (10th
Cir. 1991) (Kan. law), which affirmed a judgment for a farm worker against the manufacturer of a combine for injuries to his arm which occurred when he reached into
the combine’s auger to remove a residual buildup of grain. On the consumer expectations issue, plaintiff had ten other farm workers, each of whom had also lost portions of their arms in augers of this model combine, testify “as to unexpected danger
when, in the process of manual cleanout, the auger suddenly was engaged while the
engine was running.” Id. at 1095. Moreover, plaintiff’s expert in farm machinery
design, a mechanical engineer, testified “that the combine was more dangerous than
anticipated by ordinary consumers.” Id. at 1100. The court held that both forms of
proof of consumer expectations were acceptable. For earlier cases, see, for example,
Lester v. Magic Chef, Inc., 641 P.2d 353 (Kan. 1982); Rahmig v. Mosley Mach. Co.,
412 N.W.2d 56 (Neb. 1987); Woods v. Fruehauf Trailer Corp., 765 P.2d 770 (Okla.
1988).
44. A statute in North Dakota explicitly defines “unreasonably dangerous” in
consumer contemplation terms. See Endresen v. Scheels Hardware & Sports Shop,
Inc., 560 N.W.2d 225, 233 (N.D. 1997). Statutes in Oregon and South Carolina embrace the consumer contemplations standard indirectly, by incorporating the comments to § 402A, including comment g and i. See McCathern v. Toyota Motor Corp.,
23 P.3d 320, 329-32 (Or. 2001). And a Tennessee statute defines “unreasonably
dangerous” alternatively in both consumer contemplations and prudent manufacturer
terms. See Ray v. BIC Corp., 925 S.W.2d 527, 529 (Tenn. 1996). The statutes are:
N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01.3-01(4) (1993); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.920 (1979); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 15-73-30 (1974); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-102(8) (1978); see also
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-15-6(2) (1977) (setting forth a two-pronged test).
45. See, e.g., Phillips, supra note 18; Shapo, supra note 18. However, the plaintiff’s bar appears to recognize the weaknesses in the consumer expectations test. See
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One of the few cases applying the consumer expectations standard to allow a design defect claim is Jarke v. Jackson Products,47 which involved a
welder’s claim against the manufacturer of a welding mask. The plaintiff was
injured while squatting beneath an object he was welding overhead, with his
head cocked to one side, when some molten metal dropped from above onto
his mask, rolled down to the mask’s side rim, which channeled it into his ear.
The complaint alleged that the mask was defectively designed (1) because it
did not provide ear guards to protect a user’s ears and (2) because the mask’s
overall configuration, including its side rim, could channel molten metal into
a user’s ears. Reasoning that the danger to a user’s ears was obvious, the trial
court granted the defendant manufacturer’s motion for summary judgment,
and the plaintiff appealed. Although the appellate court agreed that the obvious absence of an ear guard precluded a finding of design defectiveness
under the consumer expectations test on that particular ground, it reversed
and remanded on the issue of whether an ordinary person would understand
that the mask’s design itself created the means for molten slag to be channeled into a user’s ear.48
It will be recalled that the consumer expectations test is an objective test
based on the average, normal, or “ordinary” expectations of a reasonable user
or consumer.49 Usually that person, whether a user or consumer, will be the
Frank J. Vandall, The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability Section 2(b):
The Reasonable Alternative Design Requirement, 61 TENN. L. REV. 1407 (1994).
46. See, e.g., Bourne v. Marty Gilman, Inc., 452 F.3d 632 (7th Cir. 2006) (Ind.
law) (risk that aluminum goalpost might snap and fall dangerously when Ball State
students rushed on field and climbed on post to celebrate football victory); Brown v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 328 F.3d 1274, 1282-83 (10th Cir. 2003) (Utah law) (ordinary
and prudent user would expect danger to toddler standing behind riding mower operated in reverse); Crosswhite v. Jumpking, Inc., 411 F. Supp. 2d 1228, 1231 (D. Or.
2006) (“an ordinary consumer buys and uses a trampoline to jump on it, and a design
that allows for such activity is exactly that which is contemplated by an ordinary
consumer or user”); Vineyard v. Empire Mach. Co., 581 P.2d 1152, 1155 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1978) (absence of rollover bar on large earth-moving scraper, which rolled over
and crushed operator’s leg, not a danger beyond consumer’s expectations since its
absence was “immediately evident”); Menard v. Newhall, 373 A.2d 505, 507 (Vt.
1977) (plaintiff’s eye put out in BB gun fight: “A BB gun which is neither defectively
designed nor manufactured is not dangerous beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer . . . . A warning by the defendant Daisy that a BB
gun, if fired at a person, could injure an eye, is nothing that even a seven-year-old
child does not already know.”).
47. 631 N.E.2d 233 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994).
48. Id. at 239.
49. Comment i is phrased in terms of the “ordinary” consumer “with the ordinary
knowledge common to the community.” See, e.g., Calles v. Scripto-Tokai Corp., 864
N.E.2d 249, 255 (Ill. 2007) (“Under the consumer-expectation test, a plaintiff must
establish what an ordinary consumer purchasing the product would expect about the
product and its safety. This is an objective standard based on the average, normal, or
ordinary expectations of the reasonable person; it is not dependent upon the subjective
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person placed at risk by the product’s design danger.50 However, purchasers
and users sometimes control product risks to other persons. In such cases,
when one person (such as a parent or a doctor) purchases a product with particular dangers or uses a product in a manner that injures a person under his
or her control (such as the parent’s child or the doctor’s patient), the law
normally looks to the expectations of the risk controller rather than to those of
the victim.51
The utility of the consumer expectations test is severely compromised
when design dangers are obvious.52 Because consumers acquire their safety
and danger expectations most directly from a product’s appearance, obvious
dangers – such as the risk to human limbs from an unguarded power mower
or industrial machine – are virtually always contemplated or expected by the
user or consumer who thereby is necessarily unprotected by the consumer
expectations test, no matter how probable and severe the likely danger nor
how easy and cheap the means of avoiding it. In such cases, the buyer gets
what he or she paid for, or the user engaged a danger that he or she expected,
so that the risk of injury shifts to the buyer or user who chose to accept it,53 or
to a third-party victim who had no say in the matter at all.54 Thus, while the
consumer expectations test protects the autonomy of buyers and users by
shielding them from unexpected harm, the flip side of this test requires users
and consumers to be ever vigilant and take responsibility for the harmful
consequences of their choices about risk. And a dire consequence of the consumer expectations test, unless its plain consequences are baldly ignored,55 is
expectation of a particular consumer or user.”). See generally OWEN, PRODUCTS
LIABILITY LAW, supra note 13, § 5.6.
50. See OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW, supra note 13, § 5.6.
51. See, e.g., Calles, 864 N.E.2d at 256 (plaintiff’s 3-year-old daughter used
utility lighter to start fire in which she died; because ordinary consumer of a lighter is
an adult, the safety expectations about such a product “must be viewed from the point
of view of the adult consumer”).
52. On obvious dangers generally, see OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW, supra
note 13, § 10.2.
53. Such as a teenager paralyzed from attempting a flip on a trampoline. See
Crosswhite v. Jumpking, Inc., 411 F. Supp. 2d 1228, 1231 (D. Or. 2006). But using
the expectations of younger users becomes problematic. See, e.g., Bunch v. Hoffinger
Indus., Inc., 20 Cal. Rptr. 3d 780, 796 (Ct. App. 2004) (affirming jury award of $12
million to child rendered quadriplegic after diving into shallow above-ground pool;
“the danger of diving into a shallow aboveground pool is not open and obvious to an
11 year old as a matter of law”).
54. Such as a toddler run over by a riding lawn mower. See Brown v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 328 F.3d 1274, 1282-83 (10th Cir. 2003) (Utah law).
55. Courts do on occasion baldly disregard the logically inescapable impact of an
obvious design danger on the consumer expectations test. See, for example, Hansen
v. New Holland North America, Inc., 574 N.W.2d 250 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997), where
the plaintiff’s hand was caught and injured in the mechanism of a hay baler while he
was trying to cut away a buildup of hay on the rollers with a jackknife. The trial court

2008]

DESIGN DEFECTS

305

that it effectively rewards manufacturers for failing to adopt cost-effective
measures to remedy obviously unnecessary dangers to human life and limb.56
The failure of the consumer expectations test to deal adequately with the obvious danger problem profoundly weakens the usefulness of this test and
effectively disqualifies it for principled use57 as the sole basis for determining
defects in design.58
Another significant limitation on the usefulness of consumer expectations as a liability standard in design cases concerns the vagueness of a consumer’s expectations concerning most complex designs.59 For example, consumers comprehend that automobiles are not completely crashproof, but they
have no meaningful expectations as to the extent to which a vehicle may be
compromised in the event of a collision at substantial speeds. The consumer
expectations test thus was held to be an invalid gauge of design defectiveness
in one case where a large rock hit the wheel of a vehicle traveling on the
highway,60 in another where the driver’s airbag deployed and broke her jaw
dismissed the plaintiff’s design defect claim on the ground that the danger of placing
one’s hands near the moving mechanism presented an obvious danger which precluded recovery under the consumer expectations test. Reversing and remanding, the
court held that the plaintiff had presented a jury question on whether an average user
would have fully appreciated the risk:
[F]ocusing solely on the user’s conduct will frustrate public policy considerations underlying product liability law. A danger that is open and
obvious to a consumer is equally apparent to the manufacturer. Concentrating only on the user’s conduct ignores the manufacturer’s responsibility for producing that danger, and indeed creates an incentive for manufacturers to ensure that hazards are in fact open and obvious, possibly minimizing needed safeguards and exposure to liability for designing dangerous products.
Id. at 254.
56. See, e.g., Chaney v. Hobart Int’l, Inc., 54 F. Supp. 2d 677, 681 (E.D. La.
1999) (“As dangerous as the meat grinder may have been without a feed pan guard, it
was clearly ‘not dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by
the ordinary user.’ The possibility of injury is glaring.”).
57. True, this test may be distorted to avoid the harsh results of its principled
application. See Phillips, supra note 37, at 1049 (characterizing as “semantic” the
consumer expectations test’s foreclosure of relief to persons injured by obvious dangers).
58. See id. In switching from the consumer expectations test to the risk-utility
standard in 1993, the Mississippi Supreme Court noted that its conversion to riskutility permitted it to reject the patent danger rule which inhered in the consumer
expectations test. See Sperry-New Holland v. Prestage, 617 So. 2d 248, 256 n.4
(Miss. 1993).
59. See W. PAGE KEETON, DAN B. DOBBS, ROBERT E. KEETON & DAVID G.
OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 99, at 699 (5th ed. 1984). But
see Phillips, supra note 37, at 1052-61 (consumer expectations can be based on riskutility, informed by experts, as in the Potter case, discussed infra Part VI).
60. Heaton v. Ford Motor Co., 435 P.2d 806 (Or. 1967).
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in a low-speed collision,61 and in another where the passenger compartment
collapsed in upon the driver’s feet in a near head-on collision.62 In such cases, the ordinary user of a vehicle “simply has ‘no idea’ how it should perform
in all [such] situations.”63 For this reason, some courts that use the consumer
expectations test limit the applicability of the test to cases involving simple,
rather than complex, product designs and accident mechanisms, as examined
in detail below.64
Some courts65 and legislatures66 are more generally blending the consumer expectations test with the risk-utility standard,67 or replacing consumer
expectations with risk-utility altogether, for determining design defectiveness.68 Even in a risk-utility regime, however, consumer expectations may be
considered together with the other evaluative factors69 and occasionally can
even be conclusive of design defect determinations.70 In addition, the consumer expectations standard is still widely accepted as the most appropriate

61. Pruitt v. Gen. Motors Corp., 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d 4 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999).
62. Soule v. Gen. Motors Corp., 882 P.2d 298 (Cal. 1994).
63. Id. at 308.
64. See infra Part VI.
65. See, e.g., Potter v. Chi. Pneumatic Tool Co., 694 A.2d 1319, 1333 (Conn.
1997) (“a consumer’s expectations may be viewed in light of various factors that
balance the utility of the product’s design with the magnitude of its risks” in cases of
complex designs); Delaney v. Deere & Co., 999 P.2d 930, 944 (Kan. 2000) (recognizing “the validity of risk/utility analysis as a guide in determining the expectations
of consumers in complex cases”); Vautour v. Body Masters Sports Indus., 784 A.2d
1178 (N.H. 2001) (consumer expectations defined in terms of risk-utility); McCathern
v. Toyota Motor Corp., 23 P.3d 320, 330-32 (Or. 2001) (risk-utility evidence may be
required to prove consumer expectations); Seattle-First Nat’l Bank v. Tabert, 542
P.2d 774, 779 (Wash. 1975).
66. For example, in Tennessee (as formerly in Ohio), liability is alternatively
defined in both consumer expectations and risk-utility terms. See TENN. CODE ANN. §
29-28-102(8) (1978). A Washington statute blends the consumer expectations and
risk-utility tests by providing (1) that a design is not reasonably safe if it fails the riskutility test, and (2) that the trier of fact shall also consider whether the product’s dangers exceeded the contemplations of the ordinary consumer. See WASH. REV. CODE §
7.72.030(1)(a), (3) (1988).
67. See infra Part VI.
68. See OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW, supra note 13, §§ 5.6, 5.7; infra parts
IV-VI.
69. See, e.g., Nichols v. Union Underwear Co., 602 S.W.2d 429 (Ky. 1980);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. g (1998).
70. “Such expectations are often influenced by how products are portrayed and
marketed and can have a significant impact on consumer behavior. Thus, although
consumer expectations do not constitute an independent standard for judging the
defectiveness of product designs, they may substantially influence or even be ultimately determinative on risk-utility balancing . . . .” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2(b) cmt. g.

2008]

DESIGN DEFECTS

307

test for certain limited types of cases.71 Finally, the consumer expectations
test still plays some role as a liability standard for design defectiveness in
roughly half of all the American states,72 and a related standard, at least in
name, exists in Europe.73

IV. THE RISK-UTILITY TEST
The risk-utility test is the principal standard for judging the safety or defectiveness of a product’s design.74 While liability for design defects was
71. Most notably in cases involving contaminated food and defects in used products. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. h; id. § 7 (food
products); id. § 8 (used products). Note, however, that food product cases virtually
always involve “manufacturing” rather than design defects, and that used product
cases normally do as well.
72. See OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW, supra note 13, § 5.6.
73. See the European Union Council Directive on the Approximation of the
Laws, Regulations and Administrative Provisions of the Member States Concerning
Liability for Defective Products, which provides in art. 6(1) as follows: “A product is
defective when it does not provide the safety which a person is entitled to expect
. . . . ” Council Directive 85/374, art. 6, 1985 O.J. (L 210) 29. See generally
GERAINT HOWELLS, COMPARATIVE PRODUCT LIABILITY ch. 3 (1993); JANE
STAPLETON, PRODUCT LIABILITY ch. 10 (1994). Note, however, that because this
provision addresses the degree of safety a person is entitled to expect, the standard
may be applied in risk-utility fashion. See also David G. Owen, Strict Products Liability in America and Europe, in FESTSCHRIFT FÜR ERWIN DEUTSCH 305, 309-10
(Hans-Jürgen Ahrens, et al. eds., 1999); Jane Stapleton, Products Liability in the
United Kingdom: The Myths of Reform, 34 TEX. INT’L L.J. 45 (1999); Jane Stapleton,
Products Liability Reform – Real or Illusory?, 6 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 392, 405
(1986). See OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW, supra note 13, § 1.4.
74. On the risk-utility test, see Green, supra note 7; Miller, supra note 7; Keith
Miller, Design Defect Litigation in Iowa: The Myths of Strict Liability, 40 DRAKE L.
REV. 465 (1991); Owen, Toward a Proper Test, supra note 7; David G. Owen, RiskUtility Balancing in Design Defect Cases, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 239 (1997) [hereinafter Owen, Risk-Utility Balancing]; Twerski, supra note 7; Barbara Ann White,
Risk-Utility Analysis and the Learned Hand Formula: A Hand that Helps or a Hand
that Hides?, 32 ARIZ. L. REV. 77 (1990). For a useful practitioner perspective, see
Stephen G. Gilles, United States v. Carroll Towing Co.: The Hand Formula’s Home
Port, in TORTS STORIES 11 (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman eds., 2003)
[hereinafter Gilles, Carroll Towing]; Rheingold, supra note 3.
For economic perspectives on risk-utility analysis, see, for example,
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW §§ 6.1, 6.6 (7th ed. 2007); W. KIP
VISCUSI, REFORMING PRODUCTS LIABILITY ch. 4 (1991) [hereinafter VISCUSI,
REFORMING]; Epstein, supra note 22; Mark Geistfeld, Reconciling Cost-Benefit Analysis with the Principle that Safety Matters More Than Money, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 114
(2001); Stephen G. Gilles, The Invisible Hand Formula, 80 VA. L. REV. 1015, 1025
(1994) [hereinafter Gilles, Invisible Hand]; Alan Schwartz, Proposals for Products
Liability Reform: A Theoretical Synthesis, 97 YALE L.J. 353, 384-88 (1988); W. Kip

17

308

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73

more commonly based on the consumer expectations test in the 1960s and
early 1970s, even during these early years some courts saw the wisdom of
assessing design defectiveness according to whether the safety benefits of
remedying a design danger were worth the costs.75 As courts over the decades have turned away from the consumer expectations test in design danger
cases,76 they have substituted some form of a cost-benefit (“risk-utility,”
Viscusi, Wading Through the Muddle of Risk-Utility Analysis, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 573
(1990) [hereinafter Viscusi, Wading]; Mary Griffin, Note, The Smoldering Issue in
Cippolone v. Ligget Group, Inc.: Process Concerns in Determining Whether Cigarettes Are a Defectively Designed Product, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 606 (1988); Kim D.
Larsen, Note, Strict Products Liability and the Risk-Utility Test for Design Defect: An
Economic Analysis, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 2045 (1984).
For general discussions of the risk-utility test in negligence and strict liability
in tort, see OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW, supra note 13, §§ 2.2, 5.7.
75. See, e.g., Helicoid Gage Div. of Am. Chain & Cable Co. v. Howell, 511
S.W.2d 573, 577 (Tex. App. 1974) (affirming verdict for plaintiff, where $2.50 safety
shield could have prevented burst pressure gauge from throwing piece of lens into
plaintiff’s eye):
To determine whether a product is unreasonably dangerous, . . . it is necessary to weigh the risk of harm against the utility of the product, considering whether safety devices would unreasonably raise the cost or diminish the utility of the product. The evidence at trial showed that shatterproof glass would have increased the cost of each gauge by approximately one dollar and would not have reduced the gage’s utility. Further,
there was testimony that this injury would not have occurred had shatterproof glass been used.
See generally Dorsey v. Yoder Co., 331 F. Supp. 753 (E.D. Pa. 1971), aff’d, 474 F.2d
1339 (3d Cir. 1973) (jury properly found that $8,000 machine was defective for not
being equipped with $200-$500 guard that would have protected operator’s hand and
arm from being caught and drawn into metal slitter machine); McCormack v.
Hankscraft Co., 154 N.W.2d 488 (Minn. 1967) (jury could find that vaporizer top
could have been screwed cheaply and without diminishing vaporizer’s usefulness
onto top of container of hot water that scalded infant plaintiff). See also Roach v.
Kononen, 525 P.2d 125 (Or. 1974), an action against Ford Motor Company for injuries from a crash occurring when the hood on a Ford automobile suddenly flew up and
blocked the driver’s vision. Plaintiff’s expert testified that the hood could have been
designed to permit substantially better visibility in such situations. Another witness
testified that Ford was aware of only six or seven inadvertent hood openings occurring over a seven or eight year period. Ford’s design engineer testified that the proposed design would require the addition of certain reinforcements to the hood and its
hinges that would cost $5 – $10 per car. The jury returned a verdict for the defendant,
and the court affirmed.
76. For examples of movements away from consumer expectations toward riskutility, see, for example, Potter v. Chi. Pneumatic Tool Co., 694 A.2d 1319 (Conn.
1997) (redefining consumer expectations in risk-utility terms); Banks v. ICI Ams.,
Inc., 450 S.E.2d 671 (Ga. 1994) (switching from consumer expectations to risk-utility); Delaney v. Deere & Co., 999 P.2d 930, 944 (Kan. 2000) (recognizing “the validity of risk/utility analysis as a guide in determining the expectations of consumers in
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“risk-benefit,” or “benefit-risk”) standard of liability, which is the liability
standard for design defectiveness adopted by the Restatement (Third) of
Torts: Products Liability.77 By the turn of the new millennium, despite the
tenacity of consumer expectations in a decreasing number of jurisdictions,78
the risk-utility test had become America’s dominant test for design defectiveness.79

complex cases”); Nichols v. Union Underwear Co., 602 S.W.2d 429 (Ky. 1980); St.
Germain v. Husqvarna Corp., 544 A.2d 1283, 1286 (Me. 1988); Vautour v. Body
Masters Sports Indus., 784 A.2d 1178 (N.H. 2001) (consumer expectations defined in
risk-utility terms); Hickey v. Otis Elevator Co., 840 N.E.2d 637, 640 n.1 (Ohio Ct.
App. 2005) (noting the Ohio legislature’s repeal of the consumer expectations test
earlier that year); McCathern v. Toyota Motor Corp., 23 P.3d 320, 330-32 (Or. 2001)
(risk-utility evidence may be required to prove consumer expectations); Seattle-First
Nat’l Bank v. Tabert, 542 P.2d 774, 779 (Wash. 1975). In Sperry-New Holland v.
Prestage, 617 So. 2d 248, 255-56 (Miss. 1993), noting its own movement away from
the consumer expectations test, the court switched to risk-utility for design defect
determinations, observing that the switch to risk-utility “has become the trend in most
federal and state jurisdictions” because it “best protects both the manufacturer and the
consumer.”
77. For the prevalence of the risk-utility test in design defect cases, see
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2, Reporters’ Notes to cmt. d
(1998). See generally infra Part VIII.
78. See Kysar, supra note 7, at 1701 (characterizing the consumer expectations
test as “stubbornly and inexplicably persistent”); see also Phillips, supra note 37.
79. See, e.g., In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether Prods. Liab. Litig., 175 F. Supp.
2d 593, 623 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (Cal., Fla., Ill., and N.Y. law) (“Courts have generally
utilized the ‘risk-utility balancing’ test to determine whether a product is defectively
designed.”); Warner Fruehauf Trailer Co. v. Boston, 654 A.2d 1272, 1276 (D.C.
1995) (“In design defect cases, most jurisdictions decide [strict liability in tort] by
applying some form of a risk-utility balancing test.”); Banks v. ICI Ams., Inc., 450
S.E.2d 671 (Ga. 1994); Wright v. Brooke Group Ltd., 652 N.W.2d 159 (Iowa 2002)
(adopting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2(b)); Sperry-New Holland v. Prestage, 617 So. 2d 248, 255 (Miss. 1993) (“Risk-utility has become the trend
in most federal and state jurisdictions.”); Bass v. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc., No. ESXL-694-99, 2006 WL 1419375, at *11 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. May 25, 2006) (“A
standard of evaluation that has gained prominence in common law design defect
claims is based on a comparison of the utility of the product with the risk of injury
that it poses.”); Ford Motor Co. v. Miles, 967 S.W.2d 377, 386 (Tex. 1998) (Owen,
J., concurring) (instruction conflicted with “the risk versus utility analysis that lies at
the core of products liability design defect law”). The dominance of the risk-utility
test for determining design defectiveness has been clear for some time. See Foley v.
Clark Equip. Co., 523 A.2d 379, 388 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987) (“Although various tests
for design defectiveness have been proposed, there is general agreement among legal
scholars that any evaluation of design defectiveness must invariably include some
form of a risk/utility analysis . . . . Most courts employ a version of this balancing
process in analyzing allegations of design defects.”).
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A. Fundamentals of Cost-Benefit Analysis; The Hand Formula
Risk-utility (cost-benefit) analysis is widely used to define liability for
design defectiveness in both negligence80 and strict liability in tort.81 An
analytical technique explicitly relied upon by Benjamin Franklin and Oliver
Wendell Holmes,82 cost-benefit analysis is as old as rational thought. All
deliberative decisions involve a weighing of the advantages (benefits) and
disadvantages (costs) of a contemplated course of action.83 Whether a particular design danger is “unreasonable” (that is, “defective”) involves “a balancing of the probability and seriousness of harm against the costs of taking
precautions. Relevant factors to be considered include the availability of
alternative designs, the cost and feasibility of adopting alternative designs,
and the frequency or infrequency of injury resulting from the design.”84 In
addition, courts and scholars increasingly recognize the importance of including a product’s warnings and instructions, which serve to reduce the foreseeable risks of a design, as an important factor in design defect risk-utility
analysis.85
80. See OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW, supra note 13, § 2.2.
81. Id. § 5.7.
82. See, e.g., Letter from Benjamin Franklin to Joseph Priestly (Sept. 19, 1772),
reprinted in EDWARD M. GRAMLICH, BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS OF GOVERNMENT
PROGRAMS 1-2 (1981) (suggesting, as aid to rendering difficult decisions, that one list
and consider “all the reasons pro and con” and contemplate “where the balance lies”).
Franklin said:
[T]hough the weight of reasons cannot be taken with the precision of algebraic quantities, yet when each is thus considered, separately and comparatively, and the whole lies before me, I think I can judge better, and am
less liable to make a rash step, and in fact I have found great advantage
from this kind of equation, in what may be called moral or prudential algebra.
Id. at 2. See also Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV.
457, 474 (1897) (advising that “for everything we have to give up something else, and
we are taught to set the advantage we gain against the other advantage we lose”).
83. See Harold P. Green, Cost-Risk-Benefit Assessment and the Law: Introduction and Perspective, 45 GEO. WASH. L. Rev. 901, 903-04 (1977); Richard A. Merrill,
Risk-Benefit Decisionmaking by the Food and Drug Administration, 45 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 994, 996 (1977) (“Risk-benefit analysis . . . includes any technique for making choices that explicitly or implicitly attempts to measure the potential adverse
consequences of an activity and to predict its benefits. In its most refined form, such
an analysis may make use of refined mathematical methods for calculating risks and
benefits, attempting to assign uniform values, usually in dollars, to all factors, including human lives.”).
84. Raney v. Honeywell, Inc., 540 F.2d 932, 935 (8th Cir. 1976) (Iowa law).
85. See Hansen v. Sunnyside Prods., Inc., 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d 266 (Ct. App. 1997)
(design defectiveness of household cleaner):
We do not think that the risk to the consumer of the design of many
household products can be rationally evaluated without considering the
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A product’s design is “defective” under a risk-utility test if the costs of
avoiding a particular hazard are foreseeably less than the resulting safety
benefits. In other words, if the costs of a precaution were foreseeably less
than the precaution’s safety benefits, a product designed without the precaution is defective under the cost-benefit (“risk-utility”) standard of liability.86
Costs and benefits should be limited to those that are foreseeable,87 and both
should be calculated for the entire product line88 for some substantial period
of time.89 The risk-utility test for establishing design defectiveness is unaffected by whether the underlying theory of recovery is negligence, strict liability in tort,90 or even implied warranty,91 because the appropriate balance
product’s warnings. Thus, for example, what is the risk of the design of a
power saw, or other power tools or equipment, without considering the
product’s directions and warnings? We dare say that the risk would be astronomically, and irrationally, high. The same could be said about common garden pesticides, or even the household microwave oven. [W]ere
we to ask jurors to evaluate the risks of the design of many household
products without considering their directions or warnings, the practical result would be the withdrawal from the market of many useful products
that are dangerous in the abstract but safe when used as directed.
Id. at 276 n.9, 278 (noting that Dean John Wade “expressly lists consideration of
warnings or instructions as a factor relevant to the determination of whether a product
is unreasonably dangerous,” referring to Dean Wade’s factor number six, discussed
below). See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2(b) cmt. f
(1998) (among “broad range of factors” relevant to design defectiveness are “the
instructions and warnings accompanying the product”). See also id. at cmt. l.
86. See, e.g., Warner Fruehauf Trailer Co. v. Boston, 654 A.2d 1272, 1276 (D.C.
1995) (plaintiff must show “‘that the magnitude of the danger from the product outweighed the costs of avoiding the danger’”). On the formulation of such a test, see
Owen, Toward a Proper Test, supra note 7, at 1686-90.
87. See, e.g., Coleman v. Cintas Sales Corp., 40 S.W.3d 544, 549 (Tex. App.
2001) (employee uniforms need not be flame retardant when there is no foreseeable
risk that they will be exposed to fire); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB.
§ 2(b) cmt. a (design may be defective “only when risks are reasonably foreseeable”).
88. Courts should guard against the tendency of juries to narrowly compare the
individuated costs of precaution and safety benefits of the particular accident in the
case at hand which, of course, is never the proper form of cost-benefit calculation for
establishing design defectiveness.
89. The period selected, whether one year or the projected lifetime of the product
line, generally should not matter provided it is large enough to establish a standard
rate and that both costs and benefits are measured over the same period.
90. See, e.g., Banks v. ICI Ams., Inc., 450 S.E.2d 671, 674 n.3 (Ga. 1994) (“the
determination of whether a product was defective (involving the reasonableness of a
manufacturer’s design decision), which is a basic inquiry for strict liability purposes,
generally will overlap the determination of whether the manufacturer’s conduct was
reasonable, which is a basic inquiry for negligence purposes”); Phillips v. Kimwood
Mach. Co., 525 P.2d 1033, 1039 (Or. 1974) (“It is necessary to remember that whether the doctrine of negligence . . . or strict liability is being used to impose liability, the
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between a particular design feature’s safety, costs, and effect on product utility remains the same.92
The cost-benefit test,93 in balancing the safety benefits of avoiding a particular risk against the avoidance costs (“burdens”), is especially well suited
to establishing the safety or defectiveness of a product design.94 The type and
degree of design safety required in any situation depends upon the type, likelihood, and amount of harm (viewed together as the magnitude of the risk)
same process is going on in each instance, i.e., weighing the utility of the article
against the risk of its use.”). See also Ackerman v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 586 N.W.2d
208, 220 (Iowa 1998) (“a growing number of courts and commentators have found
that, in cases in which the plaintiff’s injury is caused by an alleged defect in the design of a product, there is no practical difference between theories of negligence and
strict liability”); Foley v. Clark Equip. Co., 523 A.2d 379, 388-89 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1987) (“The risk/utility analysis is nothing more than a detailed version of the balancing process used in evaluating reasonable care in negligence cases. . . . Because
strict liability and negligence employ the same balancing process to assess liability,
proof sufficient to establish liability under one theory will in most instances be sufficient under the other.”).
Note, however, that many courts formerly distinguished strict liability from
negligence on the basis of the foreseeability of the costs and benefits of improving the
product’s design safety, and a few still do. See, e.g., Blue v. Envtl. Eng’g, Inc., 828
N.E.2d 1128, 1152, 1153 (Ill. 2005) (Fitzgerald, J., concurring) (“‘In negligence,
foreseeability of harm is a fact question, whereas, in strict liability, a product’s propensity to inflict harm is assumed.’”). Because most courts and commentators now
believe that a plaintiff must establish the foreseeability of harm (manufacturers rarely
challenge the foreseeability of precautionary costs) in “strict” tort actions as well as in
negligence, cost-benefit (risk-utility) analysis should normally be identical in both
contexts. The foreseeability issue is addressed in the discussion of the so-called
Wade–Keeton constructive knowledge test, infra Part VII, and is further examined in
the “state of the art” context in OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW, supra note 13, §
10.4.
91. See, e.g., Gregory v. Cincinnati Inc., 538 N.W.2d 325, 329 (Mich. 1995).
The application of tort-like risk-utility principles to implied warranty claims is widely
accepted. See U.C.C § 2-314 cmt. 7 (2003); OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW, supra
note 13, § 4.3. But see Denny v. Ford Motor Co., 662 N.E.2d 730 (N.Y. 1995).
92. At least in the absence of a manufacturer’s specific safety representations,
which may give rise to specific consumer expectations protectable in warranty. See,
e.g., Denny, 662 N.E.2d 730 (rollover of Bronco II); Leichtamer v. Am. Motors
Corp., 424 N.E.2d 568 (Ohio 1981) (pitch-over of Jeep). See generally Shapo, supra
note 40.
93. Although the “risk-utility” term has been gaining ground in recent years over
the more traditional “risk-benefit” phraseology, “cost-benefit” is the preferable term.
See Owen, Toward a Proper Test, supra note 7, at 1692. The terms are used interchangeably here.
94. Courts have found the risk-benefit test most helpful in making design defectiveness determinations and only marginally helpful in warning cases. In manufacturing flaw cases decided in strict tort, this method of analysis has been virtually
ignored.
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that a particular burden of precaution (of a particular cost) may be expected to
prevent.95 If the risk posed by the design of a product in a certain manner is
great, greater precautions must be taken to avert the risk; if the risk is small,
less precaution is required. This principle of balance, inherent in tort law
generally, is sometimes referred to as the “calculus of risk.”
The most celebrated formulation of the risk-benefit test was provided by
Judge Learned Hand in United States v. Carroll Towing Co.96 In Carroll
Towing, Judge Hand reasoned that ascertaining an appropriate level of precaution is normally a function of three factors: the burden of taking precautions to avoid a risk of harm, on the one side, balanced against the likelihood
of harm of a particular magnitude, on the other. Negligence is implied if an
actor fails to adopt a precaution of less magnitude than the harm it is likely to
prevent. Judge Hand expressed this concept algebraically: negligence is suggested if B < P x L, where B is the burden or cost of adopting precautions
against accidental loss that foreseeably might result if B is not undertaken, P
is the increased probability of loss if B is not undertaken, and L is the probable magnitude (expected cost) of such loss if it does occur. This is the socalled “Hand formula.”97 If the formula is supplemented with a symbol for
the implication ( ) of negligence (N), the full formula becomes:
B < P x L N. Applied to negligence determinations in the products liability context, the Hand formula may be explained as follows: if the cost of
adopting a particular safety precaution (B) is less than the safety gains expected to result therefrom (P x L), the manufacturer’s failure to adopt the
precaution implies its negligence ( N).
By substituting “defect” for “negligence” (D for N), the Hand formula
converts comfortably to the “strict” products liability task of determining

95. For example, if the risk at issue concerns the possible failure of an automobile’s steering, brakes, or tires at highway speeds, or the possibility that a punch press
ram may unexpectedly depress upon an operator’s hand, the manufacturer must employ the utmost precautions to avert the risk. Yet, if the risk is relatively minimal,
reasonably appearing to involve at most the risk of minor harm to person or property – scratches, stains, or the harmless malfunction of the product – then a manufacturer need apply only minimal precautions to reduce such risks.
96. 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947). Hand first employed this approach in
Conway v. O’Brien, 111 F.2d 611 (2d Cir. 1940), rev’d on other grounds, 312 U.S.
492 (1941), and subsequently reexamined it in Moisan v. Loftus, 178 F.2d 148, 149
(2d Cir. 1949). The Carroll Towing case is examined in the negligence context in
OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW, supra note 13, § 2.2, and the strict liability in tort
context in id. § 5.7.
97. Perhaps the most helpful accounts of Carroll Towing and the Hand formula
are Gilles, Carroll Towing, supra note 74, and Gilles, Invisible Hand, supra note 74.
For other treatments, see supra note 79.
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design defectiveness.98 So reformulated, the defectiveness “equation” may be
stated as follows:
B<PxL

D

In cost-benefit terms, the formula looks like this:
(Accident Prevention) Costs < (Safety) Benefits

Defect

In short, a product’s design is defective if the safety benefits of an untaken
design precaution99 foreseeably exceed its costs.100
Based on certain imprecise language in some early scholarly explorations into the meaning of product defectiveness,101 most appellate courts formulate the risk-utility test more broadly in terms of whether a product’s risks
are greater than its benefits or utility.102 While such a formulation may appear harmless at first glance, it is logically misleading and in fact conflicts
with how the law actually is applied. As discussed below,103 the proper issue
almost always litigated in trial courtrooms is the narrow “micro-balance” of
pros and cons of a manufacturer’s failure to adopt some particular design
feature that would have prevented the plaintiff’s harm – that is, whether the
costs of changing the design in some particular (“micro”) manner would have
been worth the resulting safety benefits.104 Courts could avoid considerable

98. See OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW, supra note 13, § 5.7. See generally
Owen, Toward a Proper Test, supra note 7, at 1684-86.
99. For Mark Grady’s insightful analysis of untaken precautions, see Mark F.
Grady, Untaken Precautions, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 139 (1989); Mark F. Grady, A New
Positive Economic Theory of Negligence, 92 YALE L.J. 799, 815, 814-17 (1983).
100. In addition to dollar costs, “costs” here broadly includes any diminished
usefulness or diminished safety that may result from the particular precaution. See
Owen, Toward a Proper Test, supra note 7, at 1690.
101. See Keeton, Current Developments, supra note 7, at 210; Wade, On the
Nature, supra note 7, at 837 (first two factors framed in global terms). See generally
Owen, Toward a Proper Test, supra note 7, at 1683 n.74.
102. See Owen, Risk-Utility Balancing, supra note 74 (surveying risk-utility tests
among states).
103. See infra Part V.
104. RICHARD J. HEAFEY & DON M. KENNEDY, PRODUCT LIABILITY: WINNING
STRATEGIES AND TECHNIQUES §§ 4.04, 4.05, at 4-9 (1994) (characterizing the manufacturer’s choice to forego a reasonable alternative design as “the heart of the plaintiff’s case”); John Prather Brown, Toward an Economic Theory of Liability, 2 J.
LEGAL STUD. 323, 342 (1973). See also Rheingold, Risk/Utility Test, supra note 3, at
50 (“The usual and proper approach for a plaintiff in a design defect case is to present
evidence on an alternative design which the jury can find should have been adopted
for the product in question.”).
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confusion by formulating the risk-utility standard according to the proper
cost-benefit terms of the Hand formula.105
The Hand defectiveness formula succinctly captures the commonsense
idea that a product’s design is unacceptably dangerous if it contains a danger
that might cost-effectively (and practicably) be removed. More basically, the
Hand formula requires manufacturers, in designing products, to consider risks
of injury to consumers and bystanders and weigh the interests of those parties
fairly in relation to their own interest in maximizing profits.106 In designing
products in particular ways, manufacturers properly consider such factors as
their usefulness, cost, and profitability. Yet the Hand formula ensures that
manufacturers, in legislating for consumers a particular mix of a product’s
cost and benefits, include in the balance a proportionate consideration of the
various hazards in the product’s particular design. It may be true, of course,
that manufacturers should give safety a greater weight than cold cost-benefit
analysis might suggest, since individual consumers have little voice in the
collective tradeoffs forced upon them.107 Yet, the risk-utility test has the
elasticity to absorb refinements of this type, demanding only that a manufacturer adopt design precautions proportionate to the magnitude of the expected
risk. This simple yet fundamental principle of defectiveness, which ties the
measure of precaution to the measure of risk, thus grounds the design safety
obligations of a manufacturer in both fairness and utility.

B. Burdens, Benefits, and Utility; the Wade Factors
In applying the risk-utility test, courts almost always properly restrict
their analysis to the narrow costs and benefits of some particular untaken
design precaution, as mentioned above and discussed in detail below.108 Not
infrequently, however, appellate courts open a Pandora’s Box by formulating
the risk-utility calculus more widely. For example, in Banks v. ICI Americas,
Inc.,109 in adopting a risk-benefit test for evaluating design defectiveness, the
Georgia Supreme Court remarked: “no finite set of factors can be considered
comprehensive or applicable under every factual circumstance, since such
matters must necessarily vary according to the unique facts of each case.
Such diverse matters as competing cost trade-offs, tactical market decisions,
product development and research/testing demands, the idiosyncrasies of
individual corporate management styles, and federal and other regulatory
105. See Owen, Risk-Utility Balancing, supra note 74.
106. See David G. Owen, Philosophical Foundations of Fault in Tort Law, in
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 201, 214-15 (David G. Owen ed., 1995);
Owen, Moral Foundations, supra note 40. The basic economics of this perspective
are explained in Judge Richard A. Posner’s classic essay, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J.
LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972).
107. See Geistfeld, supra note 74.
108. See infra Part V.
109. 450 S.E.2d 671 (Ga. 1994).
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restrictions” can properly enter into the determination of the “reasonableness”
of the manufacturer’s design determination.110 The court offered the following “non-exhaustive list of general factors,” beginning with what might be
labeled “risk factors”:
the usefulness of the product; the gravity and severity of the danger…; the likelihood of that danger; the avoidability of the danger,
i.e., the user’s knowledge of the product, publicity surrounding the
danger, or the efficacy of warnings, as well as common knowledge
and the expectation of danger; the user’s ability to avoid danger;
the state of the art . . . ; the ability to eliminate danger without impairing the usefulness of the product or making it too expensive;
and the feasibility of spreading the loss in the setting of the product’s price or by purchasing insurance.111
The court then listed the “[a]lternative safe design factors” also pertinent
to the issue: “the feasibility of an alternative design; the availability of an
effective substitute for the product which meets the same need but is safer;
the financial cost of the improved design; and the adverse effects from the
alternative.”112 Finally, the court set forth “benefit factors” that may also be
considered in the balancing test: “the appearance and aesthetic attractiveness
of the product; its utility for multiple uses; the convenience and extent of its
use, especially in light of the period of time it could be used [safely]; and the
collateral safety of a feature other than the one that harmed the plaintiff.”113
No doubt many (perhaps most) of the factors from this long list 114
should be considered by manufacturers making fully informed design decisions about their products. And most of the listed factors will surely be legitimate issues in different kinds of design cases confronting courts over time.
Indeed, the Georgia court’s “alternative safe design” factors usually will be
important for both manufacturers making design decisions and courts adjudicating the safety or defectiveness of particular designs after product accidents
have occurred, as discussed below.115 But such a wide and open-ended catalogue of factors provides little help for adjudicating the design defect issue in
particular cases,116 and a practicable “test” for design defectiveness must be
formulated far more narrowly in terms of the particular types of costs and
benefits normally at issue in typical design defect cases.

110. Id. at 675.
111. Id. at n.6.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Thirty-three, by one count.
115. See infra Part V.
116. For an effort, see Moore v. ECI Mgmt., 542 S.E.2d 115 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000)
(applying multi-factor risk-utility test to washer/dryer design defect claim).
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Over-broad formulations of risk-utility analysis for design defect decisionmaking are traceable to a widely quoted set of liability factors proposed
in an early, influential article written by Dean John Wade,117 On the Nature of
Strict Tort Liability for Products.118 Dean Wade proposed that a court119
consider the following list of factors:
(1) The usefulness and desirability of the product – its utility to the
user and to the public as a whole.
(2) The safety aspects of the product – the likelihood that it will
cause injury, and the probable seriousness of the injury.
(3) The availability of a substitute product which would meet the
same need and not be as unsafe.
(4) The manufacturer’s ability to eliminate the unsafe character of
the product without impairing its usefulness or making it too expensive to maintain its utility.
(5) The user’s ability to avoid danger by the exercise of care in the
use of the product.
(6) The user’s anticipated awareness of the dangers inherent in the
product and their avoidability, because of general public knowledge of the obvious condition of the product, or of the existence of
suitable warnings or instructions.
(7) The feasibility, on the part of the manufacturer, of spreading
the loss by setting the price of the product or carrying liability insurance.
Searching for some guidance in the murky sea of design defectiveness,
appellate courts quickly grasped onto the Wade factors for use in ascertaining

117. Indeed, the Banks court’s first list of factors, the risk factors, was largely a
restatement of Dean Wade’s seven factors.
118. Wade, On the Nature, supra note 7, at 837-38.
119. But Dean Wade believed that a court should not instruct the jury on the factors. Id. at 840. Courts largely have agreed. See, e.g., Fiorino v. Sears Roebuck &
Co., 707 A.2d 1053, 1057-58 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998) (including factor seven
in jury instruction is reversible error because it improperly introduces insurance into
case). But see, e.g., Potter v. Chi. Pneumatic Tool Co., 694 A.2d 1319 (Conn. 1997)
(in risk-utility balancing, jury may consider Wade factors among others); Turner v.
Gen. Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844, 848-49 (Tex. 1979).
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defects in design,120 saying that these factors were somehow relevant to design defect cases.121 However, while courts across the continent have authoritatively quoted these six or seven122 factors for decades, only infrequently
do courts actually try to apply the factors in assessing whether a particular
product was defective in design. Even more rarely has an application of these
factors actually helped a court determine design defectiveness;123 more typically, a court attempting to apply the factors has become ensnared in one of
their many traps.124
Despite some early favorable commentary on the Wade factor approach,125 commentators now view most of the Wade factors as problematic.126 The first factor, the utility of the product, has been criticized on
120. See, e.g., Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng’g Co., 386 A.2d 816 (N.J. 1978), overruled in part on other grounds by Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 406
A.2d 140 (N.J. 1979); Roach v. Kononen, 525 P.2d 125, 129 (Or. 1974) (“We agree
that these factors should be considered by a court before submitting a design defect
case to the jury. Also, proof of these factors bears on the jury’s determination of
whether or not a given design is defective.”).
For an inspired reduction of the Wade and other factors, see John E. Montgomery & David G. Owen, Reflections on the Theory and Administration of Strict
Tort Liability for Defective Products, 27 S.C. L. REV. 803, 818 (1976) (proposing
four elegantly crafted factors).
121. For more recent recitations of the Wade factors, see, for example, Akee v.
Dow Chem. Co., 272 F. Supp. 2d 1112, 1132 (D. Haw. 2003); LaBelle v. Philip Morris, Inc., 243 F. Supp. 2d 508, 515 n.4 (D.S.C. 2001); Barton v. Adams Rental, Inc.,
938 P.2d 532, 537 (Colo. 1997); Potter v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., 694 A.2d
1319, 1333-34; Calles v. Scripto-Tokai Corp., 864 N.E.2d 249, 264-69 (Ill. 2007);
Wortel v. Somerset Indus., 770 N.E.2d 1211, 1218 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002); Smith v.
Mack Trucks, Inc., 819 So. 2d 1258, 1263 (Miss. 2002); Bass v. Air Prods. &
Chems., Inc., No. ESX-L-694-99, 2006 WL 1419375, at *12 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. May 25, 2006); Denny v. Ford Motor Co., 662 N.E.2d 730, 735 (N.Y. 1995);
Brown v. Crown Equip. Corp., 181 S.W.3d 268, 282-83 (Tenn. 2005); Ray v. BIC
Corp., 925 S.W.2d 527, 533 n.10 (Tenn. 1996).
122. Many courts have left out the seventh factor, loss-spreading, as discussed
below.
123. Monahan v. Toro Co., 856 F. Supp. 955 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (astute application
of factors).
124. See, e.g., Johansen v. Makita U.S.A., Inc., 607 A.2d 637, 645 (N.J. 1992)
(court should have instructed jury not to consider evidence of plaintiff’s lack of care
in deciding question of product defect, because fifth factor pertained only to users
generally, not to particular plaintiff’s conduct); cf. Murphy v. Playtex Family Prods.
Corp., 176 F. Supp. 2d 473, 490-91 (D. Md. 2001), aff’d, 69 F. App’x 140 (4th Cir.
2003) (the court valiantly tried to apply the factors, yet ended up basing its determination on the reasonableness of the defendant’s actions).
125. See, e.g., Montgomery & Owen, supra note 120.
126. See, e.g., RICHARD ALLEN EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD
239-45 (1995); VISCUSI, REFORMING, supra note 74, at 62-86; Epstein, supra note 22;
Green, supra note 7, at 615-16; Viscusi, Wading, supra note 74.
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political grounds for allowing courts to second-guess the market as to the
desirability of different kinds of products. In particular, this factor seems to
reflect “the fallacy that ‘essentials’ provide utility whereas ‘luxuries’ do
not.”127 Factor two, on the other hand, which embraces the P x L (risk of
harm) side of the Hand formula discussed above, is vital to intelligent costbenefit decisionmaking.128
The third factor, the availability of a substitute product, is difficult to interpret. If it is read narrowly to mean the availability of a substitute design
feature, then it properly introduces the necessarily central question in design
defect analysis of the availability of a feasible and otherwise reasonable alternative design feature, a crucial issue discussed below.129 If, on the other
hand, this factor is interpreted literally, as Dean Wade probably intended it,130
the availability of substitute “products” falls victim to the flaw infecting the
first factor by inviting a judge or jury to engage in social engineering of the
highest (and most dubious) order. Factor four, the manufacturer’s ability to
eliminate the risk without unduly sacrificing price or utility, properly raises
the relevant issues of the costs and benefits of altering the chosen design to
eliminate the risk. Indeed, factors two and four together form the heart of
proper cost-benefit analysis in design defect litigation.
Factor five, the user’s ability to avoid the risk, importantly introduces
the issue of consumer responsibility into the matrix. Its only fault lies in its
tendency to mislead courts, and especially juries, into confusing the proper
issue of how users generally may act, on the one hand, with the improper
issue of whether the particular plaintiff behaved appropriately in using the
particular product in the manner that led to the accident, on the other.131 The
sixth factor, the user’s awareness of the danger and avoidance techniques, is
problematic. Its most reasonable interpretation appears to be subjective,
which then introduces the plaintiff’s conduct into the prima facie case of design defectiveness, rather than leaving it as an affirmative defense where it
more properly belongs. If, on the other hand, this factor is interpreted with
some strain as a broader inquiry into the extent to which consumers generally
may be expected to comprehend a product’s dangers, it would fit nicely with
(although should precede) factor five, which in combination would present

127. Viscusi, Wading, supra note 74, at 582.
128. See id. at 583.
129. See infra Part V.
130. This interpretation springs from the need to differentiate factor three from
factor four which appears to cover the feasible alternative design issue.
131. See, e.g., Johansen v. Makita U.S.A., Inc., 607 A.2d 637, 645-46 (N.J. 1992)
(court should have instructed jury not to consider evidence of plaintiff’s lack of care
in deciding the question of product defect, because the fifth factor pertained only to
users generally, not to particular plaintiff’s conduct). While irrelevant to duty, the
propriety of the particular user’s conduct is relevant to the misconduct defenses. See
OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW, supra note 13, ch. 13.
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the important issues on the proper allocation of responsibility for product
accidents between manufacturers and users.
The final Wade factor, number seven, is especially problematic as a factor for design liability decisionmaking. As a rationale for a generalized doctrine of strict tort liability for manufacturers, “loss-spreading” (“insurance” by
another name) has been viewed in recent decades with increasing skepticism.132 If the strict products liability litigation system is to serve as a substitute for private and social insurance, it must force people to buy types and
levels of insurance that many neither need nor want, and at excessive cost.
By so requiring consumers to pay higher prices for products as a form of
product accident insurance, loss-spreading may be seen as both unfair133 and
inefficient.134 Poor people pay regressively unfair premiums (or “taxes,”
when the tort system substitutes for social welfare insurance) for this form of
insurance,135 and the litigation method for determining whether particular
accidents are covered by the system (whether a product is “defective,” whether jurisdiction is proper, whether any defenses apply, etc.) is exceedingly
time-consuming, enervating, and expensive. For the most serious accidents,
where a victim’s compensation needs are immediate and immense, it may
take five or even ten years to complete the litigation compensation process.
And in the end, the victim may lose the case and end up with no compensation whatsoever. In short, design defect liability is a poor means for society
to spread the losses that result from product accidents.
As a factor for helping assess whether particular products are defective,
loss-spreading is even more seriously flawed, because it will always point
toward liability: a finding of design defectiveness resulting in a judgment for
the plaintiff will always spread the plaintiff’s loss, at least among the shareholders of the manufacturer.136 But the rationale for properly limiting a man132. On the nature and problems of loss-spreading as a products liability rationale,
see OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW, supra note 13, § 5.4.
133. See, e.g., Owen, Moral Foundations, supra note 40, at 484-93.
134. See, e.g., George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort
Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521 (1987); Viscusi, Wading, supra note 74, at 584-91.
135. George Priest explains that the level of insurance “premiums” manufacturers
add to product prices regressively penalizes the poor who stand to gain far less in
damages for lost earnings than wealthy victims who pay the same premium for much
higher coverage. See, e.g., Priest, supra note 134, at 1558-60.
136. See David G. Owen, Products Liability: Principles of Justice for the 21st
Century, 11 PACE L. REV. 63, 71-72 (1990); Gary T. Schwartz, Foreward: Understanding Products Liability, 67 CAL. L. REV. 435, 445 (1979):
[T]he loss-spreading criterion, when offered as a rationale for any tort law
rule, seems inherently unstable, since it is in a basic sense promiscuous. If
loss spreading is deemed the law’s fundamental purpose, a compensation
right should accordingly be extended to the victim of every serious accident, without regard to the involvement in that accident of any product.
Yet tort law as we know it is “tort law” instead of a compensation program exactly because it is selective – that is, because the liability rules it
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ufacturer’s liability to designs that are defective is to distinguish between
products whose design dangers are acceptable from those that are not,137 as
previously discussed. Including loss-spreading, or any other factor that always weighs on the same side of the scales, can only subvert the process of
fair and rational adjudication of design defectiveness.138 As a result, this
seventh, loss-spreading factor sometimes is excluded from the list as inappropriate.139
It is understandable that in the early days of modern products liability
courts looked for guidance to the Wade factors which had an aura of logic,
fairness, and commonsense. Indeed, modern products liability law has absorbed many of Dean Wade’s factors in a variety of ways. But modern design defect jurisprudence has moved well beyond the place it was when Dean
Wade conceived it at the time § 402A was just getting off the ground. Indeed, modern courts rarely do little more than pay lip service to the Wade
factors, which are now well past their prime. Typically, a court will recite the
factors and then move on to a far more narrow and appropriate cost-benefit
analysis of some particular design feature offered by the plaintiff as a safer
and preferred alternative design.140 In short, the design defect bus long ago
left the “catalogue of factors” station and now rides comfortably on the
wheels of costs and benefits of alternative designs.141

C. The Products Liability Restatement
The Products Liability Restatement explicitly adopts risk-utility balancing as the test for design defectiveness.142 In essence, § 2(b) of the Third
Restatement classifies a design as defective if the plaintiff suffered a foreseeable injury that could have been prevented by a reasonable alternative de-

fashions exclude recovery for some accident victims while permitting recovery for others.
137. See James Henderson’s classic rock-tub metaphor, in James A. Henderson,
Jr., Should a “Process Defense” Be Recognized in Product Design Cases?, 56 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 585, 601-03 (1981).
138. See Owen, Moral Foundations, supra note 40, at 492-93; David G. Owen,
Rethinking the Policies of Strict Products Liability, 33 VAND. L. REV. 681, 703-07
(1980).
139. See, e.g., Nunnally v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 869 So. 2d 373, 380
(Miss. 2004).
140. See, e.g., In re September 11 Litig., 280 F. Supp. 2d 279, 312-13 (S.D.N.Y.
2003); Barton v. Adams Rental, Inc., 938 P.2d 532, 537 (Colo. 1997); Nunnally, 869
So. 2d at 380; Brooks v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 902 P.2d 54, 61 n.2 (N.M. 1995);
Denny v. Ford Motor Co., 662 N.E.2d 730, 735 (N.Y. 1995); Irion v. Sun Lighting,
Inc., No. M2002-00766-COA-R3-CV, 2004 WL 746823, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr.
7, 2004).
141. See infra Part V.
142. See OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW, supra note 13, § 6.5.
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sign.143 Section 2(b) thus “adopts a reasonableness (‘risk-utility balancing’)
test as the standard for judging the defectiveness of product designs.”144
Numerous factors may be relevant to “whether an alternative design is reasonable and whether its omission renders a product not reasonably safe” under § 2(b), including the likelihood and seriousness of foreseeable harm from
the chosen design, warnings accompanying the product,145 and the relative
costs and benefits of the alternative design relative to the chosen design.146
Finally, it is important to note that while the Restatement rejects consumer
expectations as an independent basis for ascertaining the defectiveness of
product designs, it includes consumer expectations as a factor in the calculus
of risk-utility considerations.147 The Third Restatement’s treatment of these
and other aspects of design defectiveness is explored in greater depth below.148

V. PROOF OF A REASONABLE ALTERNATIVE DESIGN
Just as design defectiveness lies at the center of products liability law,149
cost-benefit analysis of an alternative design lies at the heart of design defectiveness.150 As examined earlier,151 design defectiveness is usually best resolved by risk-utility analysis, the purpose of which is to determine “whether
the risk of injury might have been reduced or avoided if the manufacturer had

143. See id. The Restatement addresses the special, narrow category of generically dangerous products that may possess a manifestly unreasonable design in comment e. See OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW, supra note 13, § 10.3.
144. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2(b) cmt. d (1998).
145. Id. cmt. f.
146. Including the effects the alternative design feature would likely have on
production costs, product longevity, maintenance, repair, aesthetics, and “the range of
consumer choice.” Id.
147. See id. cmt. g.
148. See infra Part VIII.
149. See supra Part I.
150. See, e.g., Jones v. NordicTrack, Inc., 550 S.E.2d 101, 103 (Ga. 2001) (“The
‘heart’ of a design defect case is the reasonableness of selecting from among alternative product designs and adopting the safest feasible one. [Hence, the question in
such cases is] whether the defendant failed to adopt a reasonable alternative design
which would have reduced the foreseeable risks of harm presented by the product.”).
See also Ford Motor Co. v. Miles, 967 S.W.2d 377, 386 (Tex. 1998) (Owen, J., concurring) (examining “the risk versus utility analysis that lies at the core of products
liability design defect law”).
151. See supra Part IV; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB.
§ 1 cmt. a (1998); id. § 2(b) cmt. d. The Third Restatement approach to design defectiveness, which requires the plaintiff in design defect cases to prove that a “reasonable
alternative design” would have prevented the injury, is examined in OWEN, PRODUCTS
LIABILITY LAW, supra note 13, § 6.5; infra Part VIII.
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used a feasible alternative design.”152 In the words of the late Gary T.
Schwartz, a leading tort law scholar, “one simply cannot talk meaningfully
about a risk-benefit defect until and unless one has identified some design
alternative (including any design omission) that can serve as the basis for a
risk-benefit analysis.”153
Throughout the twentieth century, the great majority of design defect
cases have involved proof by the plaintiff of a feasible alternative design –
proof of some practicable, cost-effective, untaken design precaution that
would have prevented the plaintiff’s harm.154 For example, the cases include
a manifold that exploded, where the resulting fire could have been contained
by chamber walls made of copper or brass, instead of steel;155 a commercial
coffee urn that exploded, where the explosion could have been prevented by a
simple reducing valve;156 a tractor steering wheel made of rubber and fiber
that broke in the driver’s hands, where a rim made of wood or metal would
not have broken;157 a vaporizer that overheated and caught fire when the water boiled away, where the fire could have been prevented by a simple cutoff
device;158 a moving metal mechanism under the arm-rest of a lawn chair that
amputated a user’s finger, where a simple housing could have shielded the
mechanism;159 a drain cleaner comprised of chemicals that were highly corrosive to human skin, where a change in the chemical formulation would have
made it much safer and actually improved its efficacy at cleaning drains;160 a
Dalkon Shield IUD that had a multi-filament tail string, facilitating migration
of bacteria into the uterus, where a single filament would have minimized the
risk;161 an industrial machine with a sharp edge that cut a worker, where the
sharp edge served no purpose and could easily have been rounded smooth;162
152. McCarthy v. Olin Corp., 119 F.3d 148, 155 (2d Cir. 1997) (N.Y. law).
153. Schwartz, supra note 136, at 468. One of the most prominent tort law scholars of the late twentieth century, Gary Schwartz was a professor at UCLA, an adviser
for the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability and the initial Reporter for the
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm (Basic Principles). Most other products liability commentators agree with Professor Schwartz’s
assertion quoted in the text. See, e.g., Green, supra note 7; Henderson & Twerski,
supra note 7; Owen, Defectiveness Restated, supra note 7, at 774-75.
154. See Dix W. Noel, Manufacturer’s Negligence of Design or Directions for
Use of a Product, 71 YALE L.J. 816, 820 (1962).
155. Air Reduction Co. v. Phila. Storage Battery Co., 14 F.2d 734, 736-37 (3d
Cir. 1926).
156. Muller v. A.B. Kirschbaum Co., 148 A. 851 (Pa. 1930).
157. Goullon v. Ford Motor Co., 44 F.2d 310 (6th Cir. 1930) (Ky. law).
158. Lindroth v. Walgreen Co., 87 N.E.2d 307 (Ill. App. Ct. 1949), aff’d, 94
N.E.2d 847 (Ill. 1950).
159. Matthews v. Lawnlite Co., 88 So. 2d 299 (Fla. 1956).
160. Drayton v. Jiffee Chem. Corp., 395 F. Supp. 1081 (N.D. Ohio 1975), judgment modified on other grounds, 591 F.2d 352 (6th Cir. 1978).
161. Hilliard v. A.H. Robins Co., 196 Cal. Rptr. 117 (Ct. App. 1983).
162. Stazenski v. Tennant Co., 617 So. 2d 344 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993).

25

324

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73

a small Playskool play block that asphyxiated a baby, where slightly increasing the size of the cylindrical block would have made it too big to swallow;163
and a truck liftgate equipped with a single hydraulic cylinder that was prone
to collapse unexpectedly, where the addition of a second cylinder would have
eliminated the risk.164
Without affirmative proof of a feasible design alternative, a plaintiff
usually cannot establish that a product’s design is defective. Put otherwise,
there typically is nothing wrong with a product that simply possesses inherent
dangers that cannot feasibly be designed away.165 For example, in Blissenbach v. Yanko,166 a child was injured by scalding water from a hot water vaporizer when it tipped over, causing the lid to fall off the top of the container.
The plaintiff alleged that the manufacturer’s failure to secure the lid to the
container was a negligent design, but the manufacturer defended on the
ground that the lid was left unattached in order to provide a “natural safety
valve” for the release of steam if the aperture for discharging medicated vapor
became clogged.167 In part because the plaintiff made no proof of a feasible
alternative design method for releasing steam, the plaintiff’s verdict was reversed on appeal.168 McCormack v. Hankscraft Co.169 was another vaporizer
tip-over case decided on similar facts except that the plaintiff’s experts established that the danger “could have been eradicated by the adoption of any one
of several practical and inexpensive alternative designs which utilized simple
and well known techniques to secure the top to the jar to the inside of the
plastic top so it could screw onto the jar and the putting of two or three small
holes in the top, which would take care of any danger that steam would build
up inside the jar.” Based on proof of such a feasible alternative design, the
McCormack court affirmed a verdict for the plaintiff.
Recognizing the central role of an alternative design to design defectiveness, many courts, perhaps most,170 hold that proof of a feasible design
alternative is generally, or always, a necessary element of design defectiveness: “[i]n order to prove defectiveness, the plaintiff must prove that a safer,
practical, alternative design was available to the manufacturer.”171 Most
163. Metzgar v. Playskool Inc., 30 F.3d 459 (3d Cir. 1994) (Pa. law).
164. Warner Fruehauf Trailer Co. v. Boston, 654 A.2d 1272 (D.C. 1995).
165. See OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW, supra note 13, §§ 6.2, 10.3.
166. 107 N.E.2d 409 (Ohio Ct. App. 1951).
167. Id. at 411.
168. See Noel, supra note 154, at 823.
169. 154 N.W.2d 488, 495 (Minn. 1967).
170. See Hernandez v. Tokai Corp., 2 S.W.3d 251 (Tex. 1999) (asserting that
most states make proof of a reasonable alternative design a prerequisite to a determination of design defectiveness).
171. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Edwards, 482 So. 2d 1176, 1191 (Ala. 1985), overruled on other grounds by Schwartz v. Volvo N. Am. Corp., 554 So. 2d 927 (Ala.
1989); accord Wankier v. Crown Equip. Corp., 353 F.3d 862 (10th Cir. 2003) (Utah
law) (trial court’s failure to instruct jury on plaintiff’s duty to establish safer alterna-
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courts properly hold that the plaintiff has the burden of proof on this issue,172
and if a plaintiff fails to present sufficient evidence on this point, a design
defect claim ordinarily will fail.173 In some states, statutes require plaintiffs
tive design was reversible error); Clinton v. Brown & Williamson Holdings, Inc., 498
F. Supp. 2d 639, 646 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (“proof of a feasible alternative design is a
required element of a prima facie design defect claim under New York law”); Bagley
v. Mazda Motor Corp., 864 So. 2d 301 (Ala. 2003); Parish v. Jumpking, Inc., 719
N.W.2d 540, 543 (Iowa 2006); Toyota Motor Corp. v. Gregory, 136 S.W.3d 35, 42
(Ky. 2004); Williams v. Bennett, 921 So. 2d 1269, 1275 (Miss. 2006) (“demonstrating a feasible alternative design as proof of a design defect is elemental to a claimant's
prima facie case”); AlliedSignal, Inc. v. Moran, 231 S.W.3d 16, 28-29 (Tex. App.
2007).
For an exhaustive (if increasingly dated) collection of authority on the extent
of each state’s commitment to a feasible alternative design requirement in design
defect cases, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2(b), Reporters’
Note to cmt. d (1998). The Reporters’ Note indicates that a large majority of courts,
either expressly or by implication, require the plaintiff in a design defect case to prove
a feasible alternative design. The cases on this point in many jurisdictions are jumbled and inconsistent, with the result that some commentators have interpreted them
quite differently as generally not requiring such proof. See, e.g., Howard Klemme,
Comments to the Reporters and Selected Members of the Consultative Group, Restatement of Torts (Third): Products Liability, 61 TENN. L. REV. 1173 (1994); Shapo,
supra note 18, at 668-71; Vandall, supra note 45; Vargo, supra note 3. As a matter of
practical jurisprudence, the Reporters appear correct in their view that, in most states,
the plaintiff appropriately will face a dismissal or directed verdict in most design
defect cases in the absence of proof of a feasible alternative design.
172. Despite a contrary rule in California and a small number of other states, the
plaintiff logically and fairly has the burden of proof on the feasibility and cost-effectiveness of the alternative design. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS.
LIAB. § 2(b) cmt. f; KEETON, DOBBS, KEETON & OWEN, supra note 59, § 99;
Schwartz, supra note 136, at 466-67; John W. Wade, On Product “Design Defects”
and Their Actionability, 33 VAND. L. REV. 551, 573 (1980) (criticizing cases that shift
the burden of proof to the defendant).
173. “Since plaintiff failed to present evidence that there was a safe and reasonably feasible alternative to defendants’ product, the trial court properly concluded that
there was no issue of design defect for the jury to determine.” Macri v. Ames McDonough Co., 512 A.2d 548, 551 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986) (hammer that
chipped). See also Smith v. Louisville Ladder Co., 237 F.3d 515 (5th Cir. 2001)
(Tex. law); Hollister v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 201 F.3d 731 (6th Cir. 2000) (Mich.
law) (negligence and implied warranty; state has no doctrine of strict liability in tort);
Whitted v. Gen. Motors Corp., 58 F.3d 1200, 1206 (7th Cir. 1995) (Ind. law) (summary judgment on strict liability design defect claim was proper where plaintiff failed
to prove a safer, more practicable, better product design that was cost-effective);
Warner Fruehauf Trailer Co. v. Boston, 654 A.2d 1272 (D.C. 1995); Kallio v. Ford
Motor Co., 407 N.W.2d 92, 96 (Minn. 1987); Williams v. Bennett, 921 So. 2d 1269,
1277 (Miss. 2006); Rix v. Gen. Motors Corp., 723 P.2d 195, 202 (Mont. 1986); Lewis
v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 715 A.2d 967 (N.J. 1998); Smith v. Keller Ladder Co., 645
A.2d 1269 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994) (ladder expert performed no risk-utility
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to prove a feasible alternative design, either in every case or with some limited exceptions.174 Other states that employ a risk-utility test implicitly
require such proof in most design defect cases.175 And a number of jurisdictions – sometimes noting the value of proof of a feasible alternative design,
other times observing how difficult and costly a requirement of such proof
would be for plaintiffs – explicitly reject any idea that proof of an alternative
design is a necessary element of a plaintiff’s design defect case.176
analysis and offered no evidence of reasonably feasible alternative design, offering
only conclusory testimony that design was defective; prima facie design defect case
requires plaintiff to prove availability of technically feasible, alternative practical
design that would have reduced or prevented plaintiff’s harm); Scarangella v. Thomas
Built Buses, Inc., 717 N.E.2d 679 (N.Y. 1999); Voss v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co.,
450 N.E.2d 204 (N.Y. 1983); Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 577 P.2d 1322, 1326-27
(Or. 1978).
174. Statutes in at least seven states require proof of a feasible alternative design
to establish liability in all or most design defect cases. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
9:2800.56 (1988); MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-1-63(f)(ii) (2004); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
2A:58C-3a(1) (1987); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-6(1) (1996); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2307.75(F) (2001 reenactment); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 82.005(1)
(1993); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 7.72.030(1)(a), (3) (1988). See, e.g., Williams v. Bennett, 921 So. 2d 1269, 1274 (Miss. 2006); Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc. v. Norman 104
S.W.3d 600 (Tex. App. 2003). Washington’s statute ambiguously provides for the
jury to consider such proof together with a consumer’s safety contemplations. See
Couch v. Mine Safety Appliances Co., 728 P.2d 585 (Wash. 1986). Statutes in New
Jersey and North Carolina make exceptions for cases for egregiously dangerous products. Illinois had such a provision that was part of a broad tort reform act that was
held unconstitutional. See Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057 (Ill. 1997).
175. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2(b), Reporters’
Notes to cmt. d (including Arizona, Florida, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Missouri,
New Hampshire, New Mexico, South Carolina, and Virginia in this list).
176. See, e.g., Boerner v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 260 F.3d 837 (8th
Cir. 2001) (Ark. law); Barton v. Adams Rental, Inc., 938 P.2d 532, 537 n.7 (Colo.
1997) (such evidence “may be a factor in the risk-benefit analysis”); Potter v. Chi.
Pneumatic Tool Co., 694 A.2d 1319, 1334 (Conn. 1997) (“The availability of a feasible alternative design is a factor that the plaintiff may, rather than must, prove in order
to establish that a product’s risks outweigh its utility.”); Delaney v. Deere and Co.,
999 P.2d 930, 944 (Kan. 2000); Smith v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., No.
WD 65542, 2007 WL 2175034, at *29 (Mo. Ct. App. July 31, 2007) (proof of alternative design may be introduced but is not required); Rahmig v. Mosley Mach. Co.,
412 N.W.2d 56 (Neb. 1987) (such evidence important but unnecessary under consumer expectations test); Vautour v. Body Masters Sports Indus., 784 A.2d 1178,
1183 (N.H. 2001) (“while proof of an alternative design is relevant in a design defect
case, it should be neither a controlling factor nor an essential element that must be
proved in every case”); McCathern v. Toyota Motor Corp., 23 P.3d 320, 331 (Or.
2001) (such evidence not always necessary); Potter v. Ford Motor Co., 213 S.W.3d
264, 269-70 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006) (evidence of alternative design “will always be
highly relevant and probative of the issue of whether a product was defective or unreasonably dangerous,” but it is not required). See Note, Just What You’d Expect:
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A. Risk-Utility Analysis of an Alternative Design
Although the risk-utility issue in design defect cases is frequently
framed vaguely in terms of a balance between the risks and benefits of the
“product,” the true cost-benefit issue litigated in almost every case is much
narrower – whether the safety benefits of altering the product’s design in a
particular manner would foreseeably have exceeded the costs of the alteration.177 Risk-utility analysis is focused, in other words, on the costs and benefits of the specific alternative design feature proposed by the plaintiff. The
relevant benefits of a proposed alternative design are limited to the aggregate
safety benefits to people suffering injury and property damage in accidents of
a similar type to that which harmed the plaintiff.178 But the costs of an alternative design feature more diversely may include: (1) the monetary costs of
adopting the alternative design for all such products; (2) any loss of usefulness in the product that the design alteration may cause; and (3) any new
dangers that the design feature may introduce.
The risk-utility (cost-benefit) issue often is conceptually quite simple:
whether the aggregate dollar costs of adding some safety feature proposed by
the plaintiff is or is not outweighed by the aggregate benefit of preventing
foreseeable accidents like that which injured the plaintiff. So, if an alternative safety feature would be expensive to adopt, and if it would be unlikely to
produce substantial safety benefits, it is not required.179 But a manufacturer
will fail the risk-utility test if it does not adopt a relatively inexpensive safety
feature that could appreciably improve a product’s safety, such as incorporating a child-resistant feature in a utility lighter for less than 5¢ per lighter;180
installing a $2.50 shield made of shatterproof glass over a pressure gauge to
protect a person’s eyes;181 including a $3 shield to cover the rear of a power

Professor Henderson’s Redesign of Products Liability, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2366, 2373
(1998) (requiring alternative design proof places a “potentially insurmountable stumbling block in the way of those injured by badly designed products”).
177. See Owen, Toward a Proper Test, supra note 7, at 1690; supra Part IV;
supra text accompanying notes 112-16.
178. Thus, a manufacturer may not introduce evidence of the collateral social
benefits from the production of cigarettes, such as profits, employment, benefits to
suppliers of goods and services, tax revenues paid, and charitable contributions made
to the community. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 644 F. Supp. 283, 286
(D.N.J. 1986); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2(b) cmt. f (1998);
Wright, supra note 7, at 1081; Griffin, supra note 74, at 616-19.
179. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2(b) cmt. f (noting that
a court should consider “the likely effects of the alternative design on production
costs”).
180. Flock v. Scripto-Tokai Corp., 319 F.3d 231, 240 (5th Cir. 2003) (Tex. law)
(at a total out-of-pocket cost to the company of $500,000).
181. Helicoid Gage Div. of Am. Chain & Cable Co. v. Howell, 511 S.W.2d 573
(Tex. App. 1974).
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mower;182 making a $5 – $10 alteration to a car’s engine hood shape to provide the driver with visibility if an improperly latched hood flies open while
driving,183 or adding an automatic shut-off feature that might cost as little as
$5 to a water heater in case it overheats.184 Because the cost of a safety improvement is weighed against the risk of harm it should prevent, even safety
features that substantially raise a product’s cost and price will sometimes be
required. If a guard costing $200 to $500 will protect an operator against a
substantial risk of losing a hand and arm in an $8,000 machine, the cost of
safety may be worth the benefit.185 And even if adding a child-proof device
to a disposable butane cigarette lighter increases its cost by as much as 60% –
75%, raising its price to that extent may be worth the benefit of substantially
reducing the massive accident costs regularly caused by children playing with
lighters not equipped with such a device.186
In addition to the actual dollar costs of enhancing a product’s safety,
risk-utility analysis of a plaintiff’s proposed alternative design requires consideration of another significant cost – any reduction in the product’s usefulness. Adding a guard to a punch press may help to keep out hands, but it may
preclude the operator from feeding large sheets of metal into the press and
may slow down production. Child-proofing tops of medicines and household
cleansers will reduce the number of small children poisoned by such products, but childproof designs may make such products useless to older persons
whose hands are weakened by arthritis. Adding flame repellant chemicals to
fabrics used for clothing will protect against fabric fire injuries, but such
chemicals may decrease a fabric’s comfort and durability, may make it more
difficult to wash out odors, and may make the fabric more prone to wrinkle
and more difficult to dry. Many hazards are serious enough that sacrificing a
little product usefulness in exchange for greater safety makes good sense.
But people buy and use products to help them with their labors and to give

182. S. Austin Drive-In Theatre v. Thomison, 421 S.W.2d 933 (Tex. App. 1967).
183. Roach v. Kononen, 525 P.2d 125 (Or. 1974).
184. A.O. Smith Corp. v. Settlement Inv. Mgmt., No. 2-04-270-CV, 2006 WL
176815, at *3 (Tex. App. Jan. 26, 2006) ($9,000 commercial water heater overheated
and caused fire).
185. See Dorsey v. Yoder Co., 331 F. Supp. 753 (E.D. Pa. 1971), aff’d, 474 F.2d
1339 (3d Cir. 1973). See also A.O. Smith Corp., 2006 WL 176815, at *2 (shut-off
feature might have cost as much as $200).
186. See Griggs v. BIC Corp., 981 F.2d 1429 (3d Cir. 1992) (Pa. law) (in early
1980s, increase of $.60-$.75 per lighter then costing under $1 apiece; 120 people
killed and 750 persons injured in such fires at annual national cost of $300-375 million); cf. Todd v. Societe BIC, S.A. (Todd II), 9 F.3d 1216, 1221 n.† (7th Cir. 1993)
(Ill. law) (Easterbrook, J.) (noting CPSC estimates that childproofing lighters would
raise their unit market price by only $.15-$.20 cents, but also noting the elusiveness of
such statistics).
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them satisfaction,187 so that sacrifices in a product’s utility are important costs
that must be carefully evaluated in assessing the costs and benefits of an alternative design.188
Another important (though less common) cost in the risk-utility evaluation of a plaintiff’s proposed alternative design is the possibility that it may
introduce new dangers into the product. That is, in eliminating one set of
dangers, the change in design proposed by the plaintiff may create new types
of dangers not present in the manufacturer’s chosen design. For example,
seatbelts and airbags of various designs protect the safety of many occupants
in certain collisions, but in other situations both seatbelts and airbags may
cause more harm than good.189 Guarding motorboat propellers presents
another example. Fitzpatrick v. Madonna190 was one of a number of cases
involving claims by swimmers injured or killed by motorboat propellers alleging that the propellers should have been shrouded with a guard. The benefit of such guards would be the large number of swimmers saved from harm.
But such devices are not without their costs, including reduced speed, reduced fuel efficiency, and reduced maneuverability. In addition, propeller
guards introduce a number of new risks, such as increasing the size of the
motor that can hit and injure swimmers and creating a trap in which human
limbs may become wedged near the moving propeller blades.191 Any such
new dangers that a proposed alternative design is likely to create are important costs which must be balanced against the alternative design’s safety ben-

187. Satisfaction may come from the senses, as from a pleasurable taste, or smell,
or touch; a motorcyclist’s pleasure of feeling the rushing air through an open design
of a motorcycle helmet might be worth the slightly increased dangers. And satisfaction may be aesthetic, such as the pleasure experienced by an owner of an especially
sleek, small sports car that may be much less safe than larger cars. Assuming in both
situations that the additional risks are widely known and appreciated, or fully disclosed to buyers, a trier of fact might well conclude that the benefits of the dangers
exceed the risks. Indeed, such dangers may properly be viewed as “inherent” in the
design. See OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW, supra note 13, § 10.3.
188. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2(b) cmt. f
(1998) (“evidence of the magnitude and probability of foreseeable harm may be offset
by evidence that the proposed alternative design would reduce the efficiency and
utility of the product”); BIC Pen Corp. v. Carter, 171 S.W.3d 657, 672 (Tex. App.
2005) (concluding, however, that a few complaints of reduced utility do not rise to the
level of “substantial” impairment required under statute to overcome benefits of childproof lighter’s safer alternative design).
189. See, e.g., Connelly v. Hyundai Motor Co., 351 F.3d 535, 541 (1st Cir. 2003)
(N.H. law) (jury entitled to find that design of aggressive front seat airbag was not
defective “because . . . on balance, the benefit to the public of including the overly
aggressive airbag system in the Sonata outweighed the danger caused by the airbag
system (because the system saved many more lives than it took)”).
190. 623 A.2d 322 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993).
191. Id. at 325.
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efits,192 such that the ultimate safety function in the calculus becomes the
overall (net) safety improvement in the alternative design.
Costs and benefits of differing alternative designs vary considerably
with the type of product, type of danger, and available methods for reducing
risk. But the basic risk-utility issue remains the same: whether the product
reasonably could have been designed more safely so as to prevent the plaintiff’s harm without unduly increasing the product’s cost, decreasing its utility,
or introducing other hazards. The Products Liability Restatement addresses
the relevant balance of costs and benefits in ascertaining a product’s design
defectiveness in terms of whether an alternative design is “reasonable” –
whether the safety advantages of the alternative design are on balance worth
its risks and other disadvantages.193

B. The “Feasibility” of an Alternative Design
An “alternative” design implies a reasonable choice between available
designs. A safety feature that a plaintiff claims a product should have carried
can fairly be considered a design “alternative” only if there was a practical
means by which a manufacturer reasonably could have adopted such a safety
feature at the time the product was designed and sold. Thus, the plaintiff
must prove that the alternative design, offered to show that the manufacturer’s chosen design was defective, was “feasible.”194 Because the feasibil192. See, e.g., Crespo v. Chrysler Corp., 75 F. Supp. 2d 225, 228 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)
(“This requirement that the alternative design be not only feasible but also safer for
the relevant users is vital, for otherwise a plaintiff could recover simply by showing
that a product could feasibly and without loss of utility be designed in such a way as
to avoid injury to him alone even though the change would inflict injury on numerous
others – an absurd position.”); Phatak v. United Chair Co., 756 A.2d 690, 695 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 2000) (automobile resembling tank “might make its occupants safer, but if
in so doing it creates an unacceptable hazard to other motorists or pedestrians, the
risk-utility is negative and the product design feature should be thought of as a negative, not a positive.”); A.O. Smith Corp. v. Settlement Inv. Mgmt., No. 2-04-270-CV,
2006 WL 176815, at *4 (Tex. App. Jan. 26, 2006) (“the alternative design also must
not impose an equal or greater risk of harm under other circumstances”). See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2(b) cmt. f (1998):
When evaluating the reasonableness of a design alternative, the overall
safety of the product must be considered. It is not sufficient that the alternative design would have reduced or prevented the harm suffered by the
plaintiff if it would also have introduced into the product other dangers of
equal or greater magnitude.
193. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2(b) cmt. f.
194. See, e.g., Wankier v. Crown Equip. Corp., 353 F.3d 862 (10th Cir. 2003)
(Utah law) (plaintiff must prove “safer, feasible, alternative design”); Jeter v. Brown
& Williamson Tobacco Corp., 294 F. Supp. 2d 681, 686 (W.D. Pa. 2003) (“[p]laintiff
must present a feasible alternative design”); Rypkema v. Time Mfg. Co., 263 F. Supp.
2d 687, 692 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“Under New York law, in a design defect case a plain-
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ity of an alternative design suggests that the design feature proposed by plaintiff was technologically and commercially practicable, feasibility is often
bound up in the issue of “state of the art.”195 Feasibility requires at least technological capability,196 but it normally is viewed more broadly to include
cost, commercial practicability (including practicable availability of materials
and components), and even the likelihood of consumer acceptance.197
Viewed in this expanded fashion, “feasibility” really means “reasonableness,”
as reflected in the Products Liability Restatement definition of a design defect
in terms of the availability of a “reasonable alternative design.”198 All signifitiff is required to prove the existence of a feasible alternative which would have prevented the accident.”); Warner Fruehauf Trailer Co. v. Boston, 654 A.2d 1272, 1278
(D.C. 1995) (“In order to determine whether a safer design that would have prevented
the injury should have been used, the trier of fact ordinarily must consider whether
any safer alternative designs were commercially feasible.”); AlliedSignal, Inc. v.
Moran, 231 S.W.3d 16, 28-29 (Tex. App. 2007) (alternative design must “‘substantially reduce the risk of injury and be both economically and technologically feasible’”).
195. See, e.g., Robinson v. Audi Nsu Auto Union AG, 739 F.2d 1481, 1485-86
(10th Cir. 1984) (Okla. law) (“plaintiff could use state-of-the-art evidence to try to
show the feasibility of other safer alternatives”); Potter v. Chi. Pneumatic Tool Co.,
694 A.2d 1319, 1344-49 (Conn. 1997); Cavanaugh v. Skil Corp., 751 A.2d 518, 523
(N.J. 2000) (“the absence of both a practical and technically feasible alternative device is a necessary predicate to barring liability under the state-of-the-art defense”);
Lancaster Silo & Block Co. v. N. Propane Gas Co., 427 N.Y.S.2d 1009, 1016 (App.
Div. 1980) (“state of the art sets the parameters of feasibility”); Boatland of Houston,
Inc. v. Bailey, 609 S.W.2d 743, 748 (Tex. 1980) (state-of-the-art evidence “important
in determining whether a safer design was feasible”). On state of the art, see OWEN,
PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW, supra note 13, § 10.4.
196. See, e.g., Martin v. Michelin N. Am., Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 745, 754 (E.D.
Tenn. 2000) (feasibility defined in terms of what manufacturer could have known
under existing state of technological and scientific art at the time of manufacture).
197. See, e.g., Glover v. BIC Corp., 6 F.3d 1318 (9th Cir. 1993) (practicability
means economic feasibility in terms of cost, overall design, and operation); Oberst v.
Int’l Harvester Co., 640 F.2d 863 (7th Cir. 1980) (Ill. law); Troja v. Black & Decker
Mfg. Co., 488 A.2d 516 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985); Rix v. Gen. Motors Corp., 723
P.2d 195 (Mont. 1986).
An expert witness’s mere concept of an alternative design, if it has never
been developed, does not satisfy the feasibility requirement. See, e.g., Allen v.
Minnstar, Inc., 8 F.3d 1470 (10th Cir. 1993) (Utah law) (speculative prototype for
motorboat propeller guard does not satisfy requirement that alternative design be
practicable and available); Ballarini v. Clark Equip. Co., 841 F. Supp. 662 (E.D. Pa.
1993) (interlock device that would disable forklift when operator forgets to apply
parking brake before dismounting).
198. “A product . . . is defective in design when the foreseeable risks of harm
posed by the product could have been reduced or avoided by the adoption of a reasonable alternative design . . . and the omission of the alternative design renders the
product not reasonably safe.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2(b)
(1998).
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cant disadvantages of a proposed alternative design are properly embraced
within the feasibility concept, including any increased cost, decreased utility,
and increased dangers of other types.199
An early case that viewed feasibility in this broader sense was Wilson v.
Piper Aircraft Corp.200 Wilson involved the crash of a small plane, possibly
due to carburetor icing, a condition that could not have occurred if the plane’s
engine had been equipped with a fuel-injection rather than carburetor system.
Although fuel injection systems were available at the time, some 80% – 90%
of small airplanes used carbureted engines that had various advantages and
were approved by the FAA. Reversing jury verdicts for the plaintiffs, the
court observed that the plaintiff in a design defect case must establish the
availability of an “alternative, safer design, practicable under the circumstances,” meaning that the alternative design must be feasible “in terms of
cost, practicality and technological possibility.”201 The appellate court concluded that the trial court should not submit a design case to a jury unless the
jury reasonably may find that the proposed alternative design is “not only
technically feasible but also practicable in terms of cost and the over-all design and operation of the product.”202
The cost-benefit approach for evaluating proposed alternative designs
may be logical and straight-forward, but the actual process of balancing the
variety of intangible considerations involved in safety, cost, and utility tradeoffs involves a complex conceptual balance which is as much political as it is
“factual.” Accordingly, the risk-utility balance determination, assuming the
plaintiff has offered credible evidence for an alternative balance, almost always raises an issue of fact for jury determination.203

C. Focusing the Risk–Utility Test on the Proposed Alternative Design
A particularly nettlesome aspect of defining the risk-utility standard for
design defectiveness is deciding precisely what to balance against what.204
Many courts have purported to lean heavily on Dean Wade’s famous seven
199. See, e.g., Hagans v. Oliver Mach. Co., 576 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1978) (Tex. law)
(multi-purpose table circular saw equipped with removable, rather than permanent,
blade guard); Monahan v. Toro Co., 856 F. Supp. 955 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (lawn tractor
rolled over on steep slope; adding roll-bar and altering center of gravity might diminish utility); Caterpillar, Inc. v. Shears, 911 S.W.2d 379 (Tex. 1995) (front-end loader
equipped with detachable rather than permanent rollover protective structure
(“ROPS”) was not defective; permanent structure was not “feasible” because it would
have destroyed multi-purpose nature of loader).
200. 577 P.2d 1322 (Or. 1978).
201. Id. at 1326.
202. Id. at 1327.
203. See id. at 1327 nn.3 & 5.
204. Extensively examined in Owen, Toward a Proper Test, supra note 7; Owen,
Risk-Utility Balancing, supra note 74.
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factors, as discussed in the previous section, and some of the problems with
relying on such an open-ended catalogue of possibly relevant considerations
were there examined. A similar problem, also previously noted, arises out of
the overly broad way in which many courts phrase the risk-utility balance for
design defectiveness – in terms of weighing the risks and utility of the “product” or the product’s “design.”205 The process of design defect litigation
would be rendered more comprehensible if courts were to formulate the riskutility test more narrowly to correspond to the issues actually litigated in
courtrooms across the nation.206 Nevertheless, trial judges and lawyers seem
to understand what the appellate judges mean when they speak of balancing

205. See, e.g., Soule v. Gen. Motors Corp., 882 P.2d 298, 308 (Cal. 1994) (indicating that no design defect exists if “‘the benefits of the . . . design outweigh the risk
of danger inherent in such design’”) (quoting Barker v. Lull Eng’g Co., 573 P.2d 443,
454 (Cal. 1978))); Armentrout v. FMC Corp., 842 P.2d 175, 182 (Colo. 1992) (holding that jury was properly instructed that a product is defective in design “if it creates
a risk of harm to persons which is not outweighed by the benefits to be achieved from
such design”); Banks v. ICI Ams., Inc., 450 S.E.2d 671, 673 (Ga. 1994) (describing a
consensus among jurisdictions that, in determining design defectiveness, “the risks
inherent in a product design are weighed against the utility or benefit derived from the
product”); Wagatsuma v. Patch, 879 P.2d 572, 584 (Haw. Ct. App. 1994) (stating that
there is no design defect if “the benefits of the design outweigh the risk of danger
inherent in that design”); Guiggey v. Bombardier, 615 A.2d 1169, 1172 (Me. 1992)
(“To determine whether a product is defectively dangerous, we balance the danger
presented by the product against its utility.”); Halliday v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 792
A.2d 1145, 1150 (Md. 2002) (“The risk-utility test . . . regards a product as defective
and unreasonably dangerous . . . if the danger presented by the product outweighs its
utility.”); Haberkorn v. Chrysler Corp., 533 N.W.2d 373, 380 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995)
(“In determining whether a defect exists, the trier of fact must balance the risk of
harm occasioned by the design against the design’s utility.”); Sperry-New Holland v.
Prestage, 617 So. 2d 248, 254 (Miss. 1993) (concluding that a design is defective if
“the utility of the product is outweighed by the danger that the product creates”);
Roberts v. Rich Foods, Inc., 654 A.2d 1365, 1371 (N.J. 1995) (characterizing O’Brien
test for a product defective in design as whether “its risks outweighed its utility”);
Denny v. Ford Motor Co., 662 N.E.2d 730, 735-36 (N.Y. 1995) (stating that ascertaining defectiveness requires “a weighing of the product’s benefits against its risks”
and “a weighing of the product’s dangers against its over-all advantages”); Hoyt v.
Vitek, Inc., 894 P.2d 1225, 1231 (Or. Ct. App. 1995) (determining defectiveness “by
balancing the product’s utility against the magnitude of the risk associated with its
use”); Caterpillar, Inc. v. Shears, 911 S.W.2d 379, 384 (Tex. 1995) (determining
design defectiveness “requires balancing the utility of the product against the risks
involved in its use”).
206. An example of a court focusing on the proper, narrow issue is Colon v. BIC
USA, Inc., 199 F. Supp. 2d 53, 91 n.32 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (test of lighters defective in
design because of their bright color is whether “the risk of bright color outweighs the
utility of using a bright color compared to the risk versus utility of using a dull color”). The proper balance is explained in Owen, Toward a Proper Test, supra note 7;
Owen, Risk-Utility Balancing, supra note 74.
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the risks and utility of a product whose design is challenged by a plaintiff in a
products liability case.207
In a design defect case, two distinct designs in a sense are separately on
trial: (1) the manufacturer’s chosen design and (2) the alternative design proposed by the plaintiff that allegedly would have prevented the plaintiff’s
harm. The propriety of the first (chosen) design would seem to be the more
important issue in such a case, and to a real extent it is: the “defectiveness”
(vel non) of the chosen design remains the ultimate issue in the trial. Yet, the
chosen design is no more than that – the ultimate legal determination that
merely characterizes, but provides no guidelines for establishing, the outcome
of a case. What typically is far more significant in the adjudication process is
the second (alternative) design – more specifically, the reasons for and
against the manufacturer’s failure to adopt it. This is the design decision
normally and properly at issue in the trial which lies at the heart of nearly
every design defect case, requiring particularized cost-benefit proof by the
parties and evaluative processing by the judge and jury. Although the propriety of the manufacturer’s chosen design remains of ultimate consequential
interest in terms of legal outcome, it ordinarily is determinable only indirectly
by evaluating the costs and benefits of the untaken design precaution proposed by the plaintiff.
Thus, regardless of how broadly appellate courts may formulate the riskutility test, design defectiveness litigation almost invariably focuses on the
costs and benefits related directly to a solution of the particular design problem asserted by the plaintiff. That is, the design defect issue actually litigated
is a micro-balance of the pros and cons of the manufacturer’s failure to adopt
some design feature that would have prevented the plaintiff’s harm – the balance of the safety benefits from changing the design in some particular manner weighed against the various costs of adopting the safety feature.208 Most
207. However, courts in at least a couple of states, most notably New Jersey,
appear to believe in the propriety of both broad and narrow forms of risk-utility balancing in design defect cases. See, e.g., Lewis v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 715 A.2d 967,
980 (N.J. 1998) (“A plaintiff must prove either that the product’s risks outweighed its
utility or that the product could have been designed in an alternative manner so as to
minimize or eliminate thce risk of harm. Plaintiffs who assert that the product could
have been designed more safely must prove under a risk-utility analysis the existence
of an alternative design that is both practical and feasible.”). New Jersey’s statutory
exception to the feasible alternative design requirement, for “egregiously unsafe or
ultrahazardous” products and those with “little or no usefulness,” suggests approval of
broad risk-utility balancing in this narrow class of cases. See N.J. STAT. ANN. §
2A:58C-3(b) (1987).
208. See, e.g., HEAFEY & KENNEDY, supra note 104, § 4.04, at 4-9 (characterizing
the manufacturer’s choice to forego a reasonable alternative design as “the heart of
the plaintiff’s case”). See also Rheingold, Risk/Utility Test, supra note 3, at 50 (“The
usual and proper approach for a plaintiff in a design defect case is to present evidence
on an alternative design which the jury can find should have been adopted for the
product in question.”). This is the manner in which design defectiveness is defined in
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simply, the risk-utility balance truly at issue in design defect litigation is
whether the safety benefits of an alternative design feature would have been
worth the resulting costs.209 More fully formulated, a product’s design is
defective if the safety benefits of the plaintiff’s proposed alternative design
features foreseeably would have exceeded the resulting costs, including any
diminished usefulness or diminished safety.210
When the risk-utility test normally applicable to design defectiveness is
properly defined in terms of the costs and benefits of adopting the alternative
design feature proposed by the plaintiff, it fails to catch a limited class of
unavoidably dangerous products – exploding cigars, lawn darts that are deadly sharp, and possibly guns, cigarettes, and alcohol whose inherent dangers
cannot be designed away and which on balance arguably cause more social
harm than good. The difficult problem here is whether the law properly may
impose product category liability for inherently dangerous products,211 an
important issue examined elsewhere.212 A number of courts,213 at least two
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmts. d, f (1998), and it reflects
more generally how courts and lawyers actually proceed in assessing liability under
the Hand formula. One scholar has noted that a plaintiff’s attorney will try to find
some act which, if the defendant had taken it, would have significantly reduced the
probability of the accident at low cost [such] that the increment in the expected loss
was greater than the cost of avoidance [and the defendant’s attorney tries to show]
that the expected benefits of the proposed act were, in fact, less than the costs of
undertaking it. [The decision maker is then] asked to compare the incremental expected benefits with the incremental costs. Brown, supra note 104, at 334-35.
209. “In sum, an alternative design is reasonable if its marginal benefits exceed its
marginal costs.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2(b), Reporters’
Note to cmt. f.
210. See Owen, Toward a Proper Test, supra note 7, at 1690.
211. As mentioned in the text, the classic examples are cigarettes, certain guns,
and alcoholic beverages. See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. §
2 cmts. d & e, illus. 5 (exploding cigar). For a range of views on the appropriateness
of using broad-based risk-utility analysis to find cigarettes defectively designed, see
the three separate opinions, each concurring and dissenting, in Horton v. American
Tobacco Co., 667 So. 2d 1289 (Miss. 1995) (compare opinion of Hawkins, C.J., arguing that risk-utility analysis is inappropriate in such cases and noting that liability
has been denied by every prior decision, with the opinions of Lee, P.J., and McRae, J.,
arguing that cigarette manufacturers properly may be held liable under a risk-utility
test). For a case holding that the absence of an alternative design to hollow-point
bullets, used in a shooting spree on a passenger train, precluded a finding of design
defectiveness under the risk-utility test because the purpose of the hollow points was
to make the bullets kill especially effectively, see McCarthy v. Olin Corp., 119 F.3d
148 (2d Cir. 1997) (N.Y. law) (2-1 decision, Calabresi, J., dissenting).
212. See OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW, supra note 13, § 10.3.
213. See, e.g., Armentrout v. FMC Corp., 842 P.2d 175, 185 n.8 (Colo. 1992) (en
banc); Kallio v. Ford Motor Co., 407 N.W.2d 92, 97 n.8 (Minn. 1987); Rix v. Gen.
Motors Corp., 723 P.2d 195, 201 (Mont. 1986); Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 577
P.2d 1322, 1328 n.5 (Or. 1978).
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state legislatures,214 and the Products Liability Restatement,215 all require
plaintiffs in design cases to prove a feasible alternative design as a general
rule but provide a special exception for a very small category of egregiously
dangerous products which possess little redeeming value, a quite reasonable
approach to a difficult problem.

VI. COMBINING CONSUMER EXPECTATIONS AND RISK-UTILITY
Evolving separately from the law of warranty and the law of negligence,
the consumer expectations and risk-utility tests for design defectiveness developed largely as rival standards for design defect liability. Thus, for much
of modern products liability law, most courts determined design defectiveness
exclusively by one test and refused to recognize the validity of the other.
More recently, however, reflecting the combined warranty-tort heritage of
products liability law, and because of inadequacies in consumer expectations
as an exclusive standard,216 many courts have begun to blend the two tests in
one way or another. The two principal approaches for blending the two standards are: (1) defining one test in terms of the other or (2) establishing each
as separate liability “prongs,”217 either one of which may independently support a design defect finding. Some jurisdictions that embrace the twopronged approach have narrowed the applicability of the consumer expectations prong to product designs viewed as “simple.”

A. Defining One Test in Terms of the Other
Quite early in the development of modern products liability law, Judge
Minor Wisdom recognized how the two basic liability tests might be viewed
as partners in evaluating product dangers. In Welch v. Outboard Marine
214. New Jersey’s statute provides that the plaintiff must prove a feasible alternative design or that the product was especially hazardous or practically useless. See
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-3(b) (1987). North Carolina’s statute provides that the
plaintiff must prove a feasible alternative design or “that a reasonable person, aware
of the relevant facts, would not use or consume a product of this design.” See N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 99B-6(a)(2) (1996).
215. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2(b) cmt. e (1998)
(entitled “Design defects: possibility of manifestly unreasonable design,” which notes
that a court might choose to abandon the alternative design requirement in special
cases where “the extremely high degree of danger posed by [a product’s] use or consumption so substantially outweighs its negligible social utility that no rational, reasonable person, fully aware of the relevant facts, would choose to use, or to allow
children to use, the product”).
216. See Schwartz, supra note 136, at 471-82; see also supra Part III.
217. In Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., 573 P.2d 443, 456 (Cal. 1978), the court
aptly referred to the use of two alternative bases of liability as the “two-pronged definition of design defect.” See Schwartz, supra note 136, at 436.
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Corp.,218 the operator of a power lawn mower was injured when a piece of
wire was thrown back from the mower, injuring his ankle. Plaintiff sued,
asserting that the mower was defectively designed because it lacked a guard
plate hinged to the back. The trial court instructed the jury that it could find
the mower defectively designed if “a reasonable man would not sell the product if he knew the risks involved. To put it another way, a product is unreasonably dangerous if it is dangerous to an extent beyond which would be
contemplated by the ordinary consumer.”219 The jury gave a verdict for the
defendant, and the plaintiff appealed, complaining that the instruction confused the jury by giving them two contradictory definitions of the liability
standard. Affirming a judgment on the verdict, Judge Wisdom observed no
inconsistency between the reasonable seller and reasonable buyer tests which
he viewed as merely “two sides of the same standard.”220 Although this twosides-of-the-same-coin perspective failed to achieve much of a judicial following, it was recognized by some courts and commentators as a novel but
sound approach that appropriately reflected the hybrid evolution of strict
manufacturer liability from warranty and tort.221 Developing Judge Wisdom’s concept further, commentators recommended interpreting the Welch
definition not as a single liability “coin” or standard, but as a bifurcated test
that would provide recovery either if a product failed a risk-benefit test or if
the product’s dangers exceeded consumer expectations.222
One year later, in 1974, the Supreme Court of Oregon entered the search
for a design defect test in Phillips v. Kimwood Machine Co.,223 a case involving the design of an industrial sanding machine that ejected a piece of fiberboard back at the operator.224 Although the Oregon court had previously
adopted the consumer expectations test for ascertaining design defectiveness
in Heaton v. Ford Motor Co.,225 it had been troubled in that case with the
vagueness of a consumer’s safety expectations in view of the kinds of engineering tradeoffs between costs and benefits unknown to consumers that inhere in design decisionmaking.226 In the process of switching from a consumer expectations test to risk-utility,227 the Phillips court reiterated Judge
218. 481 F.2d 252 (5th Cir. 1973) (La. law).
219. Id. at 253-54.
220. “A product is defective and unreasonably dangerous when a reasonable seller
would not sell the product if he knew of the risks involved or if the risks are greater
than a reasonable buyer would expect.” Id. at 254.
221. See, e.g., Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 525 P.2d 1033, 1036-37 (Or.
1974); Montgomery & Owen, supra note 120, at 843-45.
222. Montgomery & Owen, supra note 120, at 845 n.147.
223. 525 P.2d 1033.
224. The claimed design defect was the absence of teeth on the machine that could
have prevented regurgitation of the boards. Id. at 1035.
225. 435 P.2d 806 (Or. 1967).
226. See id. at 809.
227. Phillips, 525 P.2d at 1036.
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Wisdom’s view in Welch that the two tests may be the same “because a seller
acting reasonably would be selling the same product which a reasonable consumer believes he is purchasing.”228 The Oregon court’s assertion that buyers
and sellers have the same safety expectations ignores its important criticism
in Heaton that consumer expectations fail to provide a meaningful safety
gauge for complex designs, but the court may have repeated the equivalency
of the two tests as window-dressing for its switch away from the problematic
consumer expectations test to the more felicitous risk-utility standard for
design defect determinations. Be that as it may, by collapsing consumer expectations into risk-utility, Phillips abandoned the consumer expectations test
in favor of risk-utility.
The following year, the Supreme Court of Washington decided SeattleFirst National Bank v. Tabert,229 a crashworthiness case involving the structural integrity of a snub-nosed Volkswagen van. A husband and wife were
killed when the front of their van collapsed back upon them when it struck the
rear of a flatbed truck. Reversing a summary judgment for the defendants,
the court defined design defect liability under § 402A in terms of an ordinary
consumer’s reasonable safety expectations.230 Observing that an ordinary
consumer “evaluates a product in terms of safety, recognizing that virtually
no product is or can be made absolutely safe,”231 the Tabert court expressly
folded the consumer expectations test into risk-utility analysis, stating that the
reasonable expectations of ordinary consumers include the cost and feasibility
of avoiding the risk.232 Because the plaintiff’s expert in his affidavit properly
applied risk-utility analysis to the weakness of the vehicle’s forward structure, the plaintiff had presented a question of fact for the jury.233
By defining the design defect test in terms of consumer expectations,
and then “determining” consumer expectations in terms of the costs and benefits of eliminating or minimizing the danger, the Tabert court blended the two

228. Id. at 1037. The court continued: “That is to say, a manufacturer who would
be negligent in marketing a given product, considering its risks, would necessarily be
marketing a product which fell below the reasonable expectations of consumers who
purchase it. The foreseeable uses to which a product could be put would be the same
in the minds of both the seller and the buyer unless one of the parties was not acting
reasonably.” Id. Note, however, the Phillips court also curiously remarked that the
two tests “are not necessarily different standards.” Id. at 1036.
229. 542 P.2d 774 (Wash. 1975).
230. Id. at 779.
231. Id.
232. Noting that “[t]he purchaser of a Volkswagen cannot reasonably expect the
same degree of safety as would the buyer of the much more expensive Cadillac,” the
court remarked that a number of factors must be considered in determining an ordinary consumer’s reasonable expectations: “The relative cost of the product, the gravity of the potential harm from the claimed defect and the cost and feasibility of eliminating or minimizing the risk may be relevant in a particular case.” Id.
233. See id. at 779-80.

2008]

DESIGN DEFECTS

339

tests of design defectiveness. But how the blend should operate is not made
clear. While the court states that risk-utility factors are determinants of consumer expectations, it retains consumer expectations as the formal test of
liability. At this early stage in the development of design defect theory, it is
likely that the court was simply feeling its way and had not worked through
precisely how the two standards relate to one another. It may be that the
court was thinking that in crashworthiness and other complex design cases
consumers only have a right to expect that a vehicle be reasonably designed
according to the cost-benefit calculations of reasonable engineers. Yet by
leaving room for “other factors” in other situations, the court implicitly left
open the possibility of applying a pure consumer expectations test in other
contexts, perhaps in cases involving simple designs.
Whatever the Tabert court may actually have had in mind, in 1981 the
Washington state legislature enacted a statute ambiguously basing liability for
design dangers on the costs and benefits of a feasible alternative design and
on the safety contemplations of an ordinary consumer.234 A subsequent
Washington decision interpreted the statute to mean that a plaintiff could
prevail on either basis, which amounts to a two-pronged approach for defining design defectiveness,235 a dubious interpretation of the statute which narrowly avoided being overruled in a 1999 en banc decision.236
Courts in most other jurisdictions largely ignored the Welch and Tabert
approach combining the consumer expectations and risk-utility tests in some
amorphous manner,237 and the idea of mixing the two approaches to design
defectiveness (or finding them equivalent) lay dormant during the 1980s238 as
the consumer expectations test gradually lost ground to risk-utility in their
battle for supremacy as independent tests of design defectiveness. Then, as if
awakening like Rip Van Winkle from a lengthy slumber, courts in a small
number of states in the 1990s resurrected the nearly defunct idea that the two
234. See Couch v. Mine Safety Appliances Co., 728 P.2d 585 (Wash. 1986);
WASH. REV. CODE § 7.72.030(1)(a), (3) (1988).
235. Falk v. Keene Corp., 782 P.2d 974, 977-80 (Wash. 1989). Falk’s interpretation of the statutory standard converts it into a Barker standard, discussed infra Part
VI.B.
236. Soproni v. Polygon Apt. Partners, 971 P.2d 500 (Wash. 1999) (5-4 decision);
cf. Eriksen v. Mobay Corp., 41 P.3d 488, 494 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002) (asserting unequivocally that a plaintiff may establish design defect liability by statute on either
risk-utility or consumer expectations).
237. But see Potter v. Chi. Pneumatic Tool Co., 694 A.2d 1319 (Conn. 1997),
discussed supra text accompanying notes 247-54; McCathern v. Toyota Motor Corp.,
985 P.2d 804 (Or. Ct. App. 1999), aff’d, 23 P.3d 320, 330-32 (Or. 2001).
238. Or nearly dormant. Robinson v. Reed-Prentice Div. of Package Mach. Co.,
403 N.E.2d 440, 443 (N.Y. 1980) (“a defectively designed product is one which, at
the time it leaves the seller’s hands, is in a condition not reasonably contemplated by
the ultimate consumer and is unreasonably dangerous for its intended use; that is one
whose utility does not outweigh the danger inherent in its introduction into the stream
of commerce”).
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independent design defect standards are equivalent,239 merely representing
“two sides of the same coin.”240
The most notable decision in the 1990s to embrace the equivalency notion is Potter v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co.,241 decided by the Supreme
Court of Connecticut in 1997. This was a case brought by workers at a shipyard against the manufacturers of pneumatic hand tools for injuries the
workers claimed were caused by excessive vibration of the tools. Although
the consumer expectations test was “well established in Connecticut strict
products liability decisions,”242 the court was nevertheless troubled by the
vagueness problem in consumer expectations concerning the safety of complex designs. Following jurisdictions like Washington “that have modified
their formulation of the consumer expectation test by incorporating risk-utility factors into the ordinary consumer expectation analysis,”243 the Potter
court adopted the Tabert court’s reformulation of the consumer expectations
test in risk-utility terms for the complex design situation,244 as further discussed below. The Potter court observed that this “modified formulation” of
the consumer expectations test “would establish the product’s risk and utility,
and the inquiry would then be whether a reasonable consumer would consider

239. In Ray v. BIC Corp., 925 S.W.2d 527, 531 (Tenn. 1996), noting the error in
viewing the two tests as equivalent, the court “decline[d] to weave the two tests into
one.” Even Oregon, which asserted in Phillips the equivalence of the two tests, now
understands the naivete of that view. See McCathern v. Toyota Motor Corp., 23 P.3d
320, 330-32 (Or. 2001). Yet the fact that the equivalency notion is now largely discredited does not mean that courts do not occasionally muddle the developing products liability jurisprudence by dragging this obsolete notion from obscurity. See, e.g.,
Jackson v. Bomag GmbH, 638 N.Y.S.2d 819, 821 (App. Div. 1996).
240. The quote is from Ray v. BIC Corp., 925 S.W.2d at 530, which itself was
quoting Estate of Ryder v. Kelly-Springfield Tire Co., 587 P.2d 160, 164 (Wash.
1978). It is important to note, however, that the Tennessee court merely noted this
approach and criticized it as incorrect and obsolete. Ray, 925 S.W.2d at 531. Subsequent decisions resting on the idea include Potter v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co.,
694 A.2d 1319 (Conn. 1997), and Bragg v. Hi-Ranger, Inc., 462 S.E.2d 321, 328
(S.C. Ct. App. 1995) (“[W]e balance the utility of the risk inherent in the design of the
product with the magnitude of the risk to determine the reasonableness of the manufacturer’s action in designing the product. This ‘balancing act’ is also relevant to the
determination that the product, as designed, is unreasonably dangerous in its failure to
conform to the ordinary user’s expectations.”). See also the confusing discussion of
the relationship between consumer expectations and risk-utility in Flemister v. General Motors Corp., 723 So. 2d 25 (Ala. 1998), in which consumer expectations appear
to be redefined in risk-utility terms, and risk-utility appears to trump consumer expectations.
241. 694 A.2d 1319.
242. Id. at 1330.
243. Id. at 1333.
244. Id.
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the product design unreasonably dangerous.”245 Also moving the liability
standard from consumer expectations to a balance of costs and benefits, other
courts have followed Potter’s approach of redefining the consumer expectations test in risk-utility terms, at least in cases involving complex designs.246
The Potter court and others following its approach of defining consumer
expectations in risk-utility terms are obviously conflicted about abandoning
consumer expectations altogether in favor of risk-utility as the basis for design defect liability, often because they accept the now-suspect view that the
consumer expectations test protects consumer interests better than the riskutility test.247 These courts have recognized, if reluctantly, the need to turn to
a true risk-utility test for evaluating the safety of complex designs in order to
provide a determinate standard for liability decisions. As discussed below,
however, much may be said for completely breaking with consumer expectations as an independent test for evaluating the safety of product designs, particularly complex ones, and switching to risk-utility as the exclusive liability
standard for most such cases.248

B. Two Liability “Prongs” – The Barker Approach
A more forthright and intelligible approach for accommodating the warranty and tort law foundations of strict manufacturer liability, which acknowledges the separate value of each, holds a manufacturer accountable for
breaching its duties under either one by recognizing two independent bases or
“prongs” of liability. By such a “two-pronged” approach to design defectiveness, a plaintiff injured by a product may establish a design defect if the design hazard fails either (1) a consumer expectations test or (2) a risk-utility
245. Id. In determining what a consumer reasonably would expect, the court
noted that a jury should consider most of the Wade risk-utility factors, discussed
supra Part IV. Potter, 694 A.2d at 1333 n.15.
246. See, e.g., Delaney v. Deere & Co., 999 P.2d 930, 944 (Kan. 2000) (recognizing “the validity of risk/utility analysis as a guide in determining the expectations of
consumers in complex cases”); Vautour v. Body Masters Sports Indus., 784 A.2d
1178 (N.H. 2001) (consumer expectations defined in terms of risk-utility); McCathern
v. Toyota Motor Corp., 23 P.3d 320, 330-32 (Or. 2001) (risk-utility evidence may be
required to prove consumer expectations). But see Pritchett v. Cottrell, Inc., 512 F.3d
1057, 1064 (8th Cir. 2008) (Mo. law) (while Missouri formally follows the consumer
expectations test, the ultimate issue is whether a product is “unreasonably dangerous,”
such that litigants may argue “that the utility of a design outweighs its risks, or that
consumer expectations were violated, or any other theory of unreasonable dangerousness supported by the evidence”).
247. For difficulties the consumer expectations test causes plaintiffs, see supra
Part III.
248. The consumer expectations standard still may be a useful liability test for
simple product failures, discussed below, and it serves well in certain other specialized contexts. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. h
(1998); id. § 7 (food); id. § 8(b) (used products).
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test. This approach has logical appeal because it protects the essential interests furthered by each test: contract law’s protection of the expectations of
buyers and sellers in their private bargains, and tort law’s protection of the
public welfare by requiring sellers to accord due respect to the safety interests
of persons foreseeably endangered by defective products.249
Barker v. Lull Engineering Co.,250 decided by the California Supreme
Court in 1978, was the first judicial formulation of an explicitly two-pronged
definition of design defectiveness. The plaintiff, while operating a high-lift
loader manufactured by the defendant, was struck by a piece of lumber when
he leaped from the vehicle as his load began to shift. Plaintiff’s strict liability
in tort claim alleged that the loader’s design was deficient because it was not
equipped with stabilizing outriggers, a seatbelt, a roll bar, or an automatic
locking device on the leveling lever, and was deficient in certain other respects as well. The trial court instructed the jury that strict liability for defective design is “based on a finding that the product was unreasonably dangerous,” the jury found for the defendant, and the plaintiff appealed. Reversing
because of errors in the design defect instruction, the Supreme Court of California adopted a two-pronged test for defects in design:
[A] trial judge may properly instruct the jury that a product is defective in design (1) if the plaintiff demonstrates that the product
failed to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect
when used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner, or (2)
if the plaintiff proves that the product’s design proximately caused
his injury and the defendant fails to prove, in light of the relevant
factors, that on balance the benefits of the challenged design outweigh the risk of danger inherent in such design.251
Among other factors relevant to the risk-utility prong of this test, the court
listed the likelihood and gravity of danger posed by the challenged design,
“the mechanical feasibility of a safer alternative design, the financial cost of
an improved design, and the adverse consequences to the product and to the
consumer that would result from an alternative design.”252
As for the burden of proof, the Barker court left it on the plaintiff for the
consumer expectations prong but shifted it to the manufacturer for the riskutility prong.253 Observing that the doctrine of strict manufacturer liability in
249. Scholarly support for such an explicitly two-pronged approach originated in
Montgomery & Owen, supra note 120, at 843-45.
250. 573 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978).
251. Id. at 457-58.
252. Id. at 455.
253. Id. (“Once the plaintiff makes a prima facie showing that the injury was
proximately caused by the product’s design, the burden should appropriately shift to
the defendant to prove, in light of the relevant factors, that the product is not defective.”). See also id. at 456.
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tort was designed to relieve injured plaintiffs of “the onerous evidentiary
burdens” of proving a manufacturer’s negligence, the court explained the
shift in the burden of proof by noting that most risk-benefit evidence on the
feasibility and cost of alternative designs involves “technical matters peculiarly within the knowledge of the manufacturer.”254
While at least a couple of courts explicitly rejected Barker’s twopronged definition of design defect,255 a handful of states explicitly adopted
it.256 One state that followed this approach is Washington, which has a confusing statutory definition of design defectiveness. The statute separately
provides that a product design may be considered defective on a finding of
the cost-effectiveness of a feasible alternative design and for violating the
safety contemplations of an ordinary consumer, but the statute fails to state
whether the two design defect standards are independent or whether one will
trump the other.257 As mentioned earlier, the Washington Supreme Court
interpreted this statute as establishing a two-pronged standard,258 a questionable interpretation which narrowly escaped reversal a decade later.259 Unlike

254. Id.
255. See, e.g., Kallio v. Ford Motor Co., 407 N.W.2d 92, 95 (Minn. 1987); Lester
v. Magic Chef, Inc., 641 P.2d 353 (Kan. 1982). While the Kansas court flatly rejected
the Barker two-pronged approach in favor of the consumer expectations test in Lester,
risk-utility evidence has crept back into that state’s method for determining defects in
design. See Delaney v. Deere & Co., 999 P.2d 930, 944 (Kan. 2000) (recognizing “the
validity of risk/utility analysis as a guide in determining the expectations of consumers in complex cases”).
256. See Rivera Pomales v. Bridgestone Firestone, Inc., 217 F.R.D. 290, 295
(D.P.R. 2003); Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871 (Alaska 1979); Ontai v.
Straub Clinic & Hosp., Inc., 659 P.2d 734 (Haw. 1983); Lamkin v. Towner, 563
N.E.2d 449 (Ill. 1990); Knitz v. Minster Mach. Co., 432 N.E.2d 814 (Ohio 1982),
superseded by statute, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.75(B)(5) (2004); see also Dart
v. Wiebe Mfg., Inc., 709 P.2d 876 (Ariz. 1985); Liggett Group, Inc. v. Davis, No.
4D04-3811, 2007 WL 2935236, at *9 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Oct. 10, 2007) (Warner, J.,
concurring) (standard jury instruction defines design defect alternatively in terms of
consumer expectations or risk-utility); Mikolajczyk v. Ford Motor Co., 870 N.E.2d
885, 902 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007) (“the law of Illinois remains that a plaintiff may prove a
strict liability design defect by either the consumer expectations test or the risk-utility
test”).
257. On this issue, see WASH. REV. CODE § 7.72.030(1)(a), (3) (1988).
258. See Falk v. Keene Corp., 782 P.2d 974, 977-80 (Wash. 1989). See also
Bruns v. PACCAR, Inc., 890 P.2d 469 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995).
259. See Soproni v. Polygon Apt. Partners, 971 P.2d 500 (Wash. 1999) (5-4 decision). Recent decisions unquestioningly accept the two-pronged standard. See, e.g.,
Spokane Sch. Dist. No. 81 v. Nw. Bldg. Sys., Inc., No. CV-04-0078-MWL, 2006 WL
696282, at *9 (E.D. Wash. Mar. 13, 2006) (“Two alternative tests may be used to
establish that a product was not reasonably safe as designed: the risk-utility test and
the consumer expectations test.”); Thongchoom v. Graco Children’s Prods., Inc., 71
P.3d 214, 217 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003).
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Washington’s ambiguous legislation, statutes enacted in Tennessee260 and
Ohio261 clearly provide Barker-like, two-pronged standards for design defectiveness, though Ohio subsequently abandoned the two-pronged standard in
favor of a multifaceted risk-utility approach.262
A few courts have danced around the issue, seemingly adopting the
Barker two-pronged approach, but without saying so explicitly.263 A number
of jurisdictions follow a de facto Barker approach, variously applying the
consumer expectations and risk-utility tests in different cases,264 sometimes
without a satisfactory explanation as to why one test is applied in one situation and the other test in some other.265 And the Potter approach, which con260. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-102(8) (1978), defining an “unreasonably
dangerous” product as “a product [that] is dangerous to an extent beyond that which
would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, [or a product that]
because of its dangerous condition would not be put on the market by a reasonably
prudent manufacturer or seller assuming that [the manufacturer or seller] knew of its
dangerous condition.” See, e.g., Ray v. BIC Corp., 925 S.W.2d 527 (Tenn. 1996)
(declining to weave the two standards into one, and holding that the prudent manufacturer prong requires risk-utility analysis).
261. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.75(A) (as reenacted in 2001).
262. Ohio adopted Barker’s two-pronged definition of design defectiveness judicially in the 1980s and legislatively in the 1990s, but a 2004 statute (effective 2005)
adopted a multi-factor risk-utility test for design defectiveness that deleted consumer
expectations as a separate basis of liability but included it as one factor in the riskutility determination. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.75(B)(5) (2004).
263. See, e.g., Dart v. Wiebe Mfg., Inc., 709 P.2d 876 (Ariz. 1985); Ortho Pharm.
Corp. v. Heath, 722 P.2d 410 (Colo. 1986) (by implication), overruled on other
grounds by Armentrout v. FMC Corp., 842 P.2d 175 (Colo. 1992); cf. Bredberg v.
Pepsico, Inc., 551 N.W.2d 321, 325 n.3 (Iowa 1996) (pattern jury instruction appearing to present both standards as alternative tests); Phipps v. Gen. Motors Corp., 363
A.2d 955, 957-63 (Md. 1976); Baughn v. Honda Motor Co., 727 P.2d 655, 660
(Wash. 1986) (applying “consumer expectations test with a risk-utility base”). Colorado courts appear now to have interpreted Ortho as joining the Barker camp. See,
e.g., Bartholic v. Scripto-Tokai Corp., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1098 (D. Colo. 2000).
264. See, e.g., Halliday v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 792 A.2d 1145, 1153 (Md. 2002)
(consumer expectations test applies to design cases unless product malfunctions, in
which case risk-utility test applies). This is now the de facto approach to design cases
in New York whose courts apply a consumer expectations test to implied warranty
claims and a risk-utility test to claims for strict liability in tort. See, e.g., Castro v.
QVC Network, Inc., 139 F.3d 114, 118 (2d Cir. 1998) (N.Y. law) (Calabresi, J.)
(“The imposition of strict liability for an alleged design ‘defect’ is determined by a
risk-utility standard. The notion of ‘defect’ in a U.C.C.-based breach of warranty
claim focuses, instead, on consumer expectations.”); Denny v. Ford Motor Co., 662
N.E.2d 730 (N.Y. 1995).
265. See, e.g., Warner Fruehauf Trailer Co. v. Boston, 654 A.2d 1272, 1276 (D.C.
1995) (truck liftgate suddenly collapsed because it had only one, rather than two,
hydraulic cylinders). In Warner, following what it said was the majority approach,
the court used a risk-utility test for the design defect determination in the case before
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flates consumer expectations and risk-utility, is itself a variation on the Barker two-pronged standard. While some of these decisions may be faulted for
failing clearly to specify when and how the two separate tests should be applied, the courts still are feeling their way in the seemingly never-ending
search for an ideal test for design defectiveness. And there may be real value
in the idea of intelligently combining, in some manner or another, both standards of liability.266
A small number of jurisdictions adopting Barker’s two-pronged approach for defining design defects also followed that decision’s reversal of
the burden of proof.267 However, most courts adopting a two-pronged approach rejected this change in the balance of litigation responsibility and
continue to require the plaintiff to prove the feasibility and cost-effectiveness
of the alternative design, together with other components of the risk-utility
analysis.268 At a superficial level, Barker’s shift in the burden of proof seems
fair and reasonable because at least some information on cost-benefit tradeoffs is likely to reside in the defendant’s files. Yet it hardly seems unfair to
require the plaintiff to offer and prove a hypothesis as to how, specifically, a
product ought to have been more safely designed. And, requiring a defendant
it, “[g]iven the type of product,” but observed that consumer expectations test is also
frequently used. See also Bragg v. Hi-Ranger, Inc., 462 S.E.2d 321, 328 (S.C. Ct.
App. 1995).
266. See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 37, at 162-63 (1994) (“it will be prudent in
some cases to employ the consumer expectation test in conjunction with the riskutility balancing test in the form of a ‘risk-utility consumer expectation test.’ . . .
given the complexity of products and products liability tort litigation today; the moral,
social, economic, and jurisprudential values sought to be advanced by tort liability;
and the superiority of the risk-utility balancing test in serving these interests and in
resolving many of the tough issues presented in most products liability disputes”).
267. See, e.g., Quintana-Ruiz v. Hyundai Motor Corp., 303 F.3d 62 (1st Cir.
2002) (P.R. law); Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871 (Alaska 1979); Ortho
Pharm. Corp. v. Heath, 722 P.2d 410 (Colo. 1986); Ontai v. Straub Clinic & Hosp.,
Inc., 659 P.2d 734 (Haw. 1983); Lamkin v. Towner, 563 N.E.2d 449 (Ill. 1990).
Colorado and Illinois both eventually reconsidered and rejected the burden
shift. See Armentrout v. FMC Corp., 842 P.2d 175, 183 (Colo. 1992); Blue v. Envtl.
Eng’g, Inc., 828 N.E.2d 1128, 1142-44 (Ill. 2005). In Soule v. General Motors Corp.,
882 P.2d 298, 311 n.8 (Cal. 1994), the California Supreme Court revisited and reaffirmed Barker’s shift in the burden of proof.
268. Except for Alaska, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico, courts in other states have rejected Barker’s second-prong shift in the burden of proof. See, e.g., Armentrout, 842
P.2d 175 (overruling prior case); Blue, 828 N.E.2d at 1142-44 (disapproving prior
case); Hayes v. Ariens Co., 462 N.E.2d 273 (Mass. 1984), overruled in part on other
grounds by Vassallo v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 696 N.E.2d 909 (Mass. 1998); Kallio
v. Ford Motor Co., 407 N.W.2d 92 (Minn. 1987); Cremeans v. Int’l Harvester Co.,
452 N.E.2d 1281 (Ohio 1983); Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 579 P.2d 1287 (Or.
1978) (en banc). See also Dart v. Wiebe Mfg., Inc., 709 P.2d 876 (Ariz. 1985) (en
banc) (by implication); Ray v. BIC Corp., 925 S.W.2d 527, 532 (Tenn. 1996) (labeling Barker’s shift in the burden of proof “aberrant”).
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to prove why it did not adopt any of an infinite number of potential alternative designs unfairly requires it to prove a negative. For these and other
reasons, leading commentators reasonably view Barker’s shift in the burden
of proof as simply wrong.269
Putting aside the troublesome shift in the burden of proof on the riskutility prong, Barker’s basic two-pronged approach to defining design defects
makes good sense in many respects. And it is far more forthright and intelligible than artful definitions of consumer expectations and risk-utility in
terms of one another. In addition to simple clarity, an advantage of the twopronged approach is that each test shores up the weaknesses of the other.
When used alone as the exclusive test of design defectiveness, both the consumer expectations and risk-utility tests must be expanded past their fair limits to provide liability in some cases where it is appropriate. Thus, plaintiffs
are helped by the two-pronged approach because they get to bite the apple on
both sides. But this test also provides benefits for defendants and the courts.
Defendants may be advantaged by the paring down of both tests to their leanest forms, where the proofs may be clearer and results more predictable from
each test. And courts will benefit in the same respect from the improvement
in logic and clarity from narrowing down the tests to permit them to establish
proper norms of responsibility for their own particular realms. Despite the
benefits of such a lean, two-pronged definitional approach, such a standard
must be shaped carefully around the inherent weaknesses of the consumer
expectations test – its indeterminacy in evaluating complex designs and its
bar to claims involving obvious dangers that could easily have been designed
away.

C. Complex vs. Simple Designs – The Soule Approach
From the very earliest days of modern products liability law, courts and
commentators turned to the risk-utility test to avoid applying the consumer
expectations test to cases involving vague expectations concerning complex
designs.270 In one early design defect case, Heaton v. Ford Motor Co.,271 the
driver of a pickup truck hit a 5– or 6–inch rock, damaging the wheel, which
caused the truck to leave the road and tip over. In making a claim for design
269. “The rule places an enormous burden on the concept of a ‘product design that
proximately causes injury,’ a burden which the concept seems ill-equipped to handle .
. . . People fall off ladders all the time, and the fact that ladders are both high and in
some general way unstable enables these falls to occur. Does it or doesn’t it follow
that in every case of a person’s falling off a ladder, the ladder’s design proximately
causes the fall?” Schwartz, supra note 136, at 466-67. See also KEETON, DOBBS,
KEETON & OWEN, supra note 59, at 702; Wade, supra note 172, at 573.
270. See, e.g., Wade, On the Nature, supra note 7, at 829 (criticizing use of consumer expectations test in cases where “the consumer would not know what to expect,
because he would have no idea how safe the product could be made”).
271. 435 P.2d 806 (Or. 1967).
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defectiveness under § 402A, the plaintiff introduced no risk-utility evidence
of the costs or feasibility of designing a stronger wheel but relied exclusively
upon the consumer expectations test to prove his case. Affirming a non-suit
against the plaintiff, the Oregon Supreme Court ruled that the jury, without
evidence on the costs and benefits of designing the wheel more strongly, did
not have the necessary tools to render a principled decision: without such
data, the jury could only speculate on the reasonableness of the wheel’s design.272 Put otherwise, the complexity of the engineering trade-offs involved
in the wheel’s design rendered consumer expectations unsuitable as a test of
its adequacy. Instead, the risk-utility test’s factors of feasibility, costs, and
benefits were needed to ascertain the sufficiency of the design. Several years
later, the Oregon courts took the final plunge by abandoning the consumer
expectations test in favor of a risk-utility test requiring proof of a feasible
alternative design.273
After the California Supreme Court decided Barker in 1979, other courts
began to view consumer expectations and risk-utility as compatible rather
than mutually exclusive ways to define a defect in design.274 Some courts
that followed Barker in adopting a two-pronged test for design defectiveness
began to limit the consumer expectations prong to contexts where consumers
have meaningful expectations concerning product safety. For example, rather

272. “Where the jury has no experiential basis for knowing this, the record must
supply a basis. In the absence of either common experience or evidence, any verdict
would, in effect, be the jury’s opinion of how strong the product should be. Such an
opinion by the jury would be formed without the benefit of data concerning the cost
or feasibility of designing and building stronger products. Without reference to relevant factual data, the jury has no special qualifications for deciding what is reasonable.” Id. at 809.
273. See, e.g., Roach v. Kononen, 525 P.2d 125 (Or. 1974); Phillips v. Kimwood
Mach. Co., 525 P.2d 1033 (Or. 1974); Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 577 P.2d 1322
(Or. 1978), reh’g denied, 579 P.2d 1287 (Or. 1978); Willamette Essential Oils v.
Herrold & Jensen Implement Co., 683 P.2d 1374 (Or. Ct. App. 1984); Wood v. Ford
Motor Co., 691 P.2d 495 (Or. Ct. App. 1984). In 1979, the Oregon legislature essentially adopted RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965), including its comments defining “defective” and “unreasonably dangerous” in consumer contemplation
terms. See OR. REV. STAT. § 30.920(3) (1979). While at least one Oregon court
interpreted the statute to require use of the consumer expectations test alone, Burns v.
Gen. Motors Corp., 891 P.2d 1354 (Or. Ct. App. 1995), the resiliency of the riskutility test has been illustrated by subsequent decisions reintroducing risk-utility analysis as a basis for design defectiveness in complex cases. See, e.g., McCathern v.
Toyota Motor Corp., 23 P.3d 320, 330-32 (Or. 2001) (risk-utility evidence may be
required to prove consumer expectations).
274. See, e.g., Biosera, Inc. v. Forma Scientific, Inc., 941 P.2d 284, 287 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1996) (“[W]e conclude that the two tests are not mutually exclusive. Rather, a
court should review each to determine if it is an appropriate standard for judging the
dangerous nature of the product at issue.”), aff’d on other grounds, 960 P.2d 108
(Colo. 1998).
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than abandoning the consumer expectations test altogether, the Supreme
Court of Arizona, in a 1985 decision that adopted the Barker two-pronged
approach, limited the consumer expectations test to cases where such expectations are well-defined, requiring the risk-utility test in cases where consumer expectations are vague.275 The next year, the Supreme Court of Colorado adopted the Barker two-pronged test,276 observing the following year
that the consumer expectations test was inappropriate for judging the adequacy of complex designs.277
By the 1990s, it had become quite clear that the consumer expectations
test was a poor gauge for ascertaining the adequacy of complex designs. In
Soule v. General Motors Corp.,278 the California Supreme Court in 1994
squarely confronted the vagueness problem inherent in Barker’s consumer
expectations prong. The plaintiff’s ankles were fractured when the Chevrolet
Camaro she was driving collided with another vehicle at a closing speed of 50
– 60 miles per hour. She sued the manufacturer, asserting that the design of
her automobile was defective because the left front wheel broke free, collapsed rearward, and smashed the toe pan and floorboard into her feet. In
particular, she claimed that the configuration of the car’s frame, and the
bracket attaching the wheel assembly to it, were defectively designed because
they did not limit the wheel’s rearward travel in the event the bracket should
fail. At trial, the parties disagreed on the angle and force of the impact and
the extent to which the toe pan had actually deformed. Design defectiveness
and causation were addressed by numerous experts on biomechanics, metallurgy, orthopedics, design engineering, crash-test simulation, and other matters. The plaintiff’s experts, relying on crash tests, metallurgical analysis, and
other evidence, explained how the damage to her car would have been minimized had it been properly designed. The defendant’s experts attempted to
refute these claims and explained how the plaintiff’s ankle injuries were
caused by the force of the collision and her failure to wear a seatbelt rather
than any defect in the car. The trial court instructed the jury on the consumer
expectations test, and the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff.
On appeal, an important question was whether the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the consumer expectations test in a case in which the
common experience of product users does not provide a basis for determining
how safely the product should have performed. The intermediate appellate
275. Dart v. Wiebe Mfg., Inc., 709 P.2d 876 (Ariz. 1985).
276. See Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. Heath, 722 P.2d 410 (Colo. 1986) (by implication), overruled on other grounds by Armentrout v. FMC Corp., 842 P.2d 175 (Colo.
1992).
277. See Camacho v. Honda Motor Co., 741 P.2d 1240, 1246-47 (Colo. 1987)
(“exclusive reliance upon consumer expectations is a particularly inappropriate means
of determining [defectiveness] where both the unreasonableness of the danger in the
design defect and the efficacy of alternative designs in achieving a reasonable degree
of safety must be defined primarily by technical, scientific information”).
278. 882 P.2d 298 (Cal. 1994).
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court affirmed the judgment for the plaintiff, and the defendant appealed to
the California Supreme Court. Reversing, the Supreme Court held that the
trial court erred in instructing the jury on the consumer expectations test on
the facts of the case.279 The court noted that it previously had explained, in
Barker v. Lull Engineering Co.,280 that a proper assessment of the costs, benefits, and practicality inherent in appropriate design defect determinations
requires risk-utility balancing rather than a gauge of consumer expectations.281 The court there had cited automotive crashworthiness litigation as an
example of the kind of complex case in which the feasibility, costs, and benefits of particular designs are “implicit” in an evaluation of the quality of the
manufacturer’s design decision.282 Distinguishing a case in which it had held
that consumer expectations were a proper test for judging the design adequacy of a bus without a “grab bar” in easy reach of the plaintiff’s seat,283 the
Soule court reasoned that the particular safety issue in that case was a matter
of common understanding. Thus, the consumer expectations test of Barker’s
first prong is appropriate, and expert testimony on defectiveness would invade the province of the jury, in cases involving simple product safety issues
about which consumers and jurors have a common understanding of widely
accepted minimum safety expectations.284
The court reasoned further, however, that cases involving complex
products often involve risks of injury that do not intelligibly engage the reasonable minimum safety expectations of consumers.285 Thus, in automotive
crashworthiness situations, consumers typically have “no idea” how safely
their vehicles should have performed in the particular circumstances of a
crash. In such cases, “the jury must consider the manufacturer’s evidence of
competing design considerations, and the issue of design defect cannot fairly
be resolved by standardless reference to the ‘expectations’ of an ‘ordinary
consumer.’”286 Because safety performance mechanisms in such cases typically are complex, and consumer safety expectations are commensurably
vague, juries must turn to “the balancing of risks and benefits required by the

279. Id. at 307-08.
280. 573 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978).
281. Soule, 882 P.2d at 305.
282. Barker, 573 P.2d at 456.
283. Campbell v. Gen. Motors Corp., 649 P.2d 224 (Cal. 1982).
284. As examples, the Soule court pointed to situations where a car explodes
while sitting at a stoplight, experiences sudden steering or brake failure as it leaves
the dealership, or rolls over and catches fire in a two-mile-per-hour collision. 882
P.2d at 308 n.3. Thus, the consumer expectations test of Barker’s first prong must be
reserved “for cases in which the everyday experience of the product’s users permits a
conclusion that the product’s design violated minimum safety assumptions, and is
thus defective regardless of expert opinion about the merits of the design.” Id. at 308.
285. Id.
286. Id.
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second prong of Barker.”287 The Soule court thus concluded that the jury
should not have been instructed on the consumer expectations test because
the plaintiff’s design defect theory involved complex technical and mechanical issues.288
Soule’s allocation of the consumer expectations and risk-utility tests to
their best uses – the former to designs involving simple safety issues (where
expert testimony may be improper) and the latter to designs involving complex cost-benefit tradeoffs (where expert testimony is required) – seemingly
makes good sense.289 Yet, this selection of defect tests on whether a product
is “simple” or “complex” can result in serious mischief if it is used to deprive
plaintiffs of a right to employ the risk-utility test in cases where a simple risk
is obvious, such as a lighter not equipped with a simple child-proof design.290
Courts dividing design defect tests along Soule lines will need to make cau287. Id. at 308-09.
288. “An ordinary consumer of automobiles cannot reasonably expect that a car’s
frame, suspension, or interior will be designed to remain intact in any and all accidents. Nor would ordinary experience and understanding inform such a consumer
how safely an automobile’s design should perform under the esoteric circumstances
of the collision at issue here. Indeed, both parties assumed that quite complicated
design considerations were at issue, and that expert testimony was necessary to illuminate these matters. Therefore, injection of ordinary consumer expectations into the
design defect equation was improper.” Id. at 310. Nevertheless, because of the voluminous evidence presented on the costs and benefits of the Camaro’s design, the
court saw no reason to believe that the jury ignored the risk-utility issue and only
relied upon the consumer expectations test. Id. at 311. Accordingly, the court held
that the trial court’s error in instructing the jury on the consumer expectations prong
was harmless. Id.
289. See Kennedy, supra note 37.
290. Compare Todd v. Societe Bic, S.A., 21 F.3d 1402 (7th Cir. 1994) (Ill. law)
(holding that Illinois would use consumer expectations prong of its two-pronged test
in judging design of simple products with obvious risks; a disposable butane cigarette
lighter, not equipped with a child-proof design, is not defective because consumers
expect it to ignite when activated), with Robins v. Kroger Co., 80 S.W.3d 641 (Tex.
App. 2002) (seller of lighter without child-proof design not entitled to summary
judgment on risk-utility test that included consumer expectations as one factor in the
balance).
Courts in Michigan, and formerly in Illinois, have sometimes slipped into
this beastly trap. See, e.g., Miles v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., No. 00 C 3278, 2002
WL 1303131 (N.D. Ill. June 12, 2002) (obvious danger to young child who eats crystal Drano drain cleaner); Bates v. Richland Sales Corp., 803 N.E.2d 977 (Ill. App. Ct.
2004) (risk from removing loader’s roll bar). Compare Mills v. Curioni, Inc., 238 F.
Supp. 2d 876, 892 (E.D. Mich. 2002) (“It is only when a ‘simple tool’ is involved that
the ‘open and obvious danger’ rule will relieve a manufacturer of liability on a design
defect claim.”), with Cacevic v. Simplimatic Eng’g Co., 617 N.W.2d 386, 392 (Mich.
Ct. App. 2000) (concluding that “the open and obvious danger doctrine [does not]
apply to obviate a manufacturer’s duty in a case alleging defective design of a simple
product”).
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tious allowances for these types of cases to avoid resurrecting the patent danger rule, which now is properly defunct.291 Many courts have adopted
Soule’s approach of applying design defect tests based on the complexity or
simplicity of a product’s design,292 while others have rejected the complex vs.
simple product approach outright.293
Courts that have defined consumer expectations in terms of risk-util294
ity, discussed above, have effectively chosen to follow the Barker–Soule
291. See OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW, supra note 13, § 10.2.
292. See, e.g., Quintana-Ruiz v. Hyundai Motor Corp., 303 F.3d 62, 77 (1st Cir.
2002) (P.R. law) (“the rule that consumer expectations cannot be the basis of liability
in a case involving complex technical matters” precludes use of this test in airbag
design defect case); Morson v. Superior Court, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d 343, 350-51 (Ct.
App. 2001) (consumer expectations test inappropriate to determine design defectiveness of latex gloves that could trigger harmful allergic reactions in persons with nonexistent, dormant, or minor allergic conditions); Biosera, Inc. v. Forma Scientific,
Inc., 941 P.2d 284 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996), aff’d on other grounds, 960 P.2d 108 (Colo.
1998); Potter v. Chi. Pneumatic Tool Co., 694 A.2d 1319, 1333-34 (Conn. 1997);
Force v. Ford Motor Co., 879 So. 2d 103, 110 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (“there may
indeed be products that are too complex for a logical application of the consumerexpectation standard”); Bates v. Richland Sales Corp., 803 N.E.2d 977 (Ill. App. Ct.
2004); Ray v. BIC Corp., 925 S.W.2d 527, 533 (Tenn. 1996) (“the consumer expectation test will be inapplicable, by definition, to certain products about which an ordinary consumer can have no expectation”). See also Coffey v. Dowley Mfg., Inc., 187
F. Supp. 2d 958, 969 (M.D. Tenn. 2002), aff’d, 89 F. App’x 927 (6th Cir. 2003) (although “technically applicable to all cases,” consumer expectations test may be inadequate when product complex); Gen. Motors Corp. v. Farnsworth, 965 P.2d 1209,
1221 (Alaska 1998) (passenger in car submarined under lap belt; consumers could
form expectations concerning lap belt design); Camacho v. Honda Motor Co., 741
P.2d 1240, 1246-47 (Colo. 1987); cases cited infra note 299.
293. See, e.g., Calles v. Scripto-Tokai Corp., 864 N.E.2d 249, 259 (Ill. 2007)
(rejecting “simple product” exception to risk-utility test in case where 3-year-old
killed in fire she started with utility lighter that was not equipped with child-resistant
safety device, and noting that the effect of such an exception would be to relieve
manufacturers of design responsibility for obvious dangers); Jackson v. Gen. Motors
Corp., 60 S.W.3d 800 (Tenn. 2001) (refusing to limit consumer expectations prong of
two-pronged statutory design defect standard to simple product designs).
294. See, e.g., Delaney v. Deere & Co., 999 P.2d 930, 944 (Kan. 2000) (recognizing “the validity of risk/utility analysis as a guide in determining the expectations of
consumers in complex cases”); Vautour v. Body Masters Sports Indus., 784 A.2d
1178 (N.H. 2001) (consumer expectations defined in terms of risk-utility); McCathern
v. Toyota Motor Corp., 23 P.3d 320, 330-32 (Or. 2001) (risk-utility evidence may be
required to prove consumer expectations); Seattle-First Nat’l Bank v. Tabert, 542
P.2d 774, 779 (Wash. 1975). But see Pritchett v. Cottrell, Inc., 512 F.3d 1057, 1064
(8th Cir. 2008) (Mo. law) (while Missouri formally follows the consumer expectations test, the ultimate issue is whether a product is “unreasonably dangerous,” such
that litigants may argue “that the utility of a design outweighs its risks, or that consumer expectations were violated, or any other theory of unreasonable dangerousness
supported by the evidence”); cases cited supra note 292.
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approach, if by a crooked path. The Connecticut Supreme Court’s experience
in Potter v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co.295 is a good example. There, reasoning that “a consumer’s expectations may be viewed in light of various
factors that balance the utility of the product’s design with the magnitude of
its risks,”296 the court materially altered Connecticut’s design defect jurisprudence. Holding that this risk-utility formulation of a “modified consumer
expectation test” should be used for complex design cases, the court concluded, citing Soule, that the “ordinary consumer expectation test” should be
reserved for use “when the everyday experience of the particular product’s
users permits the inference that the product did not meet minimum safety
expectations.”297 In so doing, Potter effectively established its own version
of a two-pronged Barker–Soule test – with the first prong being an “ordinary”
consumer expectations test, limited to simple design cases, and the second
prong being a risk-utility test (window-dressed as a “modified” consumer
expectation test), for application in complex cases. Potter’s basic result is
sound, but tying the risk-utility prong to consumer expectations sows seeds of
confusion for future design defect litigation. Yet Potter also contains an important insight: that risk-utility analysis should be turned to when “ordinary”
consumer expectations fail to provide a rational basis for recovery.298
As cost-benefit analysis gathers strength around the globe as the dominant method for judging whether a product’s design is adequately safe,299
courts and legislatures continue to search for ways to accommodate consumer
expectations without banishing it altogether from design defect determinations.300 Even the Products Liability Restatement, though assigning con295. 694 A.2d 1319.
296. Id. at 1333.
297. Id. (emphasis added).
298. As, presumably, in obvious danger cases. Potter emphasized that only the
risk-utility test (dubbed the “modified consumer expectations test”), not the (“ordinary”) consumer expectation test, should be used in cases where the consumer expectations test does not provide relief:
[T]he jury should engage in the risk-utility balancing required by our
modified consumer expectation test when the particular facts do not reasonably permit the inference that the product did not meet the safety expectations of the ordinary consumer. Furthermore, instructions based on
the ordinary consumer expectation test would not be appropriate when, as
a matter of law, there is insufficient evidence to support a jury verdict under that test. In such circumstances, the jury should be instructed solely on
the modified consumer expectation test we have articulated today.
Id. at 1334.
299. This trend is not limited to the United States. See OWEN, PRODUCTS
LIABILITY LAW, supra note 13, § 1.4.
300. See, e.g., Pritchett v. Cottrell, Inc., 512 F.3d 1057, 1064 (8th Cir. 2008) (Mo.
law) (though Missouri formally follows consumer expectations test, ultimate issue is
whether product is “unreasonably dangerous,” so that litigants may argue “that the
utility of a design outweighs its risks, or that consumer expectations were violated, or
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sumer expectations to a secondary position as a mere factor in the risk-utility
balance, recognizes that consumer expectations may play an important (sometimes decisive) role in assessing design defectiveness.301 The approach of
some courts in defining consumer expectations and risk-utility in terms of one
another may accommodate both perspectives but does so through a sleight of
hand that muddies products liability jurisprudence. The Barker two-pronged
test for design defectiveness achieves the same objectives, more clearly and
intelligibly, but the burden of proof should be left on plaintiffs for both
prongs. Moreover, the consumer expectations prong should be limited to
simple design dangers, as in Soule and Potter, except that the risk-utility
prong should be retained for use in simple design cases in which the risks are
obvious. Combining the consumer expectations and risk-utility tests along
these lines may provide an optimal standard for judging design defectiveness.302

VII. CONSTRUCTIVE KNOWLEDGE – THE WADE–KEETON TEST
In holding manufacturers responsible for defects in design, courts and
commentators have always sought to avoid absolute liability, recognizing that
the concepts of design safety and design danger are matters of degree involving trade-offs between a product’s usefulness, cost, and safety.303 The
idea of a design defect, in other words, has long been understood to rest on
the idea of reasonable balance.304 Because negligence itself is grounded on
both reasonableness and balance, one is led to inquire whether and how negligence and strict liability may differ in design defect litigation. Accordingly,
in the 1960s, products liability scholars began to search for a way to define

any other theory of unreasonable dangerousness supported by the evidence”); Glenn
v. Overhead Door Corp., 935 So. 2d 1074, 1081 (Miss. Ct. App. 2006) (“the Products
Liability Act requires the manufacturer’s product to pass both the risk-utility and the
consumer expectations tests”); MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-1-63(b) (2004).
301. See infra Part VIII.
302. Such a test might look something like the following:
A simple product design is defective if it fails to perform as safely as an
ordinary consumer fairly would expect, and any design is defective if it
reasonably should have been designed more safely in a way that would
have prevented the plaintiff’s injuries. A product reasonably should have
been designed more safely if the foreseeable safety benefits of an untaken
design precaution clearly exceeded its foreseeable costs, including any
diminished usefulness or safety.
The liability standard suggested here limits design defect determinations to situations
where a manufacturer’s cost-benefit decisions are “clearly” wrong in order to maximize the range of product diversity and, hence, consumer choice among a wide range
of products with differing, yet acceptable, balances of cost, utility, and safety.
303. See OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW, supra note 13, §§ 5.3, 5.5.
304. See, e.g., Owen, Defectiveness Restated, supra note 7, at 754-61.
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strict liability for selling products with defects in design (and warnings) in a
manner that distinguished the strict liability standard from mere negligence.
Other than Dean Prosser, the two most prominent tort law scholars in
the 1960s who shared a special interest in products liability law were Dean
Page Keeton of the University of Texas and Dean John Wade of Vanderbilt
University. As modern products liability law was just beginning to emerge in
the 1960s, the two deans, both advisers to the American Law Institute’s Restatement (Second) of Torts which was then in progress, offered separate versions of a similar definition of product defectiveness that distinguished negligence-based responsibility from liability called “strict” in a fundamental way.
At the time, courts and commentators were just beginning to feel their way
around the new precept of holding manufacturers of defective products
“strictly” accountable for injuries to remote consumers.305 Little thought was
being devoted to how the new field might be divided up, for purposes of the
standard of liability, according to different types of defect.306 Thus, as with
most other scholars of the day, the search by Deans Keeton and Wade for an
appropriate “test” of strict liability was a search for a single liability standard
that alone would embrace most products liability problems of the day.307
The test developed by Deans Keeton and Wade, which in time became
known as the “Wade–Keeton” test308 quite simply was a negligence test
stripped of scienter.309 That is, both scholars proposed defining defectiveness
in terms of whether a manufacturer or other seller with full knowledge of its
product’s dangerous condition would be negligent in selling it in that condition. By requiring a seller to know its product’s risks, commensurately relieving an injured plaintiff of the burden of proving the foreseeability of those
risks, this test imposes on the seller “constructive knowledge” of any dangers
its products may possess.310

305. See Owen, Evolution, supra note 21.
306. See OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW, supra note 13, § 6.2. This is not to
say that certain scholars of the day did not perceive a great divide between manufacturing and design defects, for they did. See, e.g., Keeton, Liability Without Fault,
supra note 7, at 859.
307. Especially in the 1960s, the case law was quite limited, and, like other scholars of the time, both Deans Keeton and Wade drew on various examples of defects in
manufacturing, design, and warning.
308. See, e.g., Privette v. CSX Transp., Inc., 79 F. App’x 879, 889 (6th Cir. 2003)
(Tenn. law) (referring to this liability standard more fully as “the Wade-Keeton prudent manufacturer test”); Brooks v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 902 P.2d 54, 63 (N.M.
1995); Richard L. Cupp, Jr. & Danielle Polage, The Rhetoric of Strict Liability Versus
Negligence: An Empirical Analysis, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 874, 884 (2002).
309. See, e.g., Wade, On the Nature, supra note 7, at 834-35. The Wade–Keeton
test is examined from a state-of-the-art perspective in OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY
LAW, supra note 13, § 10.4.
310. See, e.g., Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 525 P.2d 1033 (Or. 1974).

2008]

DESIGN DEFECTS

355

In 1961, two years before Judge Roger Traynor penned his opinion in
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.,311 three years before Dean William
Prosser submitted to the ALI his draft of Restatement (Second) of Torts §
402A applicable to products generally,312 and four years before Dean Wade
first offered a similar proposal, Dean Page Keeton authored a little article in
the Texas Law Review in which he first articulated a liability test for product
defects that was truly strict. At the conclusion of the article in which he examined the various techniques by which courts were holding manufacturers
accountable for injuries from defective products,313 Dean Keeton proposed
that a product should not be considered defective “if a reasonable man with
full knowledge of all the properties and the danger therein, would continue to
market the product because the utility of its use outweighs the danger.”314
Two years later, Dean Keeton hinted at this test in another article in the Texas
Law Review,315 and then, in 1964, in an article exploring the nature of strict
products liability,316 he explained that courts had imposed strict manufacturer
liability when “the product was so dangerous to the user in the condition that
it was in that a reasonable man would not have sold it in such condition with
knowledge of such a condition and appreciation of the danger. The manufacturer would have been negligent except for his excusable ignorance of the
danger.”317 In numerous other articles, from 1966 to at least 1980, Dean
Keeton recommended and refined his test of design defectiveness. In his later
articles, he emphasized that a design’s risks should be determined at the date
of trial, which of course imposes constructive knowledge on the manufacturer
at the time of first design and sale: “a product is defectively designed [if] the
magnitude of the danger in fact of the design as it is proved to be at the trial
outweighs the utility of the design.”318
311. 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963).
312. The ALI approved § 402A when Dean Prosser presented it in final form,
applicable to products generally, in 1964. See OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW,
supra note 13, § 5.3.
313. Keeton, Current Developments, supra note 7.
314. Id. at 210. “This is close to a negligence test but not the same [because]
excusable ignorance of a defect or the properties of a product is immaterial. . . . ” Id.
In his full discussion, Dean Keeton mistakenly confuses the negative and positive
formulations of the standard.
315. Keeton, Liability Without Fault, supra note 7, at 867-68.
316. Page Keeton, Products Liability – The Nature and Extent of Strict Liability,
1964 U. ILL. L. F. 693, 702.
317. Id.
318. W. Page Keeton, Products Liability – Design Hazards and the Meaning of
Defect, 10 CUMB. L. REV. 293, 314-15 (1979). In this article, Dean Keeton noted that
his test differs from negligence primarily because, as proposed, the danger in fact as
proven at trial determines whether a product is good or bad. . . . When the negligence
of the defendant is in issue, it is perceivable danger at the time the product was designed that is the basis for weighing danger against utility. Therefore, a clear difference between proof of negligence and proof of defect as a basis for recovery is appar-
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In 1965, in an article319 in which he cited both of Dean Keeton’s Texas
articles,320 Dean John Wade offered a similar strict liability test for ascertaining whether a product is unreasonably dangerous: “assuming that the defendant had knowledge of the condition of the product, would he then have been
acting unreasonably in placing it on the market?”321 Further, Dean Wade
remarked: “If the test is equivalent to that of whether a reasonable prudent
man would put it on the market if he knew of the dangers of this particular
article, then the elements for determining negligence are relevant. We have
here again the problem of balancing the utility of the risk against the magnitude of the risk.”322 In his famous 1973 article in the Mississippi Law Journal,323 Dean Wade restated his version of the test:
The simplest and easiest way [to define defectiveness] is to assume
that the defendant knew of the dangerous condition of the product
and ask whether he was then negligent in putting it on the market
or supplying it to someone else. In other words, the scienter is
supplied as a matter of law, and there is no need for the plaintiff to
prove its existence as a matter of fact. Once given this notice of
the dangerous condition of the chattel, the question then becomes
whether the defendant was negligent. . . . Another way of saying
this is to ask whether the magnitude of the risk created by the dangerous condition of the product was outweighed by the social utility attained by putting it out in this fashion.324

ent. Id. at 314-15. In a footnote, Dean Keeton pointed out that the difference between the two tests was the requirement for negligence that the danger be foreseeable,
whereas, under his “strict” liability test, “it is irrelevant that the defendant did not
know or had no reason to know of the danger.” Id. at 315 n.87.
319. Wade, Strict Tort Liability, supra note 7. The article arose out of a products
liability symposium the year before in Dallas, Texas where both deans presented
papers.
320. Id. at 12, 13 n.45.
321. Id. at 15.
322. Id. at 17.
323. Wade, On the Nature, supra note 7.
324. Id. at 834-35. Dean Wade also recommended how the jury might be instructed on this test:
A [product] is not duly safe if it is so likely to be harmful to person [or
property] that a reasonable prudent manufacturer [supplier], who had actual knowledge of its harmful character would not place it on the market.
It is not necessary to find that this defendant had knowledge of the harmful character of the [product] in order to determine that it was not duly
safe.
Id. at 839-40.
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Just why the “Wade–Keeton” test was labeled precisely as it was is
shrouded in the mists of time,325 but its name is surely backwards. Not only
does it appear to have been invented by Dean Keeton in 1961,326 four years
before Dean Wade first proposed it, but Dean Keeton spread the theory far
and wide. Dean Wade, who appears to have borrowed the idea for the test
from Dean Keeton,327 may have offered the test in the law journals merely
twice, in 1965 and 1973.328 By contrast, Dean Keeton proposed and explained the test in law journals and his products liability casebook at least a
dozen times, from 1961 at least to 1980.329
Be that as it may, a number of courts, themselves searching for a basis
by which to distinguish strict liability design claims (and warning claims)
from those in negligence, picked up quite early on the Wade–Keeton hindsight test (sometimes referred to as the prudent-manufacturer test).330 Per325. The dual origins of the test were noted at least as early as 1974, see Phillips
v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 525 P.2d 1033, 1036 n.6 (Or. 1974), and the “Wade–Keeton”
moniker appeared in print no later than 1978. See Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng’g Co.,
Inc., 386 A.2d 816, 829 (N.J. 1978); see also Sheila L. Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test
for Design Defect: From Negligence [to Warranty] to Strict Liability to Negligence,
33 VAND. L. REV. 593, 619 n.125 (1980).
326. Keeton, Current Developments, supra note 7, at 210.
327. It should be noted that Dean Wade reported that, at the time he wrote his
Southwestern Law Journal article in 1964-65, he had not even read Dean Keeton’s
1961 Texas article. See John W. Wade, On the Effect in Product Liability of Knowledge Unavailable Prior to Marketing, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 734, 761 (1983)
(“Postscript: An Excursus on the ‘Wade-Keeton’ Approach”). By 1983, Dean Wade
must have forgotten that he cited both of Dean Keeton’s 1961 and 1962 Texas articles
in his own article in the Southwestern Law Journal. See Wade, Strict Tort Liability,
supra note 7, at 12, 13 n.45.
328. My research on this point was not exhaustive and may have missed Dean
Wade’s endorsement of the test somewhere else.
329. In addition to Dean Keeton’s articles cited elsewhere in this section, see, for
example, W. PAGE KEETON, DAVID G. OWEN & JOHN E. MONTGOMERY, PRODUCTS
LIABILITY AND SAFETY 245 n.1 (1980); W. Page Keeton, The Meaning of Defect in
Products Liability Law – A Review of Basic Principles, 45 MO. L. REV. 579, 592
(1980); Page Keeton, Product Liability and the Meaning of Defect, 5 ST. MARY’S L.J.
30, 37-38 (1973) [Keeton, Meaning of Defect]; Page Keeton, Products Liability –
Drugs and Cosmetics, 25 VAND. L. REV. 131, 144 (1972); W. Page Keeton, Product
Liability – Inadequacy of Information, 48 TEX. L. REV. 398, 402-03 (1970); Page
Keeton, Manufacturer’s Liability: The Meaning of “Defect” in the Manufacture and
Design of Products, 20 SYRACUSE L. REV. 559, 568 (1969) [hereinafter Keeton, Manufacturer’s Liability]; Page Keeton, Some Observations About the Strict Liability of
the Maker of Prescription Drugs: The Aftermath of MER/29, 56 CAL. L. REV. 149,
158 (1968); Page Keeton, Products Liability – Some Observations About Allocation
of Risks, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1329, 1336 (1966).
330. Early examples include Dorsey v. Yoder Co., 331 F. Supp. 753, 759-60 (E.D.
Pa. 1971), aff’d, 474 F.2d 1339 (3d Cir. 1973), Cepeda v. Cumberland Engineering
Co., 386 A.2d 816, 829 (N.J. 1978), and Phillips v. Kimwood Machine Co., 525 P.2d
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haps the first such case was Dorsey v. Yoder Co.,331 in which the court stated
that the proper test for strict products liability in tort is “whether a reasonable
manufacturer would continue to market his product in the same condition as
he sold it to the plaintiff with knowledge of the potential dangerous consequences the trial just revealed.”332 More prominently, in Phillips v. Kimwood
Machine Co.,333 the Supreme Court of Oregon embraced the test in 1974. A
worker injured when a commercial sanding machine ejected a fiberboard
sheet sued the manufacturer for failing either to warn of the danger or equip
the machine with an inexpensive line of metal teeth that would have prevented the expulsion without interference with the functioning of the machine. Reversing a summary judgment for the manufacturer, the court formulated the test in the following terms:
A dangerously defective article would be one which a reasonable
person would not put into the stream of commerce if he had knowledge of its harmful character. The test, therefore, is whether the
seller would be negligent if he sold the article knowing of the risk
involved. Strict liability imposes what amounts to constructive
knowledge of the condition of the product.334
By the 1980s, however, courts and commentators began to question the
fairness and logic of imposing strict liability for design defectiveness,335 and
the only other truly strict test of products liability, the consumer expectations
test, had already begun its decline.336 Recognizing the problems in forcing
truly strict liability on manufacturers for dangers in design, Dean Wade and
1033, 1036 (Or. 1974). See generally Dart v. Wiebe Mfg., Inc., 709 P.2d 876 (Ariz.
1985).
331. 331 F. Supp. 753 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
332. Id. at 759-60 (emphasis omitted) (citing Keeton, Manufacturer’s Liability,
supra note 329, at 568).
333. 525 P.2d 1033 (Or. 1974).
334. Id. at 1036. The court noted further that “[t]he advantage of describing a
dangerous defect in the manner of Wade and Keeton is that it preserves the use of
familiar terms and thought processes with which courts, lawyers, and jurors customarily deal.” Id. at 1037. Moreover,
[w]hile apparently judging the seller’s conduct, the test set out above
would actually be a characterization of the product by a jury. If the manufacturer was not acting reasonably in selling the product, knowing of the
risks involved, then the product would be dangerously defective when
sold and the manufacturer would be subject to liability.
Id.; see Dominick R. Vetri, Products Liability: The Developing Framework for Analysis, 54 OR. L. REV. 293, 299 (1975).
335. See OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW, supra note 13, § 5.4; supra Parts I,
IV.
336. See OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW, supra note 13, §§ 5.4, 5.6; supra Parts
III, IV.
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Dean Keeton, in the early 1980s, both repudiated the test(s) that bore their
names: Dean Wade claimed that he never meant what he had said,337 and
Dean Keeton admitted that he no longer believed what he had said.338 The
Products Liability Restatement, adopting a negligence-type risk-utility standard of liability, based on risks that are foreseeable at the time of sale, explicitly rejects the Wade–Keeton test and notes with pith: “[t]he idea has not
worn well with time.”339
Despite the rejection of the Wade–Keeton test by the scholars who gave
it birth, courts continued to adopt the test after its “official” demise in the
early 1980s,340 and some have continued rotely to restate the test,341 and even
proudly to reaffirm allegiance to it while knowing it has died.342 While one

337. See Wade, supra note 327, at 761.
338. See KEETON, DOBBS, KEETON & OWEN, supra note 59, at 697-98 n.21.
339. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB., Reporters’ Note to § 2
cmt. l (1998).
340. See, e.g., Sternhagen v. Dow Co., 935 P.2d 1139, 1147 (Mont. 1997) (adopting Wade–Keeton constructive knowledge test for strict products liability, and holding that “knowledge of any undiscovered or undiscoverable dangers should be imputed to the manufacturer”).
341. See, e.g., Clinton v. Brown & Williamson Holdings, Inc., 498 F. Supp. 2d
639, 645 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); Murphy v. Playtex Family Prods. Corp., 176 F. Supp. 2d
473, 484 (D. Md. 2001), aff’d, 69 F. App’x 140 (4th Cir. 2003) (test for design defectiveness is “‘whether a manufacturer, knowing the risks inherent in his product, acted
reasonably in putting it on the market.’”); Golonka v. Gen. Motors Corp., 65 P.3d
956, 963-64 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003) (applying hindsight test); Blue v. Envtl. Eng’g,
Inc., 828 N.E.2d 1128, 1153 (Ill. 2005) (Fitzgerald, J., specially concurring) (“‘liability in strict liability cases rests on whether a prudent manufacturer, if it were aware of
dangers involved in using its products as those dangers are known from hindsight,
would have placed the product into the stream of commerce; the plaintiff need not
prove that the danger was foreseeable’”); Sternhagen, 935 P.2d at 1144 (“Strict liability imposes what amounts to constructive knowledge of the condition of the product.”); Denny v. Ford Motor Co., 662 N.E.2d 730, 735 (N.Y. 1995) (“the New York
standard for determining the existence of a design defect has required an assessment
of whether ‘if the design defect were known at the time of manufacture, a reasonable
person would conclude that the utility of the product did not outweigh the risk inherent in marketing a product designed in that manner’”) (citing Voss v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 450 N.E.2d 204 (N.Y. 1983)); Leary v. Syracuse Model Neighborhood
Corp., 799 N.Y.S.2d 867, 873 (App. Div. 2005); Brown v. Crown Equip., 181 S.W.3d
268, 281-82 (Tenn. 2005) (stating hindsight test, now ensconced in statutory form);
Sipes v. Gen. Motors Corp., 946 S.W.2d 143, 156 (Tex. App. 1997) (“Under strict
liability, one may impute to the manufacturer constructive knowledge of the hazardous condition of the product.”). See also Sperry-New Holland v. Prestage, 617 So. 2d
248, 254-55 (Miss. 1993).
342. See Brooks v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 902 P.2d 54, 63 (N.M. 1995), recognizing that the Wade–Keeton test is now a misnomer, but reaffirming it where the facts
did not show a true advancement in the technological state of the art:
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state legislature reversed the judicial adoption of the Wade–Keeton test,343
another appears to have affirmatively adopted it,344 and one wonders at its
staying power in scattered decisions across the nation. The ghost of the
Wade–Keeton test continues to haunt judicial halls, but its time has come and
gone.

VIII. DESIGN DEFECTS IN THE THIRD RESTATEMENT
Effectively repealing § 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability substantially restructures the
principles of responsibility for selling products containing defects in design.345 Rather than using doctrinal labels of “strict” liability and “negligence,” the Products Liability Restatement provides separate “functional”
definitions of liability for each of the three forms of defect, including defects
in design. Sections 1 and 2 set forth the basic principles of a seller’s liability
for design defectiveness. Section 3 provides a special rule of circumstantial
evidence for proof of product defect in cases where direct evidence of the
cause of an accident is unavailable but where circumstances suggest the probability that a product defect caused the harm;346 and § 4 addresses the effect
[I]n those hypothetical instances in which technology known at the time
of trial and technology knowable at the time of distribution differ – and
outside of academic rationale we find little to suggest the existence in
practice of unknowable design considerations – it is more fair that the
manufacturers and suppliers who have profited from the sale of the product bear the risk of loss.
The standard New Mexico jury instruction adopts the Wade–Keeton test from Keeton,
Meaning of Defect, supra note 329, at 37-38. See Brooks, 902 P.2d at 62.
343. In 1979, the Oregon legislature abolished the Wade–Keeton test adopted by
that state’s Supreme Court in Phillips v. Kimwood Machine Co., 525 P.2d 1033 (Or.
1974), by legislatively adopting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965),
including its comments which define defectiveness in consumer contemplation terms.
See OR. REV. STAT. § 30.920 (1979); Burns v. Gen. Motors Corp., 891 P.2d 1354 (Or.
Ct. App. 1995) (statute inconsistent with instruction on Phillips’ reasonable manufacturer test); see also McCathern v. Toyota Motor Corp., 23 P.3d 320, 331 (Or.
2001).
344. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-102(8) (1978). But see TENN. CODE ANN. §
29-28-105 (1978). See also Brown v. Crown Equip., 181 S.W.3d 268, 281-82 (Tenn.
2005) (stating Wade–Keeton hindsight test); Irion v. Sun Lighting, Inc., No. M200200766-COA-R3-CV, 2004 WL 746823 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 7, 2004) (same).
345. For an overview of the entire Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, see OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW, supra note 13, § 6.5.
346. Although § 3 usually applies to accidents caused by manufacturing defects, it
may apply to defects in design. See Estate of Edward W. Knoster v. Ford Motor Co.,
200 F. App’x 106, 113-14 (3d Cir. 2006) (N.J. law) (sudden acceleration accident;
New Jersey recognizes the application of § 3 in design defect cases); Rudd v. Gen.
Motors Corp., 127 F. Supp. 2d 1330, 1340 (M.D. Ala. 2001) (pickup truck’s fan blade
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on liability of compliance or noncompliance with product safety statutes and
regulations.347 Design defects in prescription drug and medical device cases
receive separate treatment in the Third Restatement.348

A. Design Defects in §§ 1 and 2
Section 1 of the Products Liability Restatement establishes the basic liability principle of products liability: one who sells “a defective product is
subject to liability for harm to persons or property caused by the defect.”
Section 2, basing liability on the three separate types of defect, provides in
subsection (b) that a product “is defective in design when the foreseeable
risks of harm posed by the product could have been reduced or avoided by the
adoption of a reasonable alternative design by the seller or other distributor,
or a predecessor in the commercial chain of distribution, and the omission of
the alternative design renders the product not reasonably safe.” Stripped to
its essence, § 2(b) provides:
[A product] is defective in design when the foreseeable risks of
harm posed by the product could have been reduced or avoided by
the adoption of a reasonable alternative design . . . and the omission of the alternative design renders the product not reasonably
safe.
Paraphrased, § 2(b) provides:
A product is defective in design if its foreseeable risks could have
been avoided by a reasonable alternative design, the omission of
which renders the product not reasonably safe.
Converted to the active voice, § 2(b) means:
A product is defective in design if the seller could have reduced the
foreseeable risk that harmed the plaintiff by adopting a reasonable

broke due to fatigue fracture; such fractures might result from selection of lowstrength alloy for use in constructing fan); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS.
LIAB. § 3 cmt. b (1998). Section 3 of the Restatement and the “malfunction theory”
are addressed in OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW, supra note 13, § 7.4.
347. The effect of a manufacturer’s compliance and noncompliance with safety
statutes and regulations is addressed in OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW, supra note
13, § 14.3 (compliance); id. § 2.4 (noncompliance, negligence); id. § 6.4 (noncompliance, strict liability).
348. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 6(c). Design defects
in prescription drugs and medical devices are examined in OWEN, PRODUCTS
LIABILITY LAW, supra note 13, § 8.10.
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alternative design, the omission of which renders the product not
reasonably safe.349
By requiring that an alternative design be “reasonable,” and basing a
manufacturer’s liability on its failure to adopt such an alternative design only
if it renders the product “not reasonably safe,” the Third Restatement rejects
absolute safety in favor of optimality: “[s]ociety does not benefit from products that are excessively safe . . . any more than it benefits from products that
are too risky. Society benefits most when the right, or optimal, amount of
product safety is achieved.”350 The risk-utility balance prescribed in § 2(b)
for design defect determinations ordinarily resolves into a negligence-style351
evaluation of the foreseeable352 costs and benefits of the manufacturer’s decision to forego an alternative design:

349. For a more complete linguistic deconstruction of § 2(b), see Owen, Defectiveness Restated, supra note 7, at 766-77.
350. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. a.
Some sort of independent assessment of advantages and disadvantages, to
which some attach the label ‘risk-utility balancing,’ is necessary. . . .
[T]he various trade-offs need to be considered in determining whether accident costs are more fairly and efficiently borne by accident victims, on
the one hand, or, on the other hand, by consumers generally through the
mechanism of higher product prices attributable to liability costs imposed
by courts on product sellers.
Id.
351. Assessment of a product design in most instances requires a comparison
between an alternative design and the product design that caused the injury, undertaken from the viewpoint of a reasonable person. That approach is also used in administering the traditional reasonableness standard in negligence. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 283, cmt. c. The policy reasons that support use of a reasonable-person perspective in connection with the general negligence standard also support its use in the products liability context.
Id. cmt. d. See also id. § 1 cmt. a.
352. In the black-letter definition of design defectiveness in § 2(b), set forth
above, the Third Restatement limits a seller’s responsibility to risks that are “foreseeable,” an important limitation explained in comment a:
Most courts agree that, for the liability system to be fair and efficient, the
balancing of risks and benefits in judging product design and marketing
must be done in light of the knowledge of risks and risk-avoidance techniques reasonably attainable at the time of distribution. To hold a manufacturer liable for a risk that was not foreseeable when the product was
marketed might foster increased manufacturer investment in safety. But
such investment by definition would be a matter of guesswork. Furthermore, manufacturers may persuasively ask to be judged by a normative
behavior standard to which it is reasonably possible for manufacturers to
conform. For these reasons, Subsections (b) and (c) speak of products being defective only when risks are reasonably foreseeable.
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Subsection (b) adopts a reasonableness (“risk-utility balancing”)
test as the standard for judging the defectiveness of product designs. More specifically, the test is whether a reasonable alternative design would, at reasonable cost, have reduced the foreseeable
risks of harm posed by the product and, if so, whether [its] omission . . . rendered the product not reasonably safe.353
In making the relevant cost-benefit assessment, “[a] broad range of factors may be considered in determining whether an alternative design is reasonable and whether its omission renders a product not reasonably safe.”354
The balance includes a wide variety of design considerations that often conflict with one another: the foreseeable risks of harm, consumer expectations,
usefulness, cost, longevity, responsibility for maintenance, aesthetics, marketability, and other advantages and disadvantages of the chosen and alternative designs.355 A judge or jury must evaluate these factors with respect to
both the accident product as designed and the alternative design feature put
forward by the plaintiff. A product’s design is “not reasonably safe,” and is
hence “defective,” if a comparison between the accident product without the
plaintiff’s proposed safety feature and the alternative product with the proposed safety feature demonstrates that the balance of costs and benefits of the
alternative design is better than the balance of these same factors in the chosen design that resulted in the accident.356 And the converse is also true: if
the balance of competing design considerations in the accident product without the proposed safety feature was as good as or better than the balance in
the proposed alternative design, then the accident product’s design will be
deemed “reasonably safe” and “nondefective.”357 In short, “the requirement
of Subsection (b) that a product is defective in design if the foreseeable risks
of harm could have been reduced by a reasonable alternative design is based
on the common-sense notion that liability for harm caused by product designs
should attach only when harm is reasonably preventable.”358

B. Consumer Expectations
One of the most controversial aspects of the Third Restatement’s definition of design defect concerns the elimination of consumer expectations as an
353. Id. § 2 cmt. d.
354. Id. cmt. f.
355. See id.
356. The plaintiff, of course, must also prove causation – that the alternative
product would have prevented or reduced his harm. See id. §§ 1, 2 cmts. f, q, 15.
Causation is treated generally in §§ 15 and 16 of the Restatement. See also OWEN,
PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW, supra note 13, ch. 11.
357. A “better balance” definition of defective design is proposed in Owen, Defectiveness Restated, supra note 7, at 775.
358. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. f (1998).
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independent test of liability and the relegation of those expectations to mere
“factor” status in the list of risk-utility considerations.359 Comment g declares: “Under Subsection (b), consumer expectations do not constitute an
independent standard for judging the defectiveness of product designs.”360
Although not determinative in most cases, if consumer safety expectations are
implicated by a particular design, they factor into an evaluation of whether
the manufacturer should have adopted a reasonable alternative design.361
Moreover, the Restatement makes clear that manufacturers and other sellers
may not use consumer expectations as a defense when a product contains
substantial hazards, even if obvious, which may reasonably be designed
away.362

359. See, e.g., Phillips, supra note 18; Marshall S. Shapo, A New Legislation:
Remarks on the Draft Restatement of Products Liability, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
215 (1997); Shapo, supra note 18; Frank J. Vandall, Constructing a Roof Before the
Foundation Is Prepared: The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability Design
Defect, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 261 (1997); Vargo, supra note 3, at 557.
360. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. g.
361. See id.:
[C]onsumer expectations do not play a determinative role in determining
defectiveness. See Comment h. Consumer expectations, standing alone,
do not take into account whether the proposed alternative design could be
implemented at reasonable cost, or whether an alternative design would
provide greater overall safety. Nevertheless, consumer expectations about
product performance and the dangers attendant to product use affect how
risks are perceived and relate to foreseeability and frequency of the risks
of harm, both of which are relevant under Subsection (b). See Comment f.
Such expectations are often influenced by how products are portrayed and
marketed and can have a significant impact on consumer behavior. Thus,
although consumer expectations do not constitute an independent standard
for judging the defectiveness of product designs, they may substantially
influence or even be ultimately determinative on risk-utility balancing in
judging whether the omission of a proposed alternative design renders the
product not reasonably safe.
362.
Subsection (b) likewise rejects conformance to consumer expectations as
a defense. The mere fact that a risk presented by a product design is open
and obvious, or generally known, and that the product thus satisfies expectations, does not prevent a finding that the design is defective. . . .
[W]hile disappointment of consumer expectations may not serve as an independent basis for allowing recovery under Subsection (b), neither may
conformance with consumer expectations serve as an independent basis
for denying recovery. Such expectations may be relevant in both contexts, but in neither are they controlling.
Id.
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C. Special Design Defect Issues
1. Inherently Dangerous Products
While proof of a reasonable alternative design is normally required to
establish a design defect under § 2(b), inherent risks in certain products by
their very nature cannot be designed away. Ordinarily, there can be no recovery for injuries from the “design” of such products because the plaintiff
cannot prove the availability of a reasonable alternative design.363 The
Second Restatement immunized sellers of such products from design defect
liability, listing as examples ordinary sugar (which can cause diabetes), castor
oil (used by Mussolini as an instrument of torture), “good whiskey,” “good
tobacco,” “good butter” (containing cholesterol which can lead to heart attacks), eggs and strawberries (to which some people are allergic), and prescription drugs, such as the Pasteur vaccine for rabies (which sometimes
causes severe adverse reactions).364 The Third Restatement takes a similar
position, providing that “[c]ommon and widely distributed products such as
alcoholic beverages, firearms, and above-ground swimming pools may be
found to be defective” in design only if the plaintiff proves a reasonable alternative design under subsection 2(b).365
Noticeably absent in the Third Restatement from the special list of generically dangerous products protected from judicial scrutiny are tobacco
products (cigarettes, in particular), which just narrowly missed the boat. Yet
“tobacco” was in fact on the list of protected products in the Proposed Final
Draft of the Third Restatement, sandwiched between alcoholic beverages and
firearms. At the final meeting of the American Law Institute on the Third
Restatement, after five years of intense debate over thousands of particulars,
during the closing moments of final discussion a member moved from the
floor to strike “tobacco” from the short list of examples of protected products.
Noting the increasing national crescendo of legal and political attacks against
cigarette manufacturers then in progress, he argued that the American Law
Institute should not go on record as providing favored treatment for this product. The unscheduled motion caught almost everyone by surprise, and, after a
brief debate in which the Reporters explained again that the court decisions to

363. Id. cmt. d.
364. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmts. i, j, and k (1965), discussed in OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW, supra note 13, §§ 6.2, 10.3.
365. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. cmt. d (1998). In the absence of normal proof of a design or other defect, the comment notes that “courts
have not imposed liability for categories of products that are generally available and
widely used and consumed, even if they pose substantial risks of harm. Instead, courts
generally have concluded that legislatures and administrative agencies can, more
appropriately than courts, consider the desirability of commercial distribution of some
categories of widely used and consumed, but nevertheless dangerous, products.” Id.
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date supported leaving tobacco within the protected category,366 the motion to
strike “tobacco” carried by a whisker. Thus, the Restatement (Third) of
Torts: Products Liability takes no explicit position on whether sellers should
be liable for the inherent dangers contained in tobacco products.367
Comment e to § 2 of the Third Restatement addresses the related, controversial issue of whether courts should hold manufacturers liable for selling
products with inherent risks so serious that they may be viewed as possessing
“manifestly unreasonable designs.”368 Such products fortunately now are
rare, but, in former times, lawn darts, highly flammable hula skirts, and similarly hazardous products containing substantial threats to safety but little social utility were no strangers to the market. There is a paucity of cases on the
topic of whether courts should second-guess the market with respect to such
manifestly unreasonable designs,369 but comment e adopts dicta from a small
number of cases suggesting that a manufacturer might properly be subject to
liability for harm from selling a product if “the extremely high degree of danger posed by its use or consumption so substantially outweighs its negligible
social utility that no rational, reasonable person, fully aware of the relevant
facts, would choose to use, or to allow children to use, the product.”370 The
broader issue of products with inherent risks is examined elsewhere in greater
depth.371

2. Obvious Dangers and Misuse
Two major issues of design defectiveness involve whether a product
should be characterized as defectively designed if its dangers are obvious or
result from product misuse and alteration. On these important issues,372 the
Products Liability Restatement follows well-accepted judicial norms. The
obviousness of a danger is relevant to design defectiveness because the ob366. The decisions still consider cigarettes inherently dangerous and so largely
immune from challenge for being defectively designed. See, e.g., Clinton v. Brown &
Williamson Holdings, Inc., 498 F. Supp. 2d 639, 648 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (cigarette
design defect claims are “exactly the type of claim that [the] alternative feasible design requirement was meant to disallow”).
367. For a discussion of issues surrounding products containing inherent risks,
including cigarettes, see OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW, supra note 13, § 10.3.
368. This issue lies closely beside the problem of design defect liability for alcohol, certain types of guns, and cigarettes, but the Restatement segregates those products (except tobacco) in comment d and separately classifies this topic in comment e.
369. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 Reporters’ Note to cmt.
e (1998).
370. Id. § 2 cmt. e.
371. See OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW, supra note 13, §§ 6.2, 10.3.
372. A seller’s liability for obvious dangers is examined in OWEN, PRODUCTS
LIABILITY LAW, supra note 13, § 10.2; the role of product misuse is treated in § 13.5;
and product alteration is treated in § 12.3.
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vious nature of the danger gives warning to persons who confront it so that
they are likely to act to protect themselves.373 But the Third Restatement
summarily rejects the long-discredited patent-danger rule which barred recovery altogether in such cases.374
When people use and abuse products unreasonably and unforeseeably,
courts generally relieve sellers of at least partial responsibility for resulting
harm.375 Products cannot be designed to be perfectly safe for every use, and
so the doctrines of product misuse and alteration provide important limitations on liability for the sale of defective products. In general, manufacturers
and other sellers have no duty to design against unintended uses, misuses, and
alterations that cannot be foreseen, but the converse is also true: sellers must
adopt reasonable design precautions against product uses and abuses that they
reasonably should foresee.376 Further, third-party misuse raises principles of
intervening and superseding causation that may bar liability altogether if a
misuse was unforeseeable,377 and principles of comparative responsibility
generally reduce a manufacturer’s responsibility proportionately to the user’s
fault in putting a product to an improper type or extent of use.378 The Third
Restatement adopts these widespread principles on the role of product alteration and misuse.379

IX. CONCLUSION
In figuring liability for accidents caused by defective products, the issue
of greatest fundamental importance is the concept of design defectiveness.
Challenging a manufacturer’s vision of how its products should be conceived,
the very idea of a design “defect” displays the awesome power of modern
products liability law. Behind design defectiveness lies the premise that law
appropriately may require manufacturers to give fair consideration to product
safety, as well as to a product’s usefulness and cost. Yet fair safety is a much
373. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. d (1998).
374. Id.
375. “Product sellers . . . are not required to foresee and take precautions against
every conceivable mode of use and abuse to which their products might be put. Increasing the costs of designing and marketing products in order to avoid the consequences of unreasonable modes of use is not required.” Id. § 2 cmt. m.
376. See OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW, supra note 13, §§ 12.3, 13.5.
377. See id. § 12.3 (intervening and superseding causation).
378. See id. § 13.5 (misuse).
379. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. m (1998) (foreseeability of risk); id. § 2 cmt. p (misuse, modification, and alteration); id. § 15 (legal
causation); id. § 17 (apportionment of responsibility). Damages apportionment,
treated generally in § 17 as an issue of comparative responsibility, is addressed thoroughly in its own Restatement. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY (2000). On user misconduct defenses generally, see
OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW, supra note 13, ch. 13.
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richer idea than perfect safety, leading courts and legislatures on a perpetual
search, not unlike Diogenes, for the true meaning of a defect in design – of
when particular designs are too dangerous, and when they are safe enough.
Through a variety of windows on the deepest mysteries of products liability, a
study of design defectiveness reveals the aspirations, limits, and pragmatics
of this dynamic field of law.

